Genetic optimism:Framing genes and mental illness in the news

Over the past two decades the pace and specificity of discoveries associating genetics with mental illness has accelerated, which is reflected in an increase in news coverage about the genetics of mental disorder. The news media is a major source of public understanding of genetics and a strong influence on public discourse. This paper examines the news coverage of genetics and mental illness (i.e., bipolar illness and schizophrenia) over a 25 year period, emphasizing the peak period of 1987-1994. Using a sample of 110 news stories from 5 major American newspapers and 3 news magazines, we identify the frame of "genetic optimism" which dominated the reporting of genetics and mental illness beginning in the mid-1980s. The structure of the frame is comprised of 3 elements: a gene for the disorder exists; it will be found; and it will be good. New discoveries of genes were announced with great fanfare, but the most promising claims could not be replicated or were retracted in short order. Despite these disconfirmations, genetic optimism persisted in subsequent news stories. While the scientific accuracy of the gene stories is high, the genetic optimism frame distorts some of the findings, misrepresents and reifies the impact of genes on mental disorder, and leaves no space for critics or an examination of potential negative impacts. The stances of reporters, scientists and editors may all in different ways contribute to the perpetuation of genetic optimism. Genetic optimism presents an overly sanguine picture of the state of genetics; as we enter the genetic age it is important to balance the extraneous "hype and hope" contained in news stories of genetics and mental illness.

Perceived stress, coping strategies and optimism in hearing mothers of deaf children.

Tesis (Maestría en Ciencias con Orientación en Psicología de la Salud) UANL, 2012.

Objective quality of life, optimism, and social-juridical variables, as predictive ones of the subjective quality of life in disarmed Colombian persons

The goal of this research was to identify predic- tive psychosocial factors of the subjective quality of life in a group of 60 people, with ages between 19 and 57, from both sexes, included in the program of demobilization and social inclusion of the Pro- grama de la Alta Consejería para la Reintegración Social y Económica de Personas y Grupos Alzados en Armas en Colombia. this research was a predic- tive correlational descriptive study. the Question- naire of optimism/Pessimism was used to assess the optimist or pessimist trend, and, for assess the quality of life, these strategies were combined: a home visit to value the objective quality of life, the Analogous scale of subjective Quality of Life to value satisfaction and well-being, and a general format to collect socio-demographic and juridical information. Results show that some variables as perceived health, optimism, educational level, re- ligious believes, objective quality of life, type of demobilization and years spent in the armed group operating outside the law, are associated to better levels of perceived quality of life. The findings and limitations of the study are discussed.  

EU Grand Strategy: Optimism is Mandatory. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 36, July 2012

The Arab Spring, the American pivot, and the global crisis: these affect all of EU external action, but also present opportunities for EU action. A debate on grand strategy remains necessary.

Economists are not dismal, the world is not a Petri dish and other reasons for optimism

One of the recurrent themes in the debate around how to ensure global food security concerns the capacity of the planet to support its growing population. Neo-Malthusian thinking suggests that we are in a situation in which further expansion of the population cannot be supported and that the population checks, with their dismal consequences envisaged by Malthus, will lead to a new era of stagnant incomes and population. More sophisticated models of the link between population and income are less gloomy however. They see population growth as an integral component of the economic growth which is necessary to ensure that the poorest achieve food security. An undue focus on the difficulties of meeting the demands of the increasing population risks damaging this growth. Instead, attention should be focused on ensuring that the conditions to ensure that economic growth accompanies population growth are in place.

Subjective quality of life, perceived control and dispositional optimism among older people

Objectives: To examine whether the subjective quality of life (QOL) of elderly people is held under homeostatic control, and to investigate the role of perceived control and dispositional optimism in the maintenance of subjective QOL.
Method: 100 older people (M=75.6 years) and a control group of 107 younger people (M=20.1 years) completed a self-report survey.
Results: Both groups had a level of subjective QOL within the normal range. The older group reported higher levels of secondary control and optimism, but similar levels of primary control, as the younger group. Primary control and optimism predicted subjective QOL for both groups. Secondary control was a significant predictor (or the younger group, however it was only marginally significant for the older group. Optimism accounted for the most subjective QOL variance for both groups.
Conclusions: The finding that the subjective QOL of the older group lay within the normative range supports the proposal that their subjective QOL is being successfully maintained under bomeostatic control. However, they appear to have an increased reliance on secondary control. The fact that dispositional optimism captures the predictive variance of perceived control, is an important finding adding to the understanding of subjective QOL maintenance.

