Global Reuse and Optimal Waste Policy

Electronic waste generated from the consumption of durable goods in developed countries is often exported to underdeveloped countries for reuse, recycling and disposal with unfortunate environmental consequences. The lack of efficient disposal policies within developing nations coupled with global free trade agreements make it difficult for consumers to internalize these costs. This paper develops a two-country model, one economically developed and the other underdeveloped, to solve for optimal tax policies necessary to achieve the efficient allocation of economic resources in an economy with a durable good available for global reuse without policy measures in the underdeveloped country. A tax in the developed country on purchases of the new durable good combined with a waste tax set below the domestic external cost of disposal is sufficient for global efficiency. The implication of allowing free global trade in electronic waste is also examined, where optimal policy resembles a global deposit-refund system.

Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Note

Kydland and Prescott (1977) develop a simple model of monetary policy making, where the central bank needs some commitment technique to achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Although not their main focus, they illustrate the difference between consistent and optimal policy in a sequential-decision one-period world. We employ the analytical method developed in Yuan and Miller (2005), whereby the government appoints a central bank with consistent targets or delegates consistent targets to the central bank. Thus, the central bank s welfare function differs from the social welfare function, which cause consistent policy to prove optimal.

Assessing the impact of adaptive accessibility on the optimal transport policy implementation by using an integrated land-use/transport model for Madrid

Accessibility is an essential concept widely used to evaluate the impact of land-use and transport strategies in transport and urban planning. Accessibility is typically evaluated by using a transport model or a land-use model independently or successively without a feedback loop, thus neglecting the interaction effects between the two systems and the induced competition effects among opportunities due to accessibility improvements. More than a mere methodological curiosity, failure to account for land- use/transport interactions and the competition effect may result in large underestimation of the policy effects. With the recent development of land-use and transport interaction (LUTI) models, there is a growing interest in using these models to adequately measure accessibility and evaluate its impact. The current study joins this research stream by embedding an accessibility measure in a LUTI model with two main aims. The first aim is to account for adaptive accessibility, namely the adjustment of the potential accessibility due to the effect of competition among opportunities (e.g., workplaces) as a result of improved accessibility. LUTI models are particularly suitable for assessing adaptive accessibility because the competition factor is a function of the number of jobs, which is related to land-use attractiveness and the number of workers which is related, among other factors, to the transport demand. The second aim is to identify the optimal implementation scenario of policy measures on the basis of the potential and adaptive accessibility and analyse the results in terms of social welfare and accessibility. The metropolitan area of Madrid is used as a case-study and two transport policy instruments, namely a cordon toll and bus frequency increase, have been chosen for the simulation study in order to present the usefulness of the approach to urban planners and policy makers. The MARS model (Metropolitan Activity Relocation Simulator) calibrated for Madrid was employed as the analysis tool. The impact of accessibility is embedded in the model through a social welfare function that includes not only costs and benefits to both road users and transport operators, but also costs and benefits for the government and society in general (external costs). An optimisation procedure is performed by the MARS model for maximizing the value of objective function in order to find the best (optimal) policy imp lementations intensity (i.e., price, frequency). Last, the two policy strategies are evaluated in terms of their accessibility. Results show that the accessibility with competition factor influences the optimal policy implementation level and also generates different results in terms of social welfare. In addition, mapping the difference between the potential and the adaptive accessibility indicators shows that the main changes occur in areas where there is a strong competition among land-use opportunities.

Stochastic Modelling Using Markov Chains

Department of Statistics, Cochin University of Science and Technology

How Optimal is US Monetary Policy?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis assume that policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow policy to be described by various forms of optimal policy - commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment. We find that, even after allowing for Markov switching in shock variances, the inflation target and/or rule parameters, the data preferred description of policy is that the US Fed operates under discretion with a marked increase in conservatism after the 1970s. Parameter estimates are similar to those obtained under simple rules, except that the degree of habits is significantly lower and the prevalence of cost-push shocks greater. Moreover, we find that the greatest welfare gains from the ‘Great Moderation’ arose from the reduction in the variances in shocks hitting the economy, rather than increased inflation aversion. However, much of the high inflation of the 1970s could have been avoided had policy makers been able to commit, even without adopting stronger anti-inflation objectives. More recently the Fed appears to have temporarily relaxed policy following the 1987 stock market crash, and has lost, without regaining, its post-Volcker conservatism following the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

On optimal monetary and fiscal policy interactions in open economies

This paper studies monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a two country model, where taxes on firms sales are optimally chosen and the monetary policy is set cooperatively.It turns out that in a two country setting non-cooperative fiscal policy makers have an incentive to change taxes on sales depending on shocks realizations in order to reduce output production. Therefore whether the fiscal policy is set cooperatively or not matters for optimal monetary policy decisions. Indeed, as already shown in the literature, the cooperative monetary policy maker implements the flexible price allocation only when special conditions on the value of the distortions underlying the economy are met. However, if non-cooperative fiscal policy makers set the taxes on firms sales depending on shocks realizations, these conditions cannot be satisfied; conversely, when fiscal policy is cooperative, these conditions are fulfilled. We conclude that whether implementing the flexible price allocation is optimal or not depends on the fiscal policy regime.

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.

Optimal Solid Waste Policy with Centralized Recycling Opportunities

Economic models have demonstrated the efficiency of curbside collection taxes. This paper demonstrates that such efficiencies disappear in economies with centralized recycling options - where recyclable materials can be removed from the waste stream either by households or at a centralized recycling facility. In such economies a curbside garbage tax not only fails to encourage the centralized recycler to internalize the external costs of waste disposal, but introduces inefficiencies to the cost-minimizing mix of household and centralized recycling efforts. The optimal waste policy is a tax assessed further downstream at the landfill rather than at the curb.

Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random

We analyze a model where firms chose a production technology which, together with some random event, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a "clean" technology, and a "dirty" technology. The environmental regulation is based on taxes over reported emissions, and on penalties over unreported emissions. We show that the optimal inspection policy is a cut-off strategy, for several scenarios concerning the observability of the adoption of the clean technology and the cost of adopting it. We also show that the optimal inspection policy induces the firm to adopt the clean technology if the adoption cost is not too high, but the cost levels for which the firm adopts it depend on the scenario.