Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

Bringing Non-governmental Actors into the Policymaking Process: The Case of Local Development Policy in Thailand

During the past two decades in Thailand, non-governmental actors, such as NGOs, intellectuals, and people's organizations, have found widening opportunities to participate in policy formation and in the implementation of local development. The government has facilitated the formation of civil society forums, in the expectation of influencing local-level governance. The last two national five-year development plans were formulated after taking into account the voices of people in the provinces. Even though they may seem petty, some state funds are now transmitted through non-governmental institutions for policy implementation at the grassroots level. These changes have their origin in a reformation of rural development administration in early 1980s. This reformation in due course led to policies that have allowed the participation of non-governmental actors. Meanwhile, rural people have proved their ability to engage in participatory development by forming various local organizations, while NGOs have grown to be proficient facilitators of local development. This paper describes the process whereby three leading actors, namely the government, local people, and the NGOs, have interacted to bring about a more participatory system of local development administration.

Terrorism as war by other means: national security and state support for terrorism

The conventional approach in the discipline of International Relations is to treat terrorist organizations as "non-state" actors of international relations. However, this approach is problematic due to the fact that most terrorist organizations are backed or exploited by some states. In this article, I take issue with the non-stateness of terrorist organizations and seek to answer the question of why so many states, at times, support terrorist organizations. I argue that in the face of rising threats to national security in an age of devastating wars, modern nation states tend to provide support to foreign terrorist organizations that work against their present and imminent enemies. I elaborate on my argument studying three cases of state support for terrorism: Iranian support for Hamas, Syrian support for the PKK, and American support for the MEK. The analyses suggest that, for many states, terror is nothing but war by other means.

State Failure – A Rationale for EU Foreign Policy?

'Estats fallits' ha arribat a ser un lema popular per als acadèmics i els polítics per igual. En opinió dels governs occidentals i les institucions internacionals, els estats fallits no compleixen amb les condicions necessàries per assolir el desenvolupament econòmic i social i alhora proporcionar un terreny fèrtil per als actors violents conflictes i no estatals que participen en la delinqüència internacional. La Unió Europea té una relació de llarga data amb els països de l'Àfrica subsahariana, molts dels quals es caracteritzen per ser fallat. En aquest treball es pretén analitzar si el compromís retòric de la UE per fer front a la insuficiència de l'Estat es tradueix en un enfocament coherent davant les causes profundes de la fragilitat de l'Estat i pregunta pels factors que expliquen el compromís de la UE amb els problemes que enfronten aquests estats. Mitjançant la comparació de les polítiques europees cap a la República Democràtica del Congo, Sierra Leone i la República Centreafricana, s'argumenta que la resposta de la UE als Estats fallits es desenvolupa d'una manera incoherent esbiaixada cap a les situacions de conflicte en lloc de ser guiat per una preocupació més general per fragilitat . L'anàlisi suggereix que la participació de la UE es deu principalment a interessos coincidents en els Estats membres i de la UE.

Europeanization and the inclusive strategies of executive actors

In Europeanized policy domains, executive actors are considered especially powerful because they are directly responsible for international negotiations. However, in order to avoid failing in the ratification process, they are also highly dependent on the support of domestic, non-state actors. We argue that in Europeanized decision-making processes, state actors are not passively lobbied, but actively seek collaboration with - and support from - domestic actors. We apply stochastic actor-based modelling for network dynamics to collaboration data on two successive bilateral agreements on the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the European Union (EU). Results confirm our hypotheses that state actors are not passively lobbied, but actively look for collaboration with other actors, and especially with potential veto players and euro-sceptical actors from both the conservative Right and the Left.

Dissidents with an innovation cause? Non-institutionalized actors’ online social knowledge sharing, solution-finding tensions and technology management innovation

Purpose – Traditionally, most studies focus on institutionalized management-driven actors to understand technology management innovation. The purpose of this paper is to argue that there is a need for research to study the nature and role of dissident non-institutionalized actors’ (i.e. outsourced web designers and rapid application software developers). The authors propose that through online social knowledge sharing, non-institutionalized actors’ solution-finding tensions enable technology management innovation. Design/methodology/approach – A synthesis of the literature and an analysis of the data (21 interviews) provided insights in three areas of solution-finding tensions enabling management innovation. The authors frame the analysis on the peripherally deviant work and the nature of the ways that dissident non-institutionalized actors deviate from their clients (understood as the firm) original contracted objectives. Findings – The findings provide insights into the productive role of solution-finding tensions in enabling opportunities for management service innovation. Furthermore, deviant practices that leverage non-institutionalized actors’ online social knowledge to fulfill customers’ requirements are not interpreted negatively, but as a positive willingness to proactively explore alternative paths. Research limitations/implications – The findings demonstrate the importance of dissident non-institutionalized actors in technology management innovation. However, this work is based on a single country (USA) and additional research is needed to validate and generalize the findings in other cultural and institutional settings. Originality/value – This paper provides new insights into the perceptions of dissident non-institutionalized actors in the practice of IT managerial decision making. The work departs from, but also extends, the previous literature, demonstrating that peripherally deviant work in solution-finding practice creates tensions, enabling management innovation between IT providers and users.

Comparative Analysis of State and Non-State Higher Educational Institutions in Terms of their Adaptation to New Societal Conditions in Post-Soviet Russia

The present paper investigates post-Soviet non-state and state higher educational institutions in terms of students’ perceptions of school curriculum, quality of teaching, available educational resources and overall organization in their higher educational institutions.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

The Right to Water in the Global South: the impacts of neo‐liberalism on the marginalised groups

European Master's Degree in Human Rights and Democatisation Academic Year 2008/2009

The International Multilateral System: Imperatives of Change, Potential Scenarios and Suggestions for the Future

Thesis presented to satisfy the necessary requirements for obtaining a PhD degree in International Relation with specialization in Globalization and the Environment,

Organisational reforms in active welfare states: A comparative analysis of the turn to 'single gateways' in Western Europe

Based on the case of reforms aimed at integrating the provision of income protection and employment services for jobless people in Europe, this thesis seeks to understand the reasons which may prompt governments to engage in large-scale organisational reforms. Over the last 20 years, several European countries have indeed radically redesigned the organisational structure of their welfare state by merging or bundling existing front-line offices in charge of benefit payment and employment services together into 'one-stop' agencies. Whereas in academic and political debates, these reforms are generally presented as a necessary and rational response to the problems and inconsistencies induced by fragmentation in a context of the reorientation of welfare states towards labour market activation, this thesis shows that the agenda setting of these reforms is in fact the result of multidimensional political dynamics. More specifically, the main argument of this thesis is that these reforms are best understood not so such from the problems induced by organisational compartmentalism, whose political recognition is often controversial, but from the various goals that governments may simultaneously achieve by means of their adoption. This argument is tested by comparing agenda-setting processes of large-scale reforms of coordination in the United Kingdom (Jobcentre Plus), Germany (Hartz IV reform) and Denmark (2005 Jobcentre reform), and contrasting them with the Swiss case where the government has so far rejected any coordination initiative involving organisational redesign. This comparison brings to light the importance, for the rise of organisational reforms, of the possibility to couple them with the following three goals: first, goals related to the strengthening of activation policies; second, institutional goals seeking to redefine the balance of responsibilities between the central state and non-state actors, and finally electoral goals for governments eager to maintain political credibility. The decisive role of electoral goals in the three countries suggests that these reforms are less bound by partisan politics than by the particular pressures facing governments arrived in office after long periods in opposition.