On the question of proportionality of the count of observed Scrapie cases and the size of holding

Background: The present paper investigates the question of a suitable basic model for the number of scrapie cases in a holding and applications of this knowledge to the estimation of scrapie-ffected holding population sizes and adequacy of control measures within holding. Is the number of scrapie cases proportional to the size of the holding in which case it should be incorporated into the parameter of the error distribution for the scrapie counts? Or, is there a different - potentially more complex - relationship between case count and holding size in which case the information about the size of the holding should be better incorporated as a covariate in the modeling? Methods: We show that this question can be appropriately addressed via a simple zero-truncated Poisson model in which the hypothesis of proportionality enters as a special offset-model. Model comparisons can be achieved by means of likelihood ratio testing. The procedure is illustrated by means of surveillance data on classical scrapie in Great Britain. Furthermore, the model with the best fit is used to estimate the size of the scrapie-affected holding population in Great Britain by means of two capture-recapture estimators: the Poisson estimator and the generalized Zelterman estimator. Results: No evidence could be found for the hypothesis of proportionality. In fact, there is some evidence that this relationship follows a curved line which increases for small holdings up to a maximum after which it declines again. Furthermore, it is pointed out how crucial the correct model choice is when applied to capture-recapture estimation on the basis of zero-truncated Poisson models as well as on the basis of the generalized Zelterman estimator. Estimators based on the proportionality model return very different and unreasonable estimates for the population sizes. Conclusion: Our results stress the importance of an adequate modelling approach to the association between holding size and the number of cases of classical scrapie within holding. Reporting artefacts and speculative biological effects are hypothesized as the underlying causes of the observed curved relationship. The lack of adjustment for these artefacts might well render ineffective the current strategies for the control of the disease.

The proportionality of global warming to cumulative carbon emissions

The global temperature response to increasing atmospheric CO2 is often quantified by metrics such as equilibrium climate sensitivity and transient climate response1. These approaches, however, do not account for carbon cycle feedbacks and therefore do not fully represent the net response of the Earth system to anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Climate–carbon modelling experiments have shown that: (1) the warming per unit CO2 emitted does not depend on the background CO2 concentration2; (2) the total allowable emissions for climate stabilization do not depend on the timing of those emissions3, 4, 5; and (3) the temperature response to a pulse of CO2 is approximately constant on timescales of decades to centuries3, 6, 7, 8. Here we generalize these results and show that the carbon–climate response (CCR), defined as the ratio of temperature change to cumulative carbon emissions, is approximately independent of both the atmospheric CO2 concentration and its rate of change on these timescales. From observational constraints, we estimate CCR to be in the range 1.0–2.1 °C per trillion tonnes of carbon (Tt C) emitted (5th to 95th percentiles), consistent with twenty-first-century CCR values simulated by climate–carbon models. Uncertainty in land-use CO2 emissions and aerosol forcing, however, means that higher observationally constrained values cannot be excluded. The CCR, when evaluated from climate–carbon models under idealized conditions, represents a simple yet robust metric for comparing models, which aggregates both climate feedbacks and carbon cycle feedbacks. CCR is also likely to be a useful concept for climate change mitigation and policy; by combining the uncertainties associated with climate sensitivity, carbon sinks and climate–carbon feedbacks into a single quantity, the CCR allows CO2-induced global mean temperature change to be inferred directly from cumulative carbon emissions.

Do soldiers' lives matter? A view from proportionality

A military operation is about to take place during an ongoing international armed conflict; it can be carried out either by aerial attack, which is expected to cause the deaths of enemy civilians, or by using ground troops, which is expected to cause the deaths of fewer enemy civilians but is expected to result in more deaths of compatriot soldiers. Does the principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law impose a duty on an attacker to expose its soldiers to life-threatening risks in order to minimise or avert risks of incidental damage to enemy civilians? If such a duty exists, is it absolute or qualified? And if it is a qualified duty, what considerations may be taken into account in determining its character and scope? This article presents an analytic framework under the current international humanitarian law (IHL) legal structure, following a proportionality analysis. The proposed framework identifies five main positions for addressing the above queries. The five positions are arranged along two ‘axes’: a value ‘axis’, which identifies the value assigned to the lives of compatriot soldiers in relation to lives of enemy civilians; and a justification ‘axis’, which outlines the justificatory bases for assigning certain values to lives of compatriot soldiers and enemy civilians: intrinsic, instrumental or a combination thereof. The article critically assesses these positions, and favours a position which attributes a value to compatriot soldiers’ lives, premised on a justificatory basis which marries intrinsic considerations with circumscribed instrumental considerations, avoiding the indeterminacy and normative questionability entailed by more expansive instrumental considerations.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

Giving content to the principle of proportionality: happiness and pain as the universal currency for matching offence seriousness and penalty severity

The principle of proportionality prescribes that the punishment should equal the crime. It is one of the most important principles of sentencing. Yet, despite its widespread acceptance it offers no meaningful guide to sentencing. Hence penalty levels fluctuate greatly between jurisdictions and within jurisdictions. This is because there is no universally agreed criterion for measuring offence seriousness or penalty severity. This article suggests that the appropriate criteria for matching offence seriousness and penalty severity is the level of unhappiness or pain stemming from each of these impositions. Thus, for example, the level of pain meted out to a rape offender should equal the level of pain caused to a rape victim. Emerging scientific studies on human well-being and happiness show that human beings are similarly built in terms of the experiences that are either conducive or inimical to well-being. This commonality provides a strong foundation to be confident to make reasonably accurate predictions concerning the extent to which adverse events, such as being the victim of a criminal offence or subjected to a form of criminal sanction will stifle human flourishing. This will then allow us to match accurately offence seriousness and penalty level.

