How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis: how to create a financial crisis by trying to avoid one

This paper attempts to understand the Brazilian financial crisis mainly from an ‘endogenous-failure’ perspective. It argues that the general mechanisms that led to this financial crisis were in essence endogenous to the workings of an economy facing a sudden liberalisation, a surge in capital inflows, ineffective regulation and weak governance. This paper will also argue that within this general framework, there is a very specific ‘Minskyian’ feature to the Brazilian crisis, which made it different from other financial crises both in Latin America and in East Asia: how a particularly radical monetary policy led to a major financial fragility in the financial sector and State finances, and to an unmanageable Ponzi finance in the accounts of the Federal Government.

Homogeneous middles vs. heterogeneous tails, and the end of the ‘Inverted-U’: the share of the rich is what it’s all about

This paper examines the current global scene of distributional disparities within-nations. There are six main conclusions. First, about 80 per cent of the world’s population now live in regions whose median country has a Gini not far from 40. Second, as outliers are now only located among middle-income and rich countries, the ‘upwards’ side of the ‘Inverted-U’ between inequality and income per capita has evaporated (and with it the statistical support there was for the hypothesis that posits that, for whatever reason, ‘things have to get worse before they can get better’). Third, among middle-income countries Latin America and mineral-rich Southern Africa are uniquely unequal, while Eastern Europe follows a distributional path similar to the Nordic countries. Fourth, among rich countries there is a large (and growing) distributional diversity. Fifth, within a global trend of rising inequality, there are two opposite forces at work. One is ‘centrifugal’, and leads to an increased diversity in the shares appropriated by the top 10 and bottom 40 per cent. The other is ‘centripetal’, and leads to a growing uniformity in the income-share appropriated by deciles 5 to 9. Therefore, half of the world’s population (the middle and upper-middle classes) have acquired strong ‘property rights’ over half of their respective national incomes; the other half, however, is increasingly up for grabs between the very rich and the poor. And sixth, Globalisation is thus creating a distributional scenario in which what really matters is the income-share of the rich — because the rest ‘follows’ (middle classes able to defend their shares, and workers with ever more precarious jobs in ever more ‘flexible’ labour markets). Therefore, anybody attempting to understand the within-nations disparity of inequality should always be reminded of this basic distributional fact following the example of Clinton’s campaign strategist: by sticking a note on their notice-boards saying “It’s the share of the rich, stupid”.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?

Latin America’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms has been poor; this not only contrasts with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what has happened in Asia since 1980. I shall argue that the weakness of the region’s new paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it has been implemented. Latin America’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of the perceived economic weaknesses of the region — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policymaking has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse of the economic reforms that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development (and political) strategies as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Latin America, as well as their poor outcome. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation.

Cuatro fuentes de "desindustrialización" y un nuevo concepto del "síndrome holandés"

Incluye Bibliografía

SAVIA. Un sistema web de ayuda a la decisión para control de plagas

Este trabajo presenta SAVIA, una aplicación web de soporte a la decisión en el control de plagas y enfermedades en el cultivo de la uva de mesa. Para su construcción se ha aplicado un método de desarrollo de software basado en la metodología de desarrollo de software dirigido por modelos, que permite la generación automática de la aplicación web a partir del modelo conceptual del problema.

Milestones in Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering History: A Comparative Review

We present a review of the historical evolution of software engineering, intertwining it with the history of knowledge engineering because “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This retrospective represents a further step forward to understanding the current state of both types of engineerings; history has also positive experiences; some of them we would like to remember and to repeat. Two types of engineerings had parallel and divergent evolutions but following a similar pattern. We also define a set of milestones that represent a convergence or divergence of the software development methodologies. These milestones do not appear at the same time in software engineering and knowledge engineering, so lessons learned in one discipline can help in the evolution of the other one.

A organização e funcionamento dos conselhos de turma: efeitos sobre a definição e implementação de práticas pedagógicas

Dissertação de mest. em Observação e Análise da Relação Educativa, Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais, Univ. do Algarve, 2006

Afinidades y diferencias de dos periodistas-literatos del siglo XIX : Mariano José de Larra y Ricardo Palma : revisión histórica de la intemporalidad de sus artículos, crónicas y tradiciones : pervivencia de sus obras a través de las nuevas tecnologías y su aplicación en la enseñanza del periodismo actual

Analiza los géneros literarios que Mariano José de Larra, en España y, Ricardo Palma, en Perú, dos genios de la literatura y el periodismo del siglo XIX, emplearon en cada una de sus obras, coadyuvando a la divulgación de la cultura y, sobre todo, a una forma de periodismo cuyos cimientos perviven en el tiempo. En este estudio se analizan y sistematizan los textos literarios y periodísticos de Mariano José de Larra y Ricardo Palma, y se adaptan sus modelos para hacerlos compatibles con el apoyo de las tecnologías de la información y comunicación en el desarrollo periodístico de nuestros tiempos. El desarrollo de esta investigación tiene un interés, académico y científico tanto para su aplicación en los estudios de Periodismo y Comunicación en las asignaturas de Historia del Periodismo, Redacción Periodística y Géneros de Información Periodística. La investigación está estructurada en tres partes. La primer parte, trata los apartados biográficos e hitos que han ejercido influencia en la vida de cada autor. La segunda parte corresponde al análisis del contenido, a las afinidades y diferencias de la producción literaria, y al aporte que supuso para el periodismo español e hispanoamericano. La tercera parte de este trabajo, se circunscribe a la aplicación de los textos de Larra y Palma en los estudios de periodismo y comunicación, apoyados por las nuevas tecnologías de la información y comunicación. Los instrumentos utilizados en este estudio son la entrevista en profundidad, la historia oral, la observación participante, y los análisis semióticos y estructuralistas. Las técnicas de investigación utilizadas en este estudio, se caracterizan por observaciones cuantificables del tratamiento estadístico. Las más frecuentes son el experimento en laboratorio, la encuesta por muestreo y el análisis de contenido. Se fija una comparación entre los estilos literarios y periodísticos de Larra y Palma. Se analizan las similitudes que les unen, y las diferencias que les separan. Ambos autores son narradores de la época y el lugar en que les tocó vivir. El estudio fija las bases conceptuales de los aportes periodísticos, y literarios de Mariano José de Larra y Ricardo de Palma en la nueva faceta del periodismo de la actualidad, traducido en una mejora práctica del idioma castellano.