Event valence and unrealistic optimism

The effect of event valence on unrealistic optimism was studied. 94 Deakin University students rated the comparative likelihood that they would experience either a controllable or an uncontrollable health-related event. Valence was manipulated to be positive (outcome was desirable) or negative (outcome was undesirable) by varying the way a given event was framed. Particiapants either were told the conditions which promote the event and rated the comparative likelihood they would experience it or were told the conditions which prevent the event and rated the comparative likelihood they would avoid it. For both the controllable and the uncontrollable events, unrealistic optimism was greater for negative than positive valence. It is suggested that a combination of the 'motivational account' of unrealistic optimism and prospect theory provides a good explanation of the results. 

`I`m less at risk than most guys`: gay men`s unrealistic optimism about becoming infected with HIV

Among the self-justifications that gay men use when engaging in high-risk sex is the thought that they are less at risk than most gay men. Two explanatory models of such 'unrealistic optimism' (UO) have been proposed: while the motivational account holds that UO arises because it serves the function of bringing comfort, the cognitive account holds that UO serves no particular function, being simply a by-product of normal cognitive strategies. This study investigated predictions derived from the motivational account. Gay men uninfected with HIV (n = 88) answered two test questions, requiring them to estimate, respectively, their own risk of becoming infected and that of the average gay man. The questions were presented in the two possible orders, and were either separated or not separated by unrelated filler material. The great majority of the men (89%) exhibited UO. Neither question order nor the interpolation of filler material affected responses to either test question. The results were inconsistent with the motivational account, but explicable in terms of the cognitive account. It seems that the cognitive account provides the better explanation of at least that form of UO measured in this study. Implications for AIDS educators are discussed.

Explaining gay men's unrealistic optimism about becoming infected with HIV

Among the self-justifications that gay men use when deciding to have unprotected intercourse is the thought that they are at less risk than most gay men. Two explanatory models of such 'unrealistic optimism' (UO) have been proposed: while the motivational account holds that UO serves the function of bringing comfort, the cognitive account holds that UO serves no particular function, being simply a by-product of normal cognitive strategies. This study tested the prediction, derived from the motivational account, that highlighting the salience of the self-other comparison should increase UO. Gay men uninfected with HIV (n = 122) estimated both their own risk of contracting various health problems - among them, becoming infected with HIV - and that of the average gay man. The purported aim of collecting the data was varied, so as to either make the self-other comparison central to the aim or render one of the two types of estimate irrelevant to the aim. No effect on UO was found. It seems that the cognitive account provides a better explanation than does the motivational account of at least that form of UO measured in this study. Implications for AIDS education are discussed.

Event valence and unrealistic optimism: further evidence

Unrealistic optimism is assessed using either a single question, the rating of own likelihood of experience an event compared to that of the average person, or two questions, separate rating of own likelihood and that of the average person. The effect of using valence on more unrealistic optimism was studied in a sample of 175 students using the two-question measure. Valence was manipulated to be positive, i.e., outcome was desirable, or negative, i.e., outcome was undesirable, by 'framing' the same event appropriately. Unrealistic optimism was greater for negative than positive valence. The effect was of the same direction and magnitude as that found by Gold and Martyn (2003) using the single-question measure. The relationship between valence and unrealistic optimism does not depend on whether unrealistic optimism is assessed with one or two questions.

Non-equivalence of direct and indirect measures of unrealistic optimism

Individuals typically believe that they are less likely than the average person to experience negative events. Such “unrealistic optimism” (UO) has been assessed in two ways: directly (via a single question, requiring comparison of own risk to that of the average person) and indirectly (via separate questions about own risk and that of the average person). The study examined the equivalence of the direct and indirect measures of female students' UO for unwanted pregnancy. Participants (N = 120) answered questions about their own risk, that of the average female student, and their own risk relative to that of the average female student; responses and response times were recorded. There was only a moderate association between direct- and indirect-UO. Direct-UO was strongly associated with estimate of own risk, but only moderately associated with estimate of the average student's risk. Response times for the comparative risk and own risk questions did not differ, but participants took significantly longer to answer the question about average student's risk. The results suggest that the two measures of UO are not equivalent, but, rather, that individuals answering a comparative risk question focus mainly on their own risk, at the expense of that of the average person.

Unrealistic optimism about becoming infected with HIV: different causes in different populations

People tend to believe that their chance of experiencing undesirable events is lower and their chance of experiencing desirable events is higher than that of the average person like them. Two explanatory models of such 'unrealistic optimism' (UO) have been proposed: While the motivational account holds that UO serves the function of bringing comfort, the cognitive account holds that UO serves no particular function, being simply a by-product of normal cognitive strategies. UO for HIV infection was studied in samples of uninfected students (Study 1, n = 68) and gay men (Study 2, n = 63). In each case, participants rated either their relative likelihood of becoming infected (negative valence condition) or their relative likelihood of remaining uninfected (positive valence condition). As predicted, in Study 1 UO was greater where valence was negative and in Study 2 valence had no effect. The findings suggest that the students' UO is better explained by the motivational account, while the gay men's UO is better explained by the cognitive account. Implications for AIDS education are discussed.