Injecting content into the mirage that is proportionality in sentencing

Sentencing involves the deliberate infliction of harm by society on individuals. It is the most coercive means through which the community imposes its collective (albeit civilised) displeasure at harmful conduct. It is an important and complex process, which involves balancing fundamental interests of victims and the community on the one hand and offenders on the other. The single most important determinant in setting criminal sanctions is the principle of proportionality, which provides that the harshness of the penalty should match the seriousness of the offence. The principle is intuitively appealing but in reality is an illusion, and hence the reason why penalties for criminal offences vary enormously within and across jurisdictions. The main reason is because there is no agreement regarding the considerations that inform offence severity or sanction hardship. This article injects content into the proportionality principle by suggesting that both limbs of the principle should be informed by the extent to which the crime and the sanction set back the well-being of victims and offenders, respectively. These interests are not conclusively mapped. However, a methodology is set out for establishing these interests. This will lead to greater consistency in sentencing and provide a sounder, normative foundation for the manner in which society deals with criminals.

Proportionality in sentencing: the need to factor in community experience, not public opinion

This is the first book to address the question of what role public opinion should play in the way criminal offenders are punished.Should public opinion determine—or even influence—sentencing policy and practice? Should the punishment of criminal offenders reflect what the public regards as appropriate? These deceptively simple questions conceal complex theoretical and methodological challenges to the administration of punishment.In the West, politicians have often answered these questions in the affirmative; penal reforms have been justified with direct reference to the attitudes of the public. This is why the contention that politicians should bridge the gap between the public and criminal justice practice has widespread resonance. Criminal law scholars, for their part, have often been more reluctant to accept public input in penal practice, and some have even held that the idea of consulting public opinion constitutes a populist approach to punishment.The purpose of this book is to examine the moral significance of public opinion for penal theory and practice. For the first time in a single volume the editors, Jesper Ryberg and Julian V. Roberts, have assembled a number of respected criminologists, philosphers, and legal theorists to address the various aspects of why and how public opinion should be reflected in the way the criminal justice system deals with criminals. The chapters address the myriad complexities surrounding this issue by first weighing the justifications for incorporating public views into punishment practices and then considering the various ways this might be achieved through juries, prosecutors, restoratifve justice programs, and other means.

Saving the United States from lurching to another sentencing crisis: taking proportionality seriously and implementing fair fixed penalties

We make recommendations regarding how the United States cansignificantly lower its incarceration rate, while at the same time ensuring that community safety is not diminished. Moreover, we identify and recommend a consolidation and extension of the positive aspects of the current sentencing regime.

Proportionality of Website Blocking: Internet Connectivity Providers as Copyright Enforcers

Internet connectivity providers have been ordered to block access to websites facilitating copyright infringement in various EU countries.In this paper, the proportionality of these enforcement measures is analysed. After addressing preliminary questions, the recent ECJ ruling UPC Telekabel Wien (C-314/12) and then case law from all Member States are examined from the perspective of proportionality. Finally, five criteria are submitted for proportionality analysis, and a proportionality evaluation is provided. The major observation is that the underlying goal of copyright enforcement has implications on how the scale tilts. In particular, ineffective enforcement mechanisms can be more easily accepted if the goal of symbolic, educational or politically motivated enforcement is considered legitimate. On the other hand, if the goal is to decrease the impact of infringement, higher efficiency and economically quantifiable results may be required

Proportionality needed in the subsidiarity debate in the EU – Appraisal of the British and Dutch initiatives. CEPS Essay No. 11, 8 April 2014

In a new CEPS Essay, Michael Emerson assesses the initiatives taken by the UK and Dutch governments to cut out excessive EU regulatory intrusion, namely in the form of the ongoing British Balance of Competences Review and the Dutch list of 54 items of EU regulation that they would like to see repealed or reformed. He concludes that while one can approve of a campaign for better EU regulation and for cutting out unnecessary micro-regulation, it would require impressive commitment by all member states and the EU institutions to follow the best features of the British and Dutch leads for this to have a real effect in the fight against populist euroscepticism. In his view, that battle will have to be won primarily with bigger weapons – some combination of better macroeconomic results, bigger foreign policy achievements and the emergence of a European-level political leadership to which the people can relate. In short, there has to be due proportionality in the diagnosis of the responsibility of inadequate subsidiarity for the EU’s ills.