812 resultados para Reputation for Toughness


Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This work models the competitive behaviour of individuals who maximize their own utility managing their network of connections with other individuals. Utility is taken as a synonym of reputation in this model. Each agent has to decide between two variables: the quality of connections and the number of connections. Hence, the reputation of an individual is a function of the number and the quality of connections within the network. On the other hand, individuals incur in a cost when they improve their network of contacts. The initial value of the quality and number of connections of each individual is distributed according to an initial (given) distribution. The competition occurs over continuous time and among a continuum of agents. A mean field game approach is adopted to solve the model, leading to an optimal trajectory for the number and quality of connections for each individual.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This study aims to understand children‟s perceptions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives and its effect on the brand, namely Reputation and Identification. Moreover, it analyzes if the use of Cartoons helps to increase these effects. Differences among gender, age and social class, will also be considered. 292 children from the 3rd and 6th grades from 5 schools with different social backgrounds participated in this study. The research made use of a real brand targeting children. Drawings and questionnaires were used as the main research tools. Results suggest that CSR actions have a positive effect on Reputation and Identification and that Cartoons do not lead to greater positive effects.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Business Ethics following peer review. The version of record Neves, P., & Story, J. (2015). Ethical Leadership and Reputation: Combined Indirect Effects on Organizational Deviance. Journal of Business Ethics, 127(1), 165–176. “The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1997-3”.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a l’ Imperial College London, entre juliol i novembre de 2006. En aquest treball s’ha investigat la geometria més apropiada per a la caracterització de la tenacitat a fractura intralaminar de materials compòsits laminats amb teixit. L’objectiu és assegurar la propagació de l’esquerda sense que la proveta falli abans per cap altre mecanisme de dany per tal de permetre la caracterització experimental de la tenacitat a fractura intralaminar de materials compòsits laminats amb teixit. Amb aquesta fi, s’ha dut a terme l’anàlisi paramètrica de diferents tipus de provetes mitjançant el mètode dels elements finits (FE) combinat amb la virtual crack closure technique (VCCT). Les geometries de les provetes analitzades corresponen a la proveta de l’assaig compact tension (CT) i diferents variacions com la extended compact tension (ECT), la proveta widened compact tension (WCT), tapered compact tension (TCT) i doubly-tapered compact tension (2TCT). Com a resultat d’aquestes anàlisis s’han derivat diferents conclusions per obtenir la geometria de proveta més apropiada per a la caracterització de la tenacitat a fractura intralaminar de materials compòsits laminats amb teixit. A més, també s’han dut a terme una sèrie d’assaigs experimentals per tal de validar els resultats de les anàlisis paramètriques. La concordança trobada entre els resultats numèrics i experimentals és bona tot i la presència d’efectes no previstos durant els assaigs experimentals.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

One of the major problems when using non-dedicated volunteer resources in adistributed network is the high volatility of these hosts since they can go offlineor become unavailable at any time without control. Furthermore, the use ofvolunteer resources implies some security issues due to the fact that they aregenerally anonymous entities which we know nothing about. So, how to trustin someone we do not know?.Over the last years an important number of reputation-based trust solutionshave been designed to evaluate the participants' behavior in a system.However, most of these solutions are addressed to P2P and ad-hoc mobilenetworks that may not fit well with other kinds of distributed systems thatcould take advantage of volunteer resources as recent cloud computinginfrastructures.In this paper we propose a first approach to design an anonymous reputationmechanism for CoDeS [1], a middleware for building fogs where deployingservices using volunteer resources. The participants are reputation clients(RC), a reputation authority (RA) and a certification authority (CA). Users needa valid public key certificate from the CA to register to the RA and obtain thedata needed to participate into the system, as now an opaque identifier thatwe call here pseudonym and an initial reputation value that users provide toother users when interacting together. The mechanism prevents not only themanipulation of the provided reputation values but also any disclosure of theusers' identities to any other users or authorities so the anonymity isguaranteed.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This paper studies how firms make layoff decisions in the presence of adverse shocks. In this uncertain environment, workers' expectations about their job security affect their on-the-job performance. This productivity effect on job insecurity forces firms to strike a balance between laying off redundant workers and maintaining survivors' commitment when deciding on the amount and timing of downsizing. This framework offers an explanation of conservative employment practices (such as zero or reduced layoffs) based on firms having private information about their future profits. High retention rates and wages can signal that the firm has a bright future, boosting workers' confidence. Moreover, the model provides clear predictions about when waves of downsizing will occur as opposed to one-time massive cuts.