Legal Ontologies for Public Procurement Management

The thesis explores ways to formalize the legal knowledge concerning the public procurement domain by means of ontological patterns suitable, on one hand, to support awarding authorities in conducting procurement procedures and, on the other hand, to help citizens and economic operators in accessing procurement's notices and data. Such an investigation on the making up of conceptual models for the public procurement domain, in turn, inspires and motivates a reflection on the role of legal ontologies nowadays, as in the past, retracing the steps of the ``ontological legal thinking'' from Roman Law up to now. I try, at the same time, to forecast the impact, in terms of benefits, challenges and critical issues, of the application of computational models of Law in future e-Governance scenarios.

Protecting Tropical Forests through Public Procurement of Emission Reductions

The rate of destruction of tropical forests continues to accelerate at an alarming rate contributing to an important fraction of overall greenhouse gas emissions. In recent years, much hope has been vested in the emerging REDD+ framework under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which aims at creating an international incentive system to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. This paper argues that in the absence of an international consensus on the design of results-based payments, “bottom-up” initiatives should take the lead and explore new avenues. It suggests that a call for tender for REDD+ credits might both assist in leveraging private investments and spending scarce public funds in a cost-efficient manner. The paper discusses the pros and cons of results-based approaches, provides an overview of the goals and principles that govern public procurement and discusses their relevance for the purchase of REDD+ credits, in particular within the ambit of the European Union.

Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is linear and contains an incentive mechanism to enhance the effort of the agent to reduce construction costs. A theoretical model is proposed starting from a cost function with a random component and assuming that both the public authority and the firm are risk averse. The main outcome of the paper is that the optimal transfer of construction risk will be lower when the variance of errors in cost forecast, the risk aversion of the firm and the marginal cost of public funds are larger, while the optimal transfer of construction risk will grow when the variance of errors in cost monitoring and the risk aversion of the public authority are larger

Public Procurement Law and Health care: From Theory to Practice. Research Paper in Law, 2/2010

From the Introduction. This contribution will focus on the core question if, how and to what extent the EU procurement rules and principles (may) affect the national health care systems. We start our analysis by summarizing the applicable EU public procurement legislation, principles and soft law and its exact scope in relation to health care. (section 2). Subsequently, we turn to the parties in a contract, subject to procurement rules in the field of health care, addressing both the definition of contracting authorities and relevant case law (section 3). This will then lead to an analysis of possible justifications for not holding a tender procedure in the field of health care (section 4). Finally, we illustrate the impact of EU public procurement rules on health care by analysing a Dutch case study, in which the question whether public hospitals in the Netherlands qualify as contracting authorities in terms of the Public Sector Directive stood central (section 5). Our conclusions will follow in section 6.