Global Production, CSR and Human Rights: The Courts of Public Opinion and the Social License to Operate

This paper takes at its starting point the responsibility placed upon corporations by the United Nations’ Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework as elaborated upon by the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to respect human rights. The overt pragmatism and knowledge of the complex business relationships that are embedded in global production led John Ruggie, the author of the Framework, to adopt a structure for the relationship between human rights and business that built on the existing practices of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). His intention was that these practices should be developed to embrace respect for human rights by exhorting corporations to move from “the era of declaratory CSR” to showing a demonstrable policy commitment to respect for human rights. The prime motivation for corporations to do this was, according to Ruggie, because the responsibility to respect was one that would be guarded and judged by the “courts of public opinion” as part of the social expectations imposed upon corporations or to put it another way as a condition of a corporation’s social license to operate.
This article sets out the background context to the Framework and examines the structures that it puts forward. In its third and final section the article looks at how the Framework requires a corporation’s social license to be assembled and how and by whom that social license will be judged. The success or failure of the Framework in persuading corporations to respect human rights is tied to whether “the courts of public opinion” can use their “naming and shaming power” effectively.

Media coverage outside the courtroom : public opinion of restrictions imposed on news journalists and psychological effects on crime victims

Comme les études sur la couverture médiatique ont démontré qu’elle influence pratiquement toute personne qu’elle touche, des consommateurs aux jurés aux témoins, les deux études de cette thèse doctorale ont respectivement examiné l’opinion du public sur l’imposition de restrictions sur les médias dans les palais des justices et l’impact de la couverture médiatique sur la santé mentale des victimes de crime. Le gouvernement québécois a récemment introduit des restrictions sur les médias dans les palais de justice afin de minimiser l’influence des journalistes et des caméramans. Bien que l’affaire a atteint la Cour suprême du Canada, une étude préliminaire a trouvé que le public est largement favorable à ces restrictions (Sabourin, 2006). La première partie de cette thèse doctorale cherchait à approfondir ce sujet avec un échantillon plus représentatif de la population. Deux cent quarante-trois participants comprenant six groupes expérimentaux ont rempli des questionnaires mesurant leur opinion de ces restrictions. Les participants ont été divisé en deux conditions expérimentales où ils ont visionné soit des clips audiovisuels démontrant une atmosphère de débordement dans des palais de justice ou des clips plutôt calmes. Un troisième groupe n’a visionné aucun clip audiovisuel. De plus, il y avait deux versions du questionnaire ayant 20 items où les questions ont été présenté en sens inverse. L’étude a trouvé qu’une grande majorité des participants, soit presque 79 pourcent, ont supporté la restriction des médias dans les palais de justice. Il est intéressant de noter qu’un des groupes n’a pas supporté les restrictions – le groupe contrôle qui a lu les énoncés supportant l’absence des restrictions en premier. La deuxième composante de cette thèse doctorale a examiné l’impact des médias sur les victimes de crime. De nombreuses études expérimentales ont démontré que les victimes de crime sont particulièrement susceptibles à des problèmes de santé mentale. En effet, elles ont trois fois plus de chances de développer un trouble de stress post-traumatique (TSPT) que la population générale. Une étude a confirmé cette conclusion et a trouvé que les victimes de crimes qui avaient une impression plutôt négative de leur couverture médiatique avaient les taux les plus élévés de TSPT (Maercker & Mehr, 2006). Dans l’étude actuelle, vingt-trois victimes de crimes ont été interviewé en utilisant une technique narrative et ont complété deux questionnaires mésurant leur symptômes du TSPT et d’anxiété, respectivement. Une grande proportion des participantes avaient des symptômes de santé mentale et des scores élévés sur une échelle évaluant les symptômes du TSPT. La majorité des narratives des participants étaient négatives. Les thèmes les plus communs incluent dans ces narratives étaient l’autoculpabilisation et une méfiance des autres. La couverture médiatique ne semblaient pas être liée à des symptômes de santé mentale, quoique des facteurs individuels pourraient expliquer pourquoi certains participants ont été favorables envers leur couverture médiatique et d’autres ne l’été pas. Les résultats de ces deux études suggèrent que le public approuve la restriction des médias dans les palais de justice et que des facteurs individuels pourraient expliqués comment la couverture médiatique affecte les victimes de crime. Ces résultats ajoutent à la littérature qui questionne les pratiques actuelles qu’utilisent les médias.

Public Opinion and Global Justice

The concept of global justice has been developed to stress the worldwide implications of moral problems. Not much, however, has been written about the actual politics of global justice. This article focuses on public opinion and argues that attitudes about international redistribution are not a simple projection of attitudes about the domestic situation. In countries where domestic income redistribution is seen as an important priority, foreign aid is less popular; where this is less so, there is more concern for the fate of the poor in the South. Far from reflecting a lack of coherence in public opinion, these counterintuitive results need to be understood in connection with policy achievements in donor countries. The authors' empirical findings suggest that although the commitment to redistribute is stronger at the national level, relationships of solidarity do not stop at national boundaries. The achievement of justice at home in fact sustains justice abroad.

Vox Populi, Vox Dei? A closer look at the ‘public opinion’ argument for retention

The Japanese government’s justification for retaining the death penalty is that abolition would erode the legitimacy of and public trust in the criminal justice system, leading to victims’ families taking justice into their own hands. This justification is based on the results of a regularly administered public opinion survey, which is said to show strong public support for the death penalty. However, a close analysis of the results of the 2014 survey fails to validate this claim. Just over a third of respondents were committed to retaining the death penalty at all costs, while the rest accepted the possibility of future abolition, with some of them seeing this as contingent on the introduction of life imprisonment without parole as an alternative sentence. These findings hardly describe a society that expects the strict application of the death penalty and whose trust in justice depends on the government’s commitment to retaining it. My reading of the 2014 survey is that the Japanese public is ready to embrace abolition. Japan, after all, is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which calls on states not to delay or prevent abolition, so this should be welcome news for the Japanese government!

世論という神話―望むのは「死刑」ですか？’ (Public opinion myth: is ‘death’ what we really want?)

This paper summarises Mai Sato's recent report on public attitudes to the death penalty in Japan.

The state under scrutiny: public opinion, stateness and government performance in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

Political Depolarization in German Public Opinion, 1980–2010

Little is known about political polarization in German public opinion. This article offers an issue-based perspective and explores trends of opinion polarization in Germany. Public opinion polarization is conceptualized and measured as alignment of attitudes. Data from the German General Social Survey (1980 to 2010) comprise attitudes towards manifold issues, which are classified into several dimensions. This study estimates multilevel models that reveal general and issue- as well as dimension-specific levels and trends in attitude alignment for both the whole German population and sub-groups. It finds that public opinion polarization has decreased over the last three decades in Germany. In particular, highly educated and more politically interested people have become less polarized over time. However, polarization seems to have increased in attitudes regarding gender issues. These findings provide interesting contrasts to existing research on the American public.