Essays on Platforms: Business Strategies, Regulation and Policy in Telecommunications, Media and Technology Industries

The growth of the information economy has been stellar in the last decade. General-purpose technologies such as the computer and the Internet have promoted productivity growth in a large number of industries. The effect on telecommunications, media and technology industries has been particularly strong. These industries include mobile telecommunications, printing and publishing, broadcasting, software, hardware and Internet services. There have been large structural changes, which have led to new questions on business strategies, regulation and policy. This thesis focuses on four such questions and answers them by extending the theoretical literature on platforms. The questions (with short answers) are: (i) Do we need to regulate how Internet service providers discriminate between content providers? (Yes.) (ii) What are the welfare effects of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements from advertisement-supported products?(Ambiguous, but those watching ads are worse off.) (iii) Why are some markets characterized by open platforms, extendable by third parties, and some by closed platforms, which are not extendable? (It is a trade-off between intensified competition for consumers and benefits from third parties) (iv) Do private platform providers allow third parties to access their platform when it is socially desirable? (No.)

Is the Current Regulation of the VIII Division European Anchovy Optimal?

This paper sets out to assess the workability of the regulation currently in force in the European anchovy fishery of the VIII division. Particular attention is paid to the importance of the institutional regime in the allocation of natural resources. The study uses a bio-economic approach and takes into account the fact that, not only the European Union and the individual countries involved, but also some of the resource users or appropriators intervene in its management. In order to compare the effectiveness of the rules which, at the various levels, have been set up to restrict exploitation of the resource, the anchovy fishery is simulated in two extreme situations: open access and sole ownership. The results obtained by effective management will then be contrasted with those obtained from the maximum and zero profit objectives related with the two above-mentioned scenarios. Thus, if the real data come close to those derived from the sole ownership model it will have to be acknowledged that the rules at present in force are optimal. If, on the other hand, the situation more closely approach the results obtained from the open access model, we will endeavour in our conclusions to provide suggestions for economic policy measures that might improve the situation in the fishery.

Indexed Regulation

Seminal work by Weitzman (1974) revealed prices are preferred to quantities when marginal benefits are relatively flat compared to marginal costs. We extend this comparison to indexed policies, where quantities are proportional to an index, such as output. We find that policy preferences hinge on additional parameters describing the first and second moments of the index and the ex post optimal quantity level. When the ratio of these variables' coefficients of variation divided by their correlation is less than approximately two, indexed quantities are preferred to fixed quantities. A slightly more complex condition determines when indexed quantities are preferred to prices. Applied to climate change policy, we find that the range of variation and correlation in country-level carbon dioxide emissions and GDP suggests the ranking of an emissions intensity cap (indexed to GDP) compared to a fixed emission cap is not uniform across countries; neither policy clearly dominates the other.

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Liquidity, institutional ownership and regulation fair disclosure

There is a body of academic literature addressing two issues of importance for leveling the playing field for all classes of investors: 1) the impact of institutional investors on liquidity; and 2) the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on institutional investors and liquidity. Our study addresses both issues with the purpose of attaining a better understanding and explanation of this relationship. We classify institutional ownership according to Bushee's (1998, 2001) methodology; transient institutions, dedicated institutions and quasi-indexers. Our results indicate that while transient institutions and quasi-indexers have a positive impact on liquidity, dedicated institutional ownership is negatively associated with liquidity. This result is consistent with prior theoretical studies. We also find that the effectiveness ofthe Regulation Fair Disclosure in improving liquidity is limited to firms with higher transient institutional ownership, whereas quasi-indexed institutions have not been significantly affected by the regulations. In fact, the liquidity of firms is lower for firms with higher dedicated institutional holdings, which is evidence of the "chilling effect".

Simulating the impact of regulation changes on the market for prostitution services

The paper draws on recent research on the economics of prostitution focussing on the role of stigma in shaping the interaction between demand and supply and the resulting sub-markets in which this activity is typically organised. Here we extend the framework to consider the role of reputation and stigma in determining policy decisions regarding the regulation of prostitution and show how sub-optimal outcomes (from the point of view of the welfare of sex workers) may prevail.

On the regulation of spatial externalities: coexistence between GM and conventional crops in the EU and the 'newcomer principle'

Pollen-mediated gene flow is one of the main concerns associated with the introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops. Should a premium for non-GM varieties emerge on the market, ‘contamination’ by GM pollen would generate a revenue loss for growers of non-GM varieties. This paper analyses the problem of pollen-mediated gene flow as a particular type of production externality. The model, although simple, provides useful insights into coexistence policies. Following on from this and taking GM herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape (Brassica napus) as a model crop, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate data and then estimate the effect of several important policy variables (including width of buffer zones and spatial aggregation) on the magnitude of the externality associated with pollen-mediated gene flow.

