Competition, oligopoly and technological change in the construction industry: the Argentine case

Includes bibliography

Industria del algodón en México y el oligopolio transnacional en su comercialización = Mexican cotton industry and the transnational cotton marketing oligopoly

Incluye Bibliografía

Oligopolio transnacional en la industria de café y el caso de Colombia = Transnational oligopoly in the coffee industry and the case of Colombia

Incluye Bibliografía

Oligopoly Model of a Debit Card Network

JEL Classification: G21, L13.

Price vs. quantity in oligopoly games

Price-setting and quantity-setting oligopoly games lead to extremely dierent outcomes in the market. One natural way to address this problem is to formulate a model in which some rms use price while the remaining rms use quantity as their decision variable. We introduce a mixed oligopoly game of this type and determine its equilibria. In addition, we consider an extension of this mixed oligopoly game through which the choice of the decision variables can be endogenized. We prove the emergence of the Cournot game.

Price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly

In this article we examine the eects of third degree price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We nd that the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for the lowest-valuation consumers and firms produce equal quantities to the other consumer groups.

Price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly

In this article we examine the eects of third degree price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We nd that the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for the lowest-valuation consumers and firms produce equal quantities to the other consumer groups.

A Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with a public firm

We determine conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium of a mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly exists. In addition, we determine its pure-strategy equilibrium whenever it exists and compare the equilibrium outcome with that of the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with only private firms.

Losses from Horizontal Merger: an Extension to a Successive Oligopoly Model with Product Differentiation

This paper generalizes the model of Salant et al. (1983; Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, pp. 185–199) to a successive oligopoly model with product differentiation. Upstream firms produce differentiated goods, retailers compete in quantities, and supply contracts are linear. We show that if retailers buy from all producers, downstream mergers do not affect wholesale prices. Our result replicates that of Salant's, where mergers are not profitable unless the size of the merged firm exceeds 80 per cent of the industry. This result is robust to the type of competition.

Rates of change : online distribution as disruptive technology in the film industry

Much debate in media and communication studies is based on exaggerated opposition between the digital sublime and the digital abject: overly enthusiastic optimism versus determined pessimism over the potential of new technologies. This inhibits the discipline's claims to provide rigorous insight into industry and social change which is, after all, continuous. Instead of having to decide one way or the other, we need to ask how we study the process of change.This article examines the impact of online distribution in the film industry, particularly addressing the question of rates of change. Are there genuinely new players disrupting the established oligopoly, and if so with what effect? Is there evidence of disruption to, and innovation in, business models? Has cultural change been forced on the incumbents? Outside mainstream Hollywood, where are the new opportunities and the new players? What is the situation in Australia?

Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

Predicting price-tag for customized goods

We discuss a dynamic pricing model which will aid automobile manufacturer in choosing the right price for customer segment. Though there is oligopoly market structure, the customers get "locked" into a particular technology/company which virtually makes the situation akin to a monopoly. There are associated network externalities and positive feedback. The key idea in monopoly pricing lies in extracting the customer surplus by exploiting the respective elasticities of demand. We present a Walrasian general equilibrium approach to determine the segment price. We compare the prices obtained from optimization model with that from Walrasian dynamics. The results are encouraging and can serve as a critical factor in Customer Relationship Management (CRM) and thereby effectively manage the lock-in.

Optimal advertisement-innovation mix for maximizing the discounted flow of profit

Due to boom in telecommunications market, there is hectic competition among the cellular handset manufacturers. As cellular manufacturing industry operates in an oligopoly framework, often price-rigidity leads to non-price wars. The handset manufacturing firms indulge in product innovation and also advertise their products in order to achieve their objective of maximizing discounted flow of profit. It is of interest to see what would be the optimal advertisement-innovation mix that would maximize the discounted How of profit for the firms. We used differential game theory to solve this problem. We adopted the open-loop solution methodology. We experimented for various scenarios over a 30 period horizon and derived interesting managerial insights.

Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market

The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors.