Visitation and Powers of Attorney

Resident’s rights are guaranteed by the federal 1987 Nursing Home Reform Law. This law requires nursing facilities to promote and protect the rights of each resident and places a strong emphasis on individual dignity and self-determination. Iowa has incorporated these rights into state law for nursing facility residents, assisted living and elder group home tenants. The attorney-in-fact’s authority is over health care decisions and visitation and access to a resident is not a health care decision. The law does not specifically set out restrictions on visitation as a right that the attorney-in-fact can exercise. Therefore, it is the position of the Office of State Long-Term Care Ombudsman that the attorney-in-fact does not have authority to determine visitation. As such, that right remains with the resident.

Canadian federalism and treaty powers: existential communities, functional regimes and the Canadian constitution

La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ne contient aucune disposition expresse concernant un quelconque pouvoir pour les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux de conclure des traités internationaux - ce pouvoir étant réservé, à l'époque de l'adoption de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867, au pouvoir impérial britannique. Aussi, une seule disposition prévoyait les modalités de mise en oeuvre des traités impériaux au sein de la fédération canadienne et cette disposition est aujourd'hui caduque. Puisque l'autonomie du Canada face à l'Empire britannique ne s'est pas accompagnée d'une refonte en profondeur du texte de la constitution canadienne, rien n'a été expressément prévu concernant le droit des traités au sein de la fédération canadienne. Le droit constitutionnel touchant les traités internationaux est donc Ie fruit de la tradition du «constitutionnalisme organique» canadien. Cette thèse examine donc ce type de constitutionnalisme à travers le cas particulier du droit constitutionnel canadien relatif aux traités internationaux. Elle examine ce sujet tout en approfondissant les conséquences juridiques du principe constitutionnel du fédéralisme reconnu par la Cour suprême du Canada dans le Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, [1998] 2 R.C.S. 217. De manière plus spécifique, cette thèse analyse en détail l’affaire Canada (P.G.) c. Ontario (P. G.), [1937] A.C. 326 (arrêt des conventions de travail) ou le Conseil prive a conclu que si l'exécutif fédéral peut signer et ratifier des traités au nom de l'État canadien, la mise en oeuvre de ces traités devra se faire - lorsqu'une modification législative est nécessaire à cet effet - par le palier législatif compétent sur la matière visée par l'obligation internationale. Le Conseil Prive ne spécifia toutefois pas dans cet arrêt qui a compétence pour conclure des traités relatifs aux matières de compétence provinciale. Cette thèse s'attaque donc à cette question. Elle défend la position selon laquelle aucun principe ou règle de droit constitutionnel canadien ou de droit international n'exige que l'exécutif fédéral ait un pouvoir plénier et exclusif sur la conclusion des traités. Elle souligne de plus que de très importants motifs de politique publique fondes notamment sur les impératifs d'expertise, de fonctionnalité institutionnelle et de démocratie militent à l’encontre d'un tel pouvoir fédéral plénier et exclusif. L'agencement institutionnel des différentes communautés existentielles présentes au Canada exige une telle décentralisation. Cette thèse démontre de plus que les provinces canadiennes sont les seules à posséder un pouvoir constitutionnel de conclure des traités portant sur des domaines relevant de leurs champs de compétence - pouvoir dont elles peuvent cependant déléguer l'exercice au gouvernement fédéral. Enfin, cette thèse analyse de manière systématique et approfondie les arguments invoques au soutien d'un renversement des principes établis par l'arrêt des conventions de travail en ce qui concerne la mise en oeuvre législative des traités relatifs à des matières provinciales et elle démontre leur absence de fondement juridique. Elle démontre par ailleurs que, compte tenu de l'ensemble des règles et principes constitutionnels qui sous-tendent et complètent le sens de cette décision, renverser l’arrêt des conventions de travail aurait pour effet concret de transformer l'ensemble de la fédération canadienne en état quasi unitaire car le Parlement pourrait alors envahir de manière permanente et exclusive l'ensemble des champs de compétence provinciaux. Cette conséquence est assurément interdite par le principe du fédéralisme constitutionnellement enchâssé.

