Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.

Asymmetric Smiles, Leverage Effects and Structural Parameters.

In this paper, we characterize the asymmetries of the smile through multiple leverage effects in a stochastic dynamic asset pricing framework. The dependence between price movements and future volatility is introduced through a set of latent state variables. These latent variables can capture not only the volatility risk and the interest rate risk which potentially affect option prices, but also any kind of correlation risk and jump risk. The standard financial leverage effect is produced by a cross-correlation effect between the state variables which enter into the stochastic volatility process of the stock price and the stock price process itself. However, we provide a more general framework where asymmetric implied volatility curves result from any source of instantaneous correlation between the state variables and either the return on the stock or the stochastic discount factor. In order to draw the shapes of the implied volatility curves generated by a model with latent variables, we specify an equilibrium-based stochastic discount factor with time non-separable preferences. When we calibrate this model to empirically reasonable values of the parameters, we are able to reproduce the various types of implied volatility curves inferred from option market data.

On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods.

Moulin (1999) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note, we give a straightforward proof of his result.

Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle.

We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization by Miyagawa (2001a).

Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules.

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments

In spatial environments, we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements. i.e., weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space os a one-dimensional continuum, such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2n strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corrollary, we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter's preference is strictly quasi-concave. When the policy space is multi-dimensional, we establish Arrow's impossibility theorem. Among others, we show that weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.

Does the Barro-Gordon Model Explain the Behavior of US Inflation? a Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence

This paper tests the predictions of the Barro-Gordon model using US data on inflation and unemployment. To that end, it constructs a general game-theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model and a version of Cukierman’s model as special cases. Likelihood Ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of Cukierman’s model is not. Reduced-form estimates are consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.

Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S.

This paper derives optimal monetary policy rules in setups where certainty equivalence does not hold because either central bank preferences are not quadratic, and/or the aggregate supply relation is nonlinear. Analytical results show that these features lead to sign and size asymmetries, and nonlinearities in the policy rule. Reduced-form estimates indicate that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule after 1983, but not before 1979. This finding is consistent with the view that the Fed's inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime differ considerably from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime.

A Theory of Random Consumer Demand

This paper presents a new theory of random consumer demand. The primitive is a collection of probability distributions, rather than a binary preference. Various assumptions constrain these distributions, including analogues of common assumptions about preferences such as transitivity, monotonicity and convexity. Two results establish a complete representation of theoretically consistent random demand. The purpose of this theory of random consumer demand is application to empirical consumer demand problems. To this end, the theory has several desirable properties. It is intrinsically stochastic, so the econometrician can apply it directly without adding extrinsic randomness in the form of residuals. Random demand is parsimoniously represented by a single function on the consumption set. Finally, we have a practical method for statistical inference based on the theory, described in McCausland (2004), a companion paper.

Juger les lois la légitimité démocratique et la fonction du contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de doctorat en droit (LL.D.)"

Les limites de l'évaluation économique de la biodiversité

Devant le constat du déclin toujours plus rapide de la diversité biologique et les limites des ressources disponibles pour l’enrayer, il est nécessaire de déterminer quels moyens devraient être engagés dans sa protection. Pour ce faire, une méthode efficace serait d’évaluer les bénéfices tirés de la biodiversité afin d’estimer rationnellement les coûts légitimes de sa protection. L’évaluation économique, qui se présente d’emblée sur un mode quantitatif, serait alors un outil précieux. Dans ce texte, nous présentons différentes méthodes d’évaluation économique de la biodiversité ainsi que certaines de leurs limites méthodologiques. Par la suite, nous montrons qu’en dépit de ses avantages pratiques, l’évaluation économique échoue à représenter l’ensemble des valeurs en jeu dans la protection de la biodiversité. Nous décrivons alors trois types de valeurs incommensurables avec des bénéfices économiques : la valeur de legs, qui renvoie aux obligations de transmission du patrimoine naturel dont nous avons hérité ; la valeur d’existence, qui renvoie à la considération morale d’intérêts autres que ceux des êtres humains ; la valeur de transformation, qui renvoie à la capacité d’examiner et de critiquer nos préférences et inclinaisons afin d’inclure celles-ci dans une vision du monde rationnelle et cohérente. Pour conclure, nous plaidons en faveur de l’élaboration de méthodes de concertation et d’évaluation participatives et pluralistes permettant de rendre compte de la diversité et de l’hétérogénéité des valeurs de la biodiversité.

L'émergence d'un principe de justice distributive en droit international économique : analyse de l'évolution du traitement spécial et différencié du GATT à l'OMC

La libéralisation des échanges a fait augmenter les richesses, mais en réalité, elles se sont concentrées dans les pays développés. La question de la distribution plus équitable des richesses s'est rapidement posée. Le système GATT/OMC a joué un rôle décisif dans la libéralisation des échanges et dans l'articulation des rapports entre les pays développés et les pays en développement (PED). L'émergence et l'incarnation juridique dans le système GATT/OMC d'un principe de justice distributive passe par l'évolution du traitement spécial et différencié (TSD). Sous le GATT, le TSD s'est d'abord manifesté par l'article XVIII et la Partie IV du GATT de 1947, la Clause d'habilitation et le Système de préférences de 1971. Le TSD ainsi proposé appartenait essentiellement à la sof law et a échoué dans sa tentative d'intégrer les PED au système SCM. Sous l'OMC, le TSD a changé de paradigme et de mandat. Le TSD est passé d'un outil voué à mettre au développement des PED à un mécanisme employé à aider les PED à mettre en œuvre les nouvelles politiques de libéralisation découlant des accords de l'OMC. Les dispositions TSD seront alors dispersées dans l'ensemble des accords de l'OMC, mais sans jamais transcender la forme «soft law» qui les caractérisait sous le GATT. L'échec de la Conférence de Seattle, en 1999, engendrera le «Programme de Doha pour le développement», en 2001. La Déclaration de Doha était alors perçue comme l'incarnation de la transformation de l'OMC en organisation qui se préoccupe désormais de justice distributive. En observant de près le texte de la Déclaration de Doha et en analysant sa valeur juridique, on ne constate pas de progrès significatifs. Encore une fois, les mesures proposées le sont sous forme de déclarations d'intention et de promesses, voire d'engagement à négocier. Actuellement, le Cycle de Doha tarde à aboutir et tout nous porte à croire que l'avènement de l'OMC n'a pas concrétisé la volonté des PED d'une répartition plus équitable des richesses.