Iran's domestic and foreign policies

Iran has a reputation of being a problematic country. Right now, it is proceeding with its nuclear program despite the opposition of the West and neighboring countries and the massive sanctions inflicted upon it. The country is also struggling with domestic issues. Half of Iran’s population belongs to different ethnic or religious minorities. They have poor rights to express their culture in the country, which is a cause of dissatisfaction among non-Shiite and non-Persian citizens. After the Arab Spring, the situation in Iran is getting more topical than ever. In the Syrian conflict, the Shiite Iran is constantly giving support to al-Assad’s regime. These are all factors that have aggravated the already irritated relations between Iran and the West.

Irán nuclear ¿amenaza o desarrollo?

Este es un reportaje periodístico sobre Irán y su polémico programa de enriquecimiento de uranio.

De aliado a enemigo : análisis del cambio de posición de la federación rusa y china y sus relaciones con Irán y su programa nuclear, en el seno del consejo de seguridad de la Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU) en el periodo 2005 – 2010

El programa Nuclear de Irán ha causado polémica en el Sistema Internacional, donde muchos Estados han sido protagonistas. Dentro de estos se encuentran La Federación Rusa y China, los cuales han cambiado de posición a lo largo de los años y teniendo en cuenta sus intereses, con respecto a Irán, en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU entre 2005 y 2010

Análisis de la importancia geopolítica del Estrecho de Ormuz para la política exterior iraní, durante el período 2005-2011

El estrecho de Ormuz es considerado el cuello de botella más importante para el comercio internacional de los hidrocarburos. En la actualidad, la soberanía sobre este punto geográfico se encuentra compartida entre el Sultanato de Omán y la República Islámica de Irán. El siguiente documento analiza la importancia geopolítica que convierte al estrecho de Ormuz en un lugar estratégico para la política exterior iraní durante el período 2005-2011. Como respuesta a las condenas internacionales, Irán amenazó a la comunidad internacional con cerrar el paso por el estrecho si continuaban las sanciones contra su programa nuclear. De esto modo, la hipótesis se centró en el nivel de disuasión con el que cuenta el estrecho, es así como la investigación se divide en tres partes, siendo la primera el desarrollo de un contexto geopolítico que combina intereses y características del estrecho de Ormuz, la segunda explica las tensiones y dinámicas surgidas en el período de estudio, haciendo énfasis en la variable geoestratégica del estrecho y por último, la tercera parte además de describir el programa nuclear, acerca al lector con el concepto de disuasión y de igual modo plantea las consecuencias de un posible bloqueo dentro de la zona.

Beyond retrenchment over Iran: can the EU offer a framework for regional security? CEPS Commentary, 3 September 2012

A new and far-reaching round of sanctions imposed recently on Iran by the EU is starting to hurt the country, its economy and its citizens. Yet Iran’s leadership seems deaf to demands for international weapons inspectors to be allowed unhindered access to its nuclear enrichment facilities. With a regime that is not likely to sway to international and domestic pressure, and in view of the shifting strategic landscape in the Middle East, the question is whether the twin-track approach of sanctions and diplomacy should be kept up, or whether it should make way for an alternative set of policies that could preserve the fragile stability in the wider Middle East and turn a vicious circle into a virtuous one. In this new Commentary, CEPS Senior Research Fellow Steven Blockmans argues that the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, supported by the European External Action Service, is in a good position to offer a negotiated way out of this seemingly intractable situation.

Investigation of the genetic diversity of domestic Capra hircus breeds reared within an early goat domestication area in Iran

Background: Iran is an area of particular interest for investigating goat diversity. Archaeological remains indicate early goat domestication (about 10 000 years ago) in the Iranian Zagros Mountains as well as in the high Euphrates valley and southeastern Anatolia. In addition, mitochondrial DNA data of domestic goats and wild ancestors (C. aegagrusor bezoar) suggest a pre-domestication management of wild populations in southern Zagros and central Iranian Plateau. In this study genetic diversity was assessed in seven Iranian native goat breeds, namely Markhoz, Najdi, Taleshi, Khalkhali, Naini, native Abadeh and Turki-Ghashghaei. A total of 317 animals were characterized using 14 microsatellite loci. Two Pakistani goat populations, Pahari and Teddy, were genotyped for comparison.Results: Iranian goats possess a remarkable genetic diversity (average expected heterozygosity of 0.671 