955 resultados para Relational Epistemology
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Identity is traditionally defined as an emission concept (Kapferer, 2008). Yet, some research points out that there are external factors that that can influence it (Kennedy, 1975; Markwick e Fill, 1997; Balmer e Gray, 2000). This subject is even more interesting if one considers corporate brands. According to Aaker (2004) the number, the power and the credibility of corporate associations are bigger in the case corporate brands. Literature recognizes the influence of relationships between companies in identity management (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989, 1995; Hakansson and Ford, 2002). Yet, given the increasingly important role of corporate brands, it is surprising that to date no attempt to evaluate that influence has been made in corporate brand´s identity management and reputation. Also Keller and Lehman (2006) highlight relationships and costumer experience as two areas requiring more investigation. The authors argue that corporate brand´s identity can be developed under a relational perspective using relationships with other recognised brands in order to generate positive reputations in stakeholders. Based in relationship and corporate brand identity management, a framework is developed to identify how corporate brands select, develop and invest in relationships with other brands. The context of the proposed relationship concept is the services area (Dwyer et al, 1987; Moorman et al, 1992; Rauyruen et al, 2005 and Hennig-Thurau and Klee, 1997). An empirical qualitative research is designed using two reputational technological higher education institutions (two corporate brands) acting in Portuguese public higher education market.
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática
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Modeling Extract-Transform-Load (ETL) processes of a Data Warehousing System has always been a challenge. The heterogeneity of the sources, the quality of the data obtained and the conciliation process are some of the issues that must be addressed in the design phase of this critical component. Commercial ETL tools often provide proprietary diagrammatic components and modeling languages that are not standard, thus not providing the ideal separation between a modeling platform and an execution platform. This separation in conjunction with the use of standard notations and languages is critical in a system that tends to evolve through time and which cannot be undermined by a normally expensive tool that becomes an unsatisfactory component. In this paper we demonstrate the application of Relational Algebra as a modeling language of an ETL system as an effort to standardize operations and provide a basis for uncommon ETL execution platforms.
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The MAP-i Doctoral Programme in Informatics, of the Universities of Minho, Aveiro and Porto
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Tese de Doutoramento em Psicologia Básica
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Propositionalization, Inductive Logic Programming, Multi-Relational Data Mining
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This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk neutral and are subject to limited liability constraints and (ii) where agents are risk averse, have quasi-linear preferences in consumption and actions but where limited liability constraints do not bind. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. In the risk-neutral case, there may be an initial phase in which one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. However, both actions and surplus converge monotonically to a stationary state in which there is no overinvestment and surplus is at its maximum subject to the constraints. In the risk-averse case, there is no overinvestment. For this case, we establish that dynamics may or may not be monotonic depending on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation. If the first-best allocation is not sustainable, then there is a trade-off between risk sharing and surplus maximization. In general, surplus will not be at its constrained maximum even in the long run.
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Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.
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L'objectiu és estudiar les característiques orientades a l'objecte de l'estàndard SQL: 1999 i posar-les a prova amb un producte comercial que les suporti.