The Application of a Pluralist Approach of Global Administrative Law on the Governance of Doping in Sport

Plusieurs problèmes liés à l'utilisation de substances et méthodes interdites de dopage dans les sports posent de grands défis à la gouvernance antidopage. Afin de lutter contre le dopage, certains pays ont mis en oeuvre des cadres juridiques basés exclusivement sur le droit pénal tandis que d'autres pays ont plutôt misé sur des mécanismes et organismes spécialisés trouvant fondement en droit privé ou sur un régime hybride de droit public et privé. Ces différentes approches réglementaires ont pour conséquence de faire en sorte qu’il est très difficile de lutter efficacement contre le dopage dans les sports, notamment parce que leur exécution requiert un degré de collaboration internationale et une participation concertée des autorités publiques qui est difficile à mettre en place. À l’heure actuelle, on peut par exemple observer que les États n’arrivent pas à contrer efficacement la participation des syndicats et organisations transnationales liés au crime organisé dans le marché du dopage, ni à éliminer des substances et méthodes de dopage interdites par la réglementation. Par ailleurs, la gouvernance antidopage basée sur les règles prescrites par l’Agence mondiale antidopage prévoit des règles et des normes distinctes de dopage distinguant entre deux catégories de personnes, les athlètes et les autres, plaçant ainsi les premiers dans une position désavantageuse. Par exemple, le standard de responsabilité stricte sans faute ou négligence imposé aux athlètes exige moins que la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable et permet l'utilisation de preuves circonstancielles pour établir la violation des règles antidopages. S'appliquant pour prouver le dopage, ce standard mine le principe de la présomption d'innocence et le principe suivant lequel une personne ne devrait pas se voir imposer une peine sans loi. D’ailleurs, le nouveau Code de 2015 de l’Agence attribuera aux organisations nationales antidopage (ONADs) des pouvoirs d'enquête et de collecte de renseignements et ajoutera de nouvelles catégories de dopage non-analytiques, réduisant encore plus les droits des athlètes. Dans cette thèse, nous discutons plus particulièrement du régime réglementaire de l’Agence et fondé sur le droit privé parce qu’il ne parvient pas à répondre aux besoins actuels de gouvernance mondiale antidopage. Nous préconisons donc l’adoption d’une nouvelle approche de gouvernance antidopage où la nature publique et pénale mondiale du dopage est clairement reconnue. Cette reconnaissance combiné avec un modèle de gouvernance adapté basé sur une approche pluraliste du droit administratif global produira une réglementation et une administration antidopage mieux acceptée chez les athlètes et plus efficace sur le plan des résultats. Le nouveau modèle de gouvernance que nous proposons nécessitera toutefois que tous les acteurs étatiques et non-étatiques ajustent leur cadre de gouvernance en tenant compte de cette nouvelle approche, et ce, afin de confronter les défis actuels et de régler de manière plus satisfaisante les problèmes liés à la gouvernance mondiale du dopage dans les sports.

EU free movement law and the legal recognition of same-sex relationships: the case for mutual recognition

This article seeks to examine the cross-border legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the EU. Although the Member States maintain an exclusive competence in the field of family law and, thus, it is up to them to determine whether they will provide a legal status to same-sex couples within their territory, they need to exercise their powers in that field in a way that does not violate EU law. This, it is suggested, requires that Member States mutually recognize the legal status of same-sex couples and do not treat same-sex couples worse than opposite-sex couples, if the basis of the differentiation is, merely, the (homosexual) sexual orientation of the two spouses/partners. Nonetheless, the current legal framework does not make it clear that Member States are under such an obligation. The main argument of the article, therefore, is that the EU must adopt a more hands-on approach towards this issue.

