Determining the contribution of technical change, efficiency change and scale change to productivity growth in the privatized English and Welsh water and sewerage industry:1985-2000

The water and sewerage industry of England and Wales was privatized in 1989 and subjected to a new regime of environmental, water quality and RPI+K price cap regulation. This paper estimates a quality-adjusted input distance function, with stochastic frontier techniques in order to estimate productivity growth rates for the period 1985-2000. Productivity is decomposed so as to account for the impact of technical change, efficiency change, and scale change. Compared with earlier studies by Saal and Parker [(2000) Managerial Decision Econ 21(6):253-268, (2001) J Regul Econ 20(1): 61-90], these estimates allow a more careful consideration of how and whether privatization and the new regulatory regime affected productivity growth in the industry. Strikingly, they suggest that while technical change improved after privatization, productivity growth did not improve, and this was attributable to efficiency losses as firms appear to have struggled to keep up with technical advances after privatization. Moreover, the results also suggest that the excessive scale of the WaSCs contributed negatively to productivity growth. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

A Public-Private Partnership strukturális modelljeinek összevetése = Comparison of Public-Private Partnership models

A tanulmány a PPP különböző strukturális modelljeinek csoportosítását mutatja be, az egyes típusok rövid rendszerező áttekintésével. A tipológiák vizsgálata hasznos ahhoz, hogy a PPP projektek struktúrájának kialakításakor a különböző lehetőségeket mérlegelni tudjuk. Többféle megközelítésben lehet a modelleket tipizálni. Az együttműködés célja alapján a hatékonyság-, a minőség- és a finanszírozás-orientált modellek a legelterjedtebbek, a kockázatmegosztás módja alapján BOT, DBFO és koncessziós változatok, a haszonmegosztás szabályozása alapján árplafon-szabályozású, közvetlen haszonszabályozású, fixdíjas és árnyékáras megoldások a leginkább bevettek. A tanulmány ezek elemző bemutatása alapján arra a következtetésre jut, hogy a gyakorlati megoldások a legtöbb esetben az elméleti típusok valamilyen kombinációját tartalmazzák, a konkrét eset feltételeinek megfelelően. Így a gyakorlatban a fix tipológiák helyett alkalmasabb úgy megközelítenünk a PPP-t, mint egy folyamatosan változó, a helyi igényekhez idomuló jelenséget. A haszonszabályozó tipológia kapcsán a tanulmány melléklete rövid áttekintést nyújt a PPP esetében kritikus méltányos haszon becslésének lehetséges megoldásairól is. = This study shows a categorization of the different structural models of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. The typologies are useful to assess the available options when decisions on PPP project structures are made. There are different categorizing aspects. Based ont he key purpose of the partnership there are efficiency, quality and financing focused models. From a risk sharing point of view, BOT, DBFO and concession models are most typical. Regarding the regulation of returns price-cap models, ’open book’ models, fixed price and shadow pricing models are most common. Based on the analytical assessment of these, they study concludes that actual projects are mostly a combination of theoretical types, as required by the given case. Therefore in practice, it is more appropriate to approach PPP projects as a constantly shaping concept, adjustable to particular conditions. Supporting the approaches to the regulation of returns, an appendix of the study summarizes the different methods to estimate fair returns, a critical issue in PPP projects.

