Modelos econométricos para la planificación

Incluye Bibliografía

Modelos econométricos para los países de Centroamérica

Incluye Bibliografía

Citricultura na região sul paulista: modelo de previsão econômica para tomada de decisão em condições de risco

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Aplicación de los modelos econométricos cualitativos a la explicación de la actividad femenina en el mercado laboral

Incluye Bibliografía

Aplicación de los modelos econométricos como base de la toma de decisiones en la política de fomento a las exportaciones en el Ecuador 1980-1992

Técnico Estadístico

The polictical economy informed lobbies

We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Determinantes dos impactos sobre a estrutura de mercado brasileira das fusões e aquisições recentes

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar o recente processo de fusões e a aquisições na economia brasileira, no tocante aos seus impactos sobre a concentração. Busca-se verificar correlações entre a natureza da operação e algumas variáveis econômicas referentes às empresas envolvidas. Através de dados dos relatórios de julgamento dos atos de concentração do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) e dos pareceres econômicos formulados pela Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econômico do Ministério da Fazenda (SEAE), realiza-se um estudo econométrico através do modelo logit. A suposição é de que operações de natureza horizontal possuem efeitos prejudiciais maiores sobre a concentração de mercado do que as de natureza vertical e/ou conglomerado. O resultado obtido mostra que a desnacionalização de empresas e as operações ocorridas em alguns setores aumentam a concentração, enquanto que nas operações de abrangência mundial este efeito é menor.

Estimação do tamanho ótimo das empresas na indústria manufatureira brasileira

O tamanho ótimo de uma empresa exerce papel importante na determinação da estrutura de mercado, nas decisões de planejamento de empresas, e em políticas de regulação e antitruste. Assim, um dos principais objetivos deste trabalho foi estimar o tamanho ótimo (ou EME) das empresas para 106 setores da indústria manufatureira brasileira, num contexto de informação limitada. Outro objetivo foi analisar a mudança do tamanho ótimo das empresas devido ao processo de abertura comercial brasileiro. Para isso foram empregados dois procedimentos em sequência: Máxima Entropia (GOLAN, JUDGE & PERLOFF, 1996) e Survivor Technique (STIGLER, 1958). Primeiramente aplicamos a Máxima Entropia, para estimar as distribuições de market shares em cada setor utilizando somente medidas de concentração. Os dados se referem aos anos de 1978, 1995 e 1997. O próximo procedimento consistiu na aplicação da survivor technique a estas distribuições para encontrarmos o tamanho ótimo da empresa nos períodos pré e pós abertura comercial. Os resultados indicam que o processo de abertura comercial contribuiu para uma elevação do tamanho ótimo das empresas em mais de 60% dos setores. Este aumento ocorreu principalmente em setores capital intensivo e que apresentavam elevadas taxas de participação de empresas estrangeiras. Esses resultados corroboram os argumentos da literatura de organização industrial e comércio internacional que afirmam que o elevado protecionismo estimulou a proliferação de empresas pequenas e ineficientes que operam com escalas reduzidas e pouco competitivas.

Are the antiglobalizers right?: the issue of trade without a Walrasian auctioneer

This paper analyzes the determinants of expectational coordination on the perfect foresight equilibrium of an open economy in the class of one-dimensional models where the price is determined by price expectations. In this class of models, we relate autarky expectational stability conditions to regional integration ones, providing an intuitive open economy interpretation ofthe elasticities condition obtained by Guesnerie [11]. There, we show that the degree of structural heterogeneity trades-off the existence of standard efficiency gains -due to the increase in competition (spatial price stabilization)- and coordination upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium (stabilizing price expectations). This trade-off provides a new rationale for an exogenous price intervention at the international levei. Through the coordinational concern of the authority, trading countries are ab]e to fully reap the bene:fits from trade. We illustrate this point showing that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advise integration between two expectationally stable economies.

Forecast comparison with nonlinear methods for brazilian industrial production

Este trabalho avalia as previsões de três métodos não lineares — Markov Switching Autoregressive Model, Logistic Smooth Transition Autoregressive Model e Autometrics com Dummy Saturation — para a produção industrial mensal brasileira e testa se elas são mais precisas que aquelas de preditores naive, como o modelo autorregressivo de ordem p e o mecanismo de double differencing. Os resultados mostram que a saturação com dummies de degrau e o Logistic Smooth Transition Autoregressive Model podem ser superiores ao mecanismo de double differencing, mas o modelo linear autoregressivo é mais preciso que todos os outros métodos analisados.

Inattention in individual expectations

This paper investigates the expectations formation process of economic agents about inflation rate. Using the Market Expectations System of Central Bank of Brazil, we perceive that agents do not update their forecasts every period and that even agents who update disagree in their predictions. We then focus on the two most popular types of inattention models that have been discussed in the recent literature: sticky-information and noisy-information models. Estimating a hybrid model we find that, although formally fitting the Brazilian data, it happens at the cost of a much higher degree of information rigidity than observed.

Investor disagreement: the modern approach

Disagreement between economists is a well know fact. However, it took a long time for this concept to be incorporated in economic models. In this survey, we review the consequences and insights provided by recent models. Since disagreement between market agents can be generated through different hypotheses, the main differences between them are highlighted. Finally, this work concludes with a short review of nowcasting using google trends, emphasizing advances connecting both literatures.