Nitrogênio mineral e microbiano do solo em sistemas agroflorestais com palma de óleo na Amazônia oriental

O sucesso da produção de palma de óleo (Elaeis guineensis Jacq.) em sistemas agroflorestais (SAFs) na Amazônia está condicionado ao manejo sustentável do solo, em especial dos atributos químicos e microbiológicos. Nosso objetivo foi avaliar o impacto de SAFs com palma de óleo sobre os teores de nitrogênio (N) mineral e microbiano do solo, em função da sazonalidade pluviométrica. Avaliamos diferentes formas de N do solo (N microbiano, nitrato, amônio), além da concentração de carbono (C) do solo, em SAFs com baixa e alta diversidade de espécies cultivadas, os quais foram comparados com uma floresta secundária adjacente de 13 anos de idade. Para a maioria das variáveis analisadas (N total, relação C:N, N microbiano, relação N microbiano:N total, amônio) houve diferença significativa somente entre as épocas de amostragem. A concentração média de C no solo sob o SAF com alta diversidade (15,6 mg g-1) foi maior do que na floresta (13 mg g-1). Na época chuvosa a concentração de nitrato no SAF com alta diversidade foi 5,1 mg (N) kg-1 (solo), maior do que nos demais tipos de vegetação, resultando em menor concentração média de amônio no solo sob esse SAF, cujo valor foi 9,6 mg (N) kg-1 (solo). A mineralização do N no SAF com baixa diversidade, na época seca, foi 0,1 mg (N) kg-1 (solo) dia-1, menor do que nos demais tipos de vegetação. As variáveis analisadas foram mais sensíveis à sazonalidade da precipitação pluviométrica do que à conversão de floresta secundária em SAFs com palma de óleo.

Variação temporal do efluxo de CO2do solo em sistemas agroflorestais com palma de óleo na Amazônia Oriental

RESUMOA dinâmica do efluxo de dióxido de carbono (CO2) do solo e seus fatores controladores em sistemas agroflorestais da Amazônia são pouco compreendidas. O objetivo deste estudo foi avaliar a variação temporal do efluxo de CO2 do solo em sistemas agroflorestais onde a palma de óleo é a cultura principal e sua relação com fatores bióticos (carbono microbiano do solo, carbono total do solo, respiração microbiana do solo, raízes finas do solo, indivíduos componentes dos sistemas agroflorestais (SAFs) ) e abióticos (umidade e temperatura do solo). As medições foram realizadas nos períodos menos chuvoso (dezembro de 2010) e chuvoso (maio de 2011). O efluxo de CO2do solo foi mais alto no período chuvoso, provavelmente, devido à maior atividade microbiana nesse período influenciada por fatores climáticos aliados a fatores bióticos. O efluxo de CO2do solo se correlacionou positivamente com umidade do solo e carbono da biomassa microbiana e negativamente com temperatura do solo e quociente metabólico, porém as correlações foram fracas. O efluxo de CO2do solo foi sensível ao tipo de sistema agroflorestal e a sazonalidade da precipitação.

La desafecció política : desvinculació amb el sistema democràtic dels ciutadans a Palma de Mallorca

Aquesta recerca analitza la desafecció política que experimenten els ciutadans de Palma de Mallorca, tractada com una desvinculació amb el sistema democràtic que és gestionat pels polítics. La recerca explica el que una mostra de població pensa de la democràcia i de la vida política. Els conceptes principals -desafecció política i sistema democràtic- vehiculen tot el contingut del treball.

Manejo de colheita e espaçamento da palma-forrageira, em consórcio com sorgo granífero, no Agreste de Pernambuco

Este trabalho foi realizado na zona semi-árida de Pernambuco e teve como objetivo investigar o efeito de espaçamento, e a freqüência e intensidade de colheitas da palma-forrageira (Opuntia ficus-indica Mill.) consorciada com sorgo granífero (Sorghum bicolor (L.) Moench). O delineamento experimental foi o de blocos ao acaso em parcelas subdivididas, sendo os espaçamentos alocados nas parcelas principais, e as freqüências e intensidades de colheitas, nas subparcelas. Os resultados são de um período de 12 anos, e as produções de matéria seca de palma, de grãos e restolhos de sorgo foram: 5,23, 1,65 e 2,07; 4,51, 1,30 e 2,10; 2,75, 1,97 e 3,51 t/ha/ano, em espaçamentos de 2,0 m x 1,0 m; 3,0 m x 1,0 m x 0,50 m e 7,0 m x 1,0 m x 0,50 m, respectivamente. A produção de matéria seca foi diferente entre as freqüências de corte, quando foram conservados os artículos primários: 4,08 t/ha/ano na freqüência de quatro anos, e de 3,43 t/ha/ano na freqüência de dois anos. A produção de palma aumentou com o período de crescimento da planta, nas duas intensidades de corte estudadas. A composição química dos artículos de palma e dos restolhos de sorgo foi pouco afetada pelos tratamentos.