International public goods through integrated natural resources management research in CGIAR partnerships

The CGIAR System conducts research to produce international public goods (IPG) that are of wide applicability creating a scientific base which speeds and broadens local adaptive development. Integrated natural resources management (INRM) research is sometimes seen to be very location specific and consequently does not lend itself readily to the production of IPGs. In this paper we analyse ways in which strategic approaches to INRM research can have broad international applicability and serve as useful foundations for the development of locally adapted technologies. The paper describes the evolution of the IPG concept within the CGIAR and elaborates on five major types of IPGs that have been generated from a varied set of recent INRM research efforts. CGIAR networks have both strengths and weaknesses in INRM research and application, with enormous differences in relative research and development capacities, responsibilities and data access of its partners, making programme process evolution critical to acceptance and participation. Many of the lessons learnt regarding challenges and corresponding IPG research approaches are relevant to designing and managing future multi-scale, multi-locational, coordinated INRM programmes involving broad-based partnerships to address complex environmental and livelihood problems for development.

The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions

In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model.

Interpersonal interaction and economic theory: the case of public goods

Interpersonal interaction in public goods contexts is very different in character to its depiction in economic theory, despite the fact that the standard model is based on a small number of apparently plausible assumptions. Approaches to the problem are reviewed both from within and outside economics. It is argued that quick fixes such as a taste for giving do not provide a way forward. An improved understanding of why people contribute to such goods seems to require a different picture of the relationships between individuals than obtains in standard microeconomic theory, where they are usually depicted as asocial. No single economic model at present is consistent with all the relevant field and laboratory data. It is argued that there are defensible ideas from outside the discipline which ought to be explored, relying on different conceptions of rationality and/or more radically social agents. Three such suggestions are considered, one concerning the expressive/communicative aspect of behaviour, a second the possibility of a part-whole relationship between interacting agents and the third a version of conformism.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).

The social evolution of dispersal with public goods cooperation

Selection can favour the evolution of individually costly dispersal if this alleviates competition between relatives. However, conditions that favour altruistic dispersal also mediate selection for other social behaviours, such as public goods cooperation, which in turn is likely to mediate dispersal evolution. Here, we investigate – both experimentally (using bacteria) and theoretically – how social habitat heterogeneity (i.e. the distribution of public goods cooperators and cheats) affects the evolution of dispersal. In addition to recovering the well-known theoretical result that the optimal level of dispersal increases with genetic relatedness of patch mates, we find both mathematically and experimentally that dispersal is always favoured when average patch occupancy is low, but when average patch occupancy is high, the presence of public goods cheats greatly alters selection for dispersal. Specifically, when public goods cheats are localized to the home patch, higher dispersal rates are favoured, but when cheats are present throughout available patches, lower dispersal rates are favoured. These results highlight the importance of other social traits in driving dispersal evolution.

Welfare and fiscal policy with public goods and infrastructure

We construct and simulate a model to study the welfare and macroeconomic impact of government actions when its productive role is taken into account. The trade-off between public investment and public consumption is also investigated, since public consumption is introduced as a public good that directly affects individuals' well-being. Our results replicate econometric evidence showing that part of the observed slowdown of U.S. productivity growth can be explained by the reduction of investment in infrastructure which also implied a sizable welfare 1085 to the popu1ation. Depending on the methodology used we found a welfare cost ranging from 4.2% to 1.16% of GNP. The impact of fiscal policy can be qualitative and quantitative distinct depending on Whether we assume a higher or smaller output elasticity to infrastructure. If it is high enough, increases in tax rates may stimulate accumulation and production, which is the opposite prediction of standard ncocJassica1 models.

Municipalities secession and uncertainty on public goods provision

This paper investigates the causes of municipalities secession in Brazil. The theoretical model proposes that the median voter is not fully informed about the efficiency effect of secession on public good provision and uses the break up decision undertaken by neighbor’s municipalities within the state to account for his voting. Our empirical results confirms that prediction

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.

External control of the public water supply in 29 Brazilian cities

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Use of the HDS system (hydric depuration with soils) associated to other constructed wetlands techniques for public water supply

Two projects of water treatment for public water supply were developed and operated by using combined systems of constructed wetlands. One of the projects was carried out in the town of Analandia, Sao Paulo, Brazil and wetlands with floating aquatic plants associated to the HDS system were used. Nearly 6480 inhabitants were supplied. The other conducted project was an experimental station in partnership with SABESP (Sao Paulo State Sanitation Agency/Brazil), for the pretreatment of 1700 l.s-1 of waters from the Cotia River, which is used for the population's supply after conventional treatment at the Lower Cotia Water Treatment Station. For this pilot project, wetlands with emergents and floating plants associated to the HDS system were used. The proposed objectives were achieved in both projects.

Performance of constructed wetland system for public water supply

The project is being conducted in the town of Analândia, São Paulo, Brazil. The constructed wetlands system for water supply consists of a channel with floating aquatic macrophytes, HDS system (Water Decontamination with Soil - Patent PI 850.3030), chlorinating system, filtering system and distribution. The project objectives include investigating the process variables to further optimize design and operation factors, evaluating the relation of nutrients and plants development, biomass production, shoot development, nutrient cycling and total and fecal coliforms removal, comparing the treatment efficiency among the seasons of the year; and moreover to compare the average values obtained between February and June 1998 (Salati et al., 1998) with the average obtained for the same parameters between March and June 2000. Studies have been developed in order to verify during one year the drinking quality of the water for the following parameters: turbidity, color, pH, dissolved oxygen, total of dissolved solids, COD, chloride, among others, according to the Ministry of Health's Regulation 36. This system of water supply projected to treat 15 L s-1 has been in continuous operation for 2 years, it was implemented with support of the National Environment Fund (FNMA), administered by the Center of Environmental Studies (CEA-UNESP), while the technical supervision and design were performed by the Institute of Applied Ecology. The actual research project is being supported by FAPESP.