Going twice to the polls?: Optimality of two-stage voting procedures

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Approval voting ion dichotomous preferences

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

Voting by committees under constraints

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Weighted approval voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

The 2004 election in Spain: terrorism, accountability, and voting

In this paper the electoral consequences of the Islamist terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004 are analysed. According to a quantitative analysis based on a post-electoral survey, we show the causal mechanisms that transform voters’ reactions to the bombings into a particular electoral behaviour and estimate their relevance in the electoral results on March 14, 2004

The fourth extracellular loop of the alpha subunit of Na,K-ATPase. Functional evidence for close proximity with the second extracellular loop.

Na,K-ATPase is the main active transport system that maintains the large gradients of Na(+) and K(+) across the plasma membrane of animal cells. The crystal structure of a K(+)-occluding conformation of this protein has been recently published, but the movements of its different domains allowing for the cation pumping mechanism are not yet known. The structure of many more conformations is known for the related calcium ATPase SERCA, but the reliability of homology modeling is poor for several domains with low sequence identity, in particular the extracellular loops. To better define the structure of the large fourth extracellular loop between the seventh and eighth transmembrane segments of the alpha subunit, we have studied the formation of a disulfide bond between pairs of cysteine residues introduced by site-directed mutagenesis in the second and the fourth extracellular loop. We found a specific pair of cysteine positions (Y308C and D884C) for which extracellular treatment with an oxidizing agent inhibited the Na,K pump function, which could be rapidly restored by a reducing agent. The formation of the disulfide bond occurred preferentially under the E2-P conformation of Na,K-ATPase, in the absence of extracellular cations. Using recently published crystal structure and a distance constraint reproducing the existence of disulfide bond, we performed an extensive conformational space search using simulated annealing and showed that the Tyr(308) and Asp(884) residues can be in close proximity, and simultaneously, the SYGQ motif of the fourth extracellular loop, known to interact with the extracellular domain of the beta subunit, can be exposed to the exterior of the protein and can easily interact with the beta subunit.

From e-voting to smart-voting : e-Tools in and for elections and direct democracy in Switzerland

To what extent do and could e-tools contribute to a democracy like Switzerland? This paper puts forward experiences and visions concerning the application of e-tools for the most traditional democratic processes- elections and, of special importance in Switzerland, direct-democratic votes.Having the particular voting behaviour of the Swiss electorate in mind (low voter turnout - especially among the youngest age group, low political knowledge, etc.) we believe that e-tools which provide information in the forefront of elections or direct-democratic votes offer an enormous service to the voter. As soon as e-voting will be possible in Switzerland (as planned by the government), those e-tools for gathering information online will become indispensable and will gain power enormously. Therefore political scientists should not only focus on potential effects of e-voting itself but rather on the combination of (connected)e-tools of the pre-voting and the voting sphere. In the case of Switzerland, we argue in this paper, the offer of VAAs such as smartvote for elections and direct-democratic votes can provide the voter with more balanced and qualitatively higher information and thereby make a valuable contribution to the Swiss democracy.

Proximity-dependent pollen performance in Silene vulgaris.

BACKGROUND AND AIMS: Pollen and seed dispersal in herbaceous insect-pollinated plants are often restricted, inducing strong population structure. To what extent this influences mating within and among patches is poorly understood. This study investigates the influence of population structure on pollen performance using controlled pollinations and genetic markers. METHODS: Population structure was investigated in a patchily distributed population of gynodioecious Silene vulgaris in Switzerland using polymorphic microsatellite markers. Experimental pollinations were performed on 21 hermaphrodite recipients using pollen donors at three spatial scales: (a) self-pollination; (b) within-patch cross-pollinations; and (c) between-patch cross-pollinations. Pollen performance was then compared with respect to crossing distance. KEY RESULTS: The population of S. vulgaris was characterized by a high degree of genetic sub-structure, with neighbouring plants more related to one another than to distant individuals. Inbreeding probably results from both selfing and biparental inbreeding. Pollen performance increased with distance between mates. Between-patch pollen performed significantly better than both self- and within-patch pollen donors. However, no significant difference was detected between self- and within-patch pollen donors. CONCLUSIONS: The results suggest that population structure in animal-pollinated plants is likely to influence mating patterns by favouring cross-pollinations between unrelated plants. However, the extent to which this mechanism could be effective as a pre-zygotic barrier preventing inbred mating depends on the patterns of pollinator foraging and their influence on pollen dispersal.

Social capital formation across space: proximity and trust in European regions

An extensive economics and regional science literature has discussed the importance of social capital for economic growth and development. Yet, what social capital is and how it is formed are elusive issues, which require further investigation. Here, we refer to social capital in terms of civic capital and good culture , as rephrased by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) and Tabellini (2010). The accumulation of this kind of capital allows the emerging of regional informal institutions, which may help explaining diff erences in regional development. In this paper, we take a regional perspective and use exploratory space and space-time methods to assess whether geography, via proximity, contributes to the formation of social capital across European regions. In particular, we ask whether generalized trust, a fundamental constituent of social capital and an ingredient of economic development, tends to be clustered across space and over time. From the policy standpoint, the spatial hysteresis of regional trust may contribute to the formation of spatial traps of social capital and act as a further barrier to regional economic development and convergence.