Conflicts of law and the mutual recognition of same-sex unions in the EU

My thesis uses legal arguments to demonstrate a requirement for recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships between EU Member States. I draw on the US experience, where arguments for recognition of marriages void in some states previously arose in relation to interracial marriages. I show how there the issue of recognition today depends on conflicts of law and its interface with US constitutional freedoms against discrimination. I introduce the themes of the importance of domicile, the role of the public policy exception, vested rights, and relevant US constitutional freedoms. Recognition in the EU also depends on managing the tension between private international law and freedoms guaranteed by higher norms, in this case the EU Treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights. I set out the inconsistencies between various private international law systems and the problems this creates. Other difficulties are caused by the use of nationality as a connecting factor to determine personal capacity, and the overuse of the public policy exception. I argue that EU Law can constrain the use of conflicts law or public policy by any Member State where these are used to deny effect to same-sex unions validly formed elsewhere. I address the fact that family law falls only partly within Union competence, that existing EU Directives have had limited success at achieving full equality and that powers to implement new measures have not been used to their full potential. However, Treaty provisions outlawing discrimination on grounds of nationality can be interpreted so as to require recognition in many cases. Treaty citizenship rights can also be interpreted favourably to mandate recognition, once private international law is itself recognised as an obstacle to free movement. Finally, evolving interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights may also support claims for cross-border recognition of existing relationships.

Enforcement in environmental law: an economic analysis of citizen suits

Previous to 1970, state and federal agencies held exclusive enforcement responsibilities over the violation of pollution control standards. However, recognizing that the government had neither the time nor resources to provide full enforcement, Congress created citizen suits. Citizen suits, first amended to the Clean Air Act in 1970, authorize citizens to act as private attorney generals and to sue polluters for violating the terms of their operating permits. Since that time, Congress has included citizen suits in 13 other federal statutes. The citizen suit phenomenon is sufficiently new that little is known about it. However, we do know that citizen suits have increased rapidly since the early 1980's. Between 1982 and 1986 the number of citizen suits jumped from 41 to 266. Obviously, they are becoming a widely used method of enforcing the environmental statutes. This paper will provide a detailed description, analysis and evaluation of citizen suits. It will begin with an introduction and will then move on to provide some historic and descriptive background on such issues as how citizen suit powers are delegated, what limitations are placed on the citizens, what parties are on each side of the suit, what citizens can enforce against, and the types of remedies available. The following section of the paper will provide an economic analysis of citizen suits. It will begin with a discussion of non-profit organizations, especially non-profit environmental organizations, detailing the economic factors which instigate their creation and activities. Three models will be developed to investigate the evolution and effects of citizen suits. The first model will provide an analysis of the demand for citizen suits from the point of view of a potential litigator showing how varying remedies, limitations and reimbursement procedures can effect both the level and types of activities undertaken. The second model shows how firm behavior could be expected to respond to citizen suits. Finally, a third model will look specifically at the issue of efficiency to determine whether the introduction of citizen enforcement leads to greater or lesser economic efficiency in pollution control. The database on which the analysis rests consists of 1205 cases compiled by the author. For the purposes of this project this list of citizen suit cases and their attributes were computerized and used to test a series of hypotheses derived from three original economic models. The database includes information regarding plaintiffs, defendants date notice and/or complaint was filed and statutes involved in the claim. The analysis focuses on six federal environmental statutes (Clean Water Act} Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act) because the majority of citizen suits have occurred under these statutes.

After balance of powers diplomacy, globalization´s politics

The September 11th episode not only marked the end of the Cold War, but of the Balance of Powers Diplomacy, through which the nation-states defin e themselves as enemies, and solve their problems with war or war threat. Today the major countries do not have enemies among other nation-states. Slowly Globalization’s Politics replace the previous system, as long as globalization gets regulated, and the rule of law emerges at international level. In the global world we have three types of countries: the rich, the ones of intermediary development, and the poor. Globalization is inherently unjust to the latter. Unable to compete in a world where competition prevails everywhere, such countries are either just outside the system, or, frustrated, recur to terrorism. Interests, however, do not point out only in the direction of inequalities. Through politics, i.e., through debate and argument, it will be possible to create a less unjust international law system. And also though it, the hope in an international government ceases to be a mere utopia.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

3.1 Lincoln University Law School

Despite his sudden disappearance, Lloyd Gaines’ impact had a resounding effect in many ways. The successful bridging of the gap from segregation to integration in the United States educational system was initiated because Gaines sought to be treated equally and fairly by the established powers. Much of the credit goes to the NAACP legal team, especially Charles Hamilton Houston’s dedication and expertise. However, without the initial action of Lloyd Gaines applying to the University of Missouri, there would have been no case. Additionally, the Lincoln University School of Law was founded due to the results of the Gaines case. Although it was only in operation for 16 years, it provided opportunities for those who had been denied previously.