Essays on labour market dualisation in Western Europe: active labour market policies, temporary work regulation and inequality

European labour markets are increasingly divided between insiders in full-time permanent employment and outsiders in precarious work or unemployment. Using quantitative as well as qualitative methods, this thesis investigates the determinants and consequences of labour market policies that target these outsiders in three separate papers. The first paper looks at Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) that target the unemployed. It shows that left and right-wing parties choose different types of ALMPs depending on the policy and the welfare regime in which the party is located. These findings reconcile the conflicting theoretical expectations from the Power Resource approach and the insider-outsider theory. The second paper considers the regulation and protection of the temporary work sector. It solves the puzzle of temporary re-regulation in France, which contrasts with most other European countries that have deregulated temporary work. Permanent workers are adversely affected by the expansion of temporary work in France because of general skills and low wage coordination. The interests of temporary and permanent workers for re-regulation therefore overlap in France and left governments have an incentive to re-regulate the sector. The third paper then investigates what determines inequality between median and bottom income workers. It shows that non-inclusive economic coordination increases inequality in the absence of compensating institutions such as minimum wage regulation. The deregulation of temporary work as well as spending on employment incentives and rehabilitation also has adverse effects on inequality. Thus, policies that target outsiders have important economic effects on the rest of the workforce. Three broader contributions can be identified. First, welfare state policies may not always be in the interests of labour, so left parties may not always promote them. Second, the interests of insiders and outsiders are not necessarily at odds. Third, economic coordination may not be conducive to egalitarianism where it is not inclusive.

Administrative costs of regulation and foreign direct investment: evidence from Standard Cost Model implementation in non-OECD countries

In recent years both developed and developing countries have experienced an increasing number of government initiatives dedicated to reducing the administrative costs (AC) imposed on businesses by regulation. We use a bi-linear fixed-effects model to analyze the extent to which government initiatives to reduce AC through the Standard Cost Model (SCM) attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among 32 developing countries. Controlling for standard determinants of the SCM, we find that the SCM in most cases leads to higher FDI and that the benefits are more significant where the SCM has been implemented for a longer period.

Determinants of biosecurity behaviour of British cattle and sheep farmers: a behavioural economics analysis

The paper analyses the impact of a priori determinants of biosecurity behaviour of farmers in Great Britain. We use a dataset collected through a stratified telephone survey of 900 cattle and sheep farmers in Great Britain (400 in England and a further 250 in Wales and Scotland respectively) which took place between 25 March 2010 and 18 June 2010. The survey was stratified by farm type, farm size and region. To test the influence of a priori determinants on biosecurity behaviour we used a behavioural economics method, structural equation modelling (SEM) with observed and latent variables. SEM is a statistical technique for testing and estimating causal relationships amongst variables, some of which may be latent using a combination of statistical data and qualitative causal assumptions. Thirteen latent variables were identified and extracted, expressing the behaviour and the underlying determining factors. The variables were: experience, economic factors, organic certification of farm, membership in a cattle/sheep health scheme, perceived usefulness of biosecurity information sources, knowledge about biosecurity measures, perceived importance of specific biosecurity strategies, perceived effect (on farm business in the past five years) of welfare/health regulation, perceived effect of severe outbreaks of animal diseases, attitudes towards livestock biosecurity, attitudes towards animal welfare, influence on decision to apply biosecurity measures and biosecurity behaviour. The SEM model applied on the Great Britain sample has an adequate fit according to the measures of absolute, incremental and parsimonious fit. The results suggest that farmers’ perceived importance of specific biosecurity strategies, organic certification of farm, knowledge about biosecurity measures, attitudes towards animal welfare, perceived usefulness of biosecurity information sources, perceived effect on business during the past five years of severe outbreaks of animal diseases, membership in a cattle/sheep health scheme, attitudes towards livestock biosecurity, influence on decision to apply biosecurity measures, experience and economic factors are significantly influencing behaviour (overall explaining 64% of the variance in behaviour).

Insuring cleaner oceans: the economics of oil pollution prevention

The current system of controlling oil spills involves a complex relationship of international, federal and state law, which has not proven to be very effective. The multiple layers of regulation often leave shipowners unsure of the laws facing them. Furthemore, nations have had difficulty enforcing these legal requirements. This thesis deals with the role marine insurance can play within the existing system of legislation to provide a strong preventative influence that is simple and cost-effective to enforce. In principle, insurance has two ways of enforcing higher safety standards and limiting the risk of an accident occurring. The first is through the use of insurance premiums that are based on the level of care taken by the insured. This means that a person engaging in riskier behavior faces a higher insurance premium, because their actions increase the probability of an accident occurring. The second method, available to the insurer, is collectively known as cancellation provisions or underwriting clauses. These are clauses written into an insurance contract that invalidates the agreement when certain conditions are not met by the insured The problem has been that obtaining information about the behavior of an insured party requires monitoring and that incurs a cost to the insurer. The application of these principles proves to be a more complicated matter. The modern marine insurance industry is a complicated system of multiple contracts, through different insurers, that covers the many facets of oil transportation. Their business practices have resulted in policy packages that cross the neat bounds of individual, specific insurance coverage. This paper shows that insurance can improve safety standards in three general areas -crew training, hull and equipment construction and maintenance, and routing schemes and exclusionary zones. With crew, hull and equipment, underwriting clauses can be used to ensure that minimum standards are met by the insured. Premiums can then be structured to reflect the additional care taken by the insured above and beyond these minimum standards. Routing schemes are traffic flow systems applied to congested waterways, such as the entrance to New York harbor. Using natural obstacles or manmade dividers, ships are separated into two lanes of opposing traffic, similar to a road. Exclusionary zones are marine areas designated off limits to tanker traffic either because of a sensitive ecosystem or because local knowledge is required of the region to ensure safe navigation. Underwriting clauses can be used to nullify an insurance contract when a tanker is not in compliance with established exclusionary zones or routing schemes.