Les économies de taille en production laitière en Amérique du Nord

Après une période où la valeur des quotas laitiers a été en forte croissance au Québec, un plafond à cette valeur a été fixé à compter de 2007. Ce plafond a eu pour effet de limiter l’offre de quota sur le marché et la croissance de la taille des entreprises laitières québécoises. Cette situation soulève un questionnement sur l’efficience économique, le blocage de la croissance des entreprises les empêchant de bénéficier d’économies de taille, si bien entendu il en existe. En conséquence, cette étude s’intéresse aux économies de taille en production laitière en Amérique du Nord. Les économies de taille des entreprises ont été mesurées à l’aide d’une régression linéaire multiple à partir de certains indicateurs de coût monétaire et non monétaire. Cette analyse comprend quatre strates de taille formées à partir d’un échantillon non aléatoire de 847 entreprises du Québec, de l’État de New York et de la Californie, ainsi qu’à partir d’un groupe d’entreprises efficientes (groupe de tête). Les résultats démontrent l’existence d’économies de taille principalement au niveau des coûts fixes et plus particulièrement des coûts fixes non monétaires. Ils révèlent aussi que les deux indicateurs où l’effet des économies de taille est le plus important sont le coût du travail non rémunéré et l’amortissement. Par ailleurs, lorsque la taille d’une entreprise augmente, les économies de taille supplémentaires réalisées deviennent de moins en moins importantes. Enfin, les résultats indiquent qu’il existe des déséconomies de taille au niveau des coûts d’alimentation. Les résultats obtenus au niveau du groupe de tête vont dans le même sens. Ils confirment également qu’il est possible pour les grandes entreprises efficientes de réaliser des économies de taille pour la plupart des indicateurs de coût. Toutefois, les économies additionnelles que ces entreprises peuvent réaliser sont moins importantes que celles obtenues par les petites entreprises efficientes. Mots clés : Agriculture, production laitière, Amérique du Nord, économies de taille, efficience économique, régression linéaire.

The Smart Paradox : Stimulate the deployment of Smart grids with effective regulatory instruments

The concept of SG (Smart Grids) encompasses a set of technologies that raise the intelligence of the electrical networks, such as smart meters or instruments of communication, sensing and auto-correction of networks. Nevertheless, the cost is still an important obstacle for the transformation of the current electricity system into a smarter one. Regulation can have an important role in setting up a favorable framework that fosters investments. However, the novelty with SG is the disembodied character of the technology, which may change the incentives of the regulated network companies to invest, affecting the effectiveness of the regulatory instruments (“cost plus” or “price cap”). This paper demonstrates that the solution to this “Smart” paradox requires strong incentive regulation mechanisms able to stimulate the adoption of SG technologies. Moreover, the regulation should not jeopardize conventional investments that are unable to be substituted by SG. Thus, a combination of performance regulation and efficiency obligations may be necessary.

A catalog of HI-selected galaxies from the south celestial cap region of sky

The first deep catalog of the H I Parkes All Sky Survey (HIPASS) is presented, covering the south celestial cap (SCC) region. The SCC area is similar to2400 deg(2) and covers delta < -62&DEG;. The average rms noise for the survey is 13 mJy beam(-1). Five hundred thirty-six galaxies have been cataloged according to their neutral hydrogen content, including 114 galaxies that have no previous cataloged optical counterpart. This is the largest sample of galaxies from a blind H I survey to date. Most galaxies in optically unobscured regions of sky have a visible optical counterpart; however, there is a small population of low-velocity H I clouds without visible optical counterparts whose origins and significance are unclear. The rms accuracy of the HIPASS positions is found to be 1.'9. The H I mass range of galaxies detected is from &SIM;10(6) to &SIM;10(11) M-.. There are a large number of late-type spiral galaxies in the SCC sample (66%), compared with 30% for optically selected galaxies from the same region in the NASA Extragalactic Database. The average ratio of H I mass to B luminosity of the sample increases according to optical type, from 1.8 M-./L-. for early types to 3.2 M-./L-. for late-type galaxies. The H I-detected galaxies tend to follow the large-scale structure traced by galaxies found in optical surveys. From the number of galaxies detected in this region of sky, we predict the full HIPASS catalog will contain &SIM;5000 galaxies, to a peak flux density limit of &SIM;39 mJy (3 σ), although this may be a conservative estimate as two large voids are present in the region. The H I mass function for this catalog is presented in a subsequent paper.

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

Effects of competition over quality-adjusted price indexes: an application to the Spanish automobile market

Using a newly constructed data set, we calculate quality-adjusted price indexes after estimating hedonic price regressions from 1988 to 2004 in the Spanish automobile market. The increasing competition was favoured by the removal of trade restrictions and the special plans for the renewal of the Spanish automobile fleet. We find that the increasing degree of competition during those years led to an overall drop in automobile prices by 20 percent which implied considerable consumer gains thanks to higher market efficiency. Additionally, our results indicate that loyalty relevance and discrepancies in automobile reliability declined during those years. This is captured.