Immigration Law by Proxy: The Case of Colorado’s Human Smuggling Crime

Despite the federal government’s well known expansive reach in creating and enforcing immigration law, the states retain substantial authority to play an important role in migrants’ lives. Through their traditional powers to adopt criminal statutes and police their communities, states can indirectly — but intentionally — inject themselves into the incidents of ordinary life as a migrant. Colorado’s human smuggling statute, currently being challenged before the state supreme court, illustrates this type of state regulation of migration. This essay addresses the statute’s reach, its shaky constitutional footing, and places it in a broader context in which states criminalize immigration-related activity.

Transmission and Transport of Energy in the Western U.S. and Canada: A Law and Policy Road Map

This collection of short essays arose from the inaugural meeting of the Idaho Symposium on Energy in the West, which was held in November, 2014. The topic for this first Symposium was Transmission and Transport of Energy in the Western U.S. and Canada: A Law and Policy Road Map. The essays in this collection provide a notable introduction to the major energy issues facing the West today. Topics include: building a resilient legal architecture for western energy production; natural gas flaring; transmission planning for wind energy; utilities and rooftop solar; special considerations for western states and the Clean Power Plan; the Clean Power Plan's implications for the western grid; siting renewable energy on public lands; and implications of utility reform in New York and Hawaii for the Northwest.

The Future Direction of Delaware Law (Including a Brief Exegesis on Fee Shifting Bylaws)

Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies. The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by the existence of a favorable statutory regime. Delaware was not invariably the first or the only state to implement management friendly provisions. Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical importance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an outsized role in setting legal standards. The management friendly nature of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attraction to public corporations. A current example of a management friendly trend in the case law had seen the recent decisions setting out the board’s authority to adopt bylaws under Section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), particularly those involving the shifting of fees in litigation against the corporation or its directors. The DGCL allows bylaws that address “the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” The broad parameters are, however, subject to limits. Bylaws cannot be inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation or “the law.” Law includes the common law. The Delaware courts have used the limitations imposed by “the law” to severely restrict the reach of shareholder inspired bylaws. The courts have not used the same principles to impose similar restraints on bylaws adopted by the board of directors. This can be seen with respect to bylaws that restrict or even eliminate the right of shareholders to bring actions against management and the corporation. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund the court approved a fee shifting bylaw that had littl relationship to the internal affairs of the corporation. The decision upheld the bylaw as facially valid.The decision ignored a number of obvious legal infirmities. Among other things, the decision did not adequately address the requirement in Section 109(b) that bylaws be consistent with “the law.” The decision obliquely acknowledged that the provisions would “by their nature, deter litigation” but otherwise made no effort to assess the impact of this deterrence on shareholders causes of action. The provision in fact had the practical effect of restricting, if not eliminating, litigation rights granted by the DGCL and the common law. Perhaps most significantly, however, the bylaws significantly limited common law rights of shareholders to bring actions against the corporation and the board. Given the high dismissal rates for these actions, fee shifting bylaws imposed a meaningful risk of liability on plaintiffs. Moreover, because judgments in derivative suits were paid to the corporation, shareholders serving as plaintiffs confronted the risk of liability without any offsetting direct benefit. By preventing suits in this area, the bylaw effectively insulated the behavior of boards from legal challenge. The ATP decision was poorly reasoned and overstepped acceptable boundaries. The management friendly decision threatened the preeminent role of Delaware in the development of corporate law. The decision raised the specter of federal intervention and the potential for meaningful competition from the states. Because the opinion examined the bylaw in the context of non-stock companies, the reasoning may remain applicable only to those entities and never make the leap to for-profit stock corporations. Nonetheless, the analysis reflects a management friendly approach that does not adequately take into account the impact of the provision on the rights of shareholders.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.