Uma crítica ao paradigma neoclássico: um enfoque micro e macroeconômico

Verifica-se o comportamento da firma oligopólica e até onde o modelo neoclássico é representativo desse comportamento. Verifica-se também se os valores de uma economia de mercado, como apresentados pela economia neoclássica, são os norteadores da política econômica.

Considerações analíticas sobre a competição no sistema bancário brasileiro

O mercado bancário brasileiro aparenta se organizar sob a forma de oligopólio, sobretudo por conta da presença de um número reduzido de grandes instituições. A teoria microeconômica nos sugere, no entanto, que mercado oligopolizado não é sinônimo de ausência de competição. A partir disso, conclui-se que não é evidente que os bancos privados domésticos não compitam entre si (claro, tampouco o contrário é evidente). Neste trabalho analisamos a evolução do grau de competitividade da indústria bancária brasileira, entre janeiro de 2001 e dezembro de 2012, utilizando a estatística-H de Panzar & Rosse. A mensuração da competição para a amostra completa continuou a indicar que os bancos brasileiros operam em regime de concorrência monopolística. Não obstante, a evolução trimestral da estatística-H aponta para períodos de significativa redução da competitividade na indústria bancária brasileira, que coincidem com momentos importantes em termos de fusões e aquisições dentro deste setor. Como complemento às conclusões obtidas através do cálculo da estatística-H, e à luz da recente intensiva do governo de “forçar” uma queda do spread bancário via instituições públicas, foram executados testes de causalidade (de Granger) entre as taxas de juros cobradas pelos bancos públicos e privados. Os resultados indicam que as instituições bancárias aparentemente levam em conta, dentre outros fatores, as decisões dos seus concorrentes na hora de definir as taxas de juros que serão cobradas, sugerindo que a estratégia do governo pode contribuir para a continuidade do processo de convergência do spread bancário para patamares internacionais.

A indústria do cimento no Brasil: um estudo de casos em concentração industrial

Busca demonstrar como a indústria do cimento no Brasil foi implantada, analisando os recursos necessários à produção do cimento. Aborda a história da Indústria e sua evolução baseada nas suas principais estatísticas.Examina o processo tecnológico no setor e a criação de barreiras à entrada que acabam por transformar o setor num mercado oligopólico. Analisa ainda o capital estrangeiro na indústria e o relacionamento desta com o Estado.

Microeconomia: teoria do mercado, teoria do consumidor, economia de empresas

O trabalho inicia expondo nos primeiros três capítulos os métodos da teoria econômica, o mecanismo de tomada de decisões e as reações do mercado. Em seguida são desenvolvidas as teorias do consumidor e da firma, onde gráficos e tabelas ilustram didaticamente a estrutura da demanda e da oferta. A parte final discorre sobre o equilíbrio em diferentes estruturas de mercado como a competição perfeita, o monopólio e o oligopólio.

Tributos indiretos na cadeia produtiva do camarão

The state of Rio Grande do Norte counts with a relevant potential in the shrimp farming supply chain. In the larviculture step the state responds for more than half of the national production. In the farming step it is the second largest producer. In the industrial step, its industries have almost 40% of the shrimp processing capacity of the northeast of Brazil. However, this country has the highest tax rate comparing with the main shrimp producer countries. Considering the influence of taxes in the competition among companies, the main goal of this research is to analyze the impact of indirect taxes in the above steps of the supply chain. To achieve it, it will be used the data of the 2011 Census of the Shrimp Farming and it will be applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to identify the market form of those steps. In order to contribute with the characterization of the supply chain, CEO´s of farms and industries will be interviewed. The price-elasticity of the shrimp larvae, the in natura shrimp and the processed shrimp will be analyzed in order to verify the possibility that each one of those three steps has to pass-through the onus of the end of benefit over the ICMS. The data analysis shows that the larviculture step functions as a duopoly and, facing the end of that benefit, it will be able to pass-through most its onus to the farming step. On the other hand, this step functions similar to a perfect competing market, which diminishes its capacity to pass-through that onus to the processing step. This step operates as oligopoly with a lower concentration than the larviculture step but, due to the fact that it faces an oligopsony, it will end up assuming most of that onus, which will cause a decrease in the amount of processed shrimp. It is concluded that the end of that benefit would impact negatively, in this state, the supply chain at all, but mainly the farming and the industrial steps

A concentração do mercado siderúrgico: uma análise dos indicadores CR4 e HHI no períiodo 1990-2010

The paper analyses the concentration degree in the global steel industry in the 1990-2010 period. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index, the paper has concluded that concentration in the world steel industry increased, mainly because the increase of acquisitions and fusions among firms.

A regulação jurídica constitucional dos meios e a monopolização das transmissões esportivas

It is this presentation of search results undergraduates, which had the purpose to analyze the legal regulation constitutional produced during the constituent process of 87/88 on the right of ownership of the media, in order to investigate the ban constitutional monopoly and oligopoly in the appropriation of the means. A research proposal considers that this prohibition is also, as a consequence, the seal of the oligopoly and monopoly in the transmission of information, assuming a market plural and diverse. Further considers that, notwithstanding the statutory prohibition on the plane of reality some media companies monopolize certain sectors of the economy, controlling the flow of information, as can be seen in the recent issue about the monopoly rights to broadcast games of the Championship Football Serie A, by the Globo Television Network, a theme that will be used to justify the illegality pointed to the sector. In this sense, the research revisited the constitutional process in order to analyze the projects and legislative debates that led to the current constitutional regulation of ownership of the media, as well as reviewed the decision of the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) in against the monopoly of the Globo broadcasts Brasileirão, series A.

Tributos indiretos na cadeia produtiva do camarão

The state of Rio Grande do Norte counts with a relevant potential in the shrimp farming supply chain. In the larviculture step the state responds for more than half of the national production. In the farming step it is the second largest producer. In the industrial step, its industries have almost 40% of the shrimp processing capacity of the northeast of Brazil. However, this country has the highest tax rate comparing with the main shrimp producer countries. Considering the influence of taxes in the competition among companies, the main goal of this research is to analyze the impact of indirect taxes in the above steps of the supply chain. To achieve it, it will be used the data of the 2011 Census of the Shrimp Farming and it will be applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to identify the market form of those steps. In order to contribute with the characterization of the supply chain, CEO´s of farms and industries will be interviewed. The price-elasticity of the shrimp larvae, the in natura shrimp and the processed shrimp will be analyzed in order to verify the possibility that each one of those three steps has to pass-through the onus of the end of benefit over the ICMS. The data analysis shows that the larviculture step functions as a duopoly and, facing the end of that benefit, it will be able to pass-through most its onus to the farming step. On the other hand, this step functions similar to a perfect competing market, which diminishes its capacity to pass-through that onus to the processing step. This step operates as oligopoly with a lower concentration than the larviculture step but, due to the fact that it faces an oligopsony, it will end up assuming most of that onus, which will cause a decrease in the amount of processed shrimp. It is concluded that the end of that benefit would impact negatively, in this state, the supply chain at all, but mainly the farming and the industrial steps

Tributos indiretos na cadeia produtiva do camarão

The state of Rio Grande do Norte counts with a relevant potential in the shrimp farming supply chain. In the larviculture step the state responds for more than half of the national production. In the farming step it is the second largest producer. In the industrial step, its industries have almost 40% of the shrimp processing capacity of the northeast of Brazil. However, this country has the highest tax rate comparing with the main shrimp producer countries. Considering the influence of taxes in the competition among companies, the main goal of this research is to analyze the impact of indirect taxes in the above steps of the supply chain. To achieve it, it will be used the data of the 2011 Census of the Shrimp Farming and it will be applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to identify the market form of those steps. In order to contribute with the characterization of the supply chain, CEO´s of farms and industries will be interviewed. The price-elasticity of the shrimp larvae, the in natura shrimp and the processed shrimp will be analyzed in order to verify the possibility that each one of those three steps has to pass-through the onus of the end of benefit over the ICMS. The data analysis shows that the larviculture step functions as a duopoly and, facing the end of that benefit, it will be able to pass-through most its onus to the farming step. On the other hand, this step functions similar to a perfect competing market, which diminishes its capacity to pass-through that onus to the processing step. This step operates as oligopoly with a lower concentration than the larviculture step but, due to the fact that it faces an oligopsony, it will end up assuming most of that onus, which will cause a decrease in the amount of processed shrimp. It is concluded that the end of that benefit would impact negatively, in this state, the supply chain at all, but mainly the farming and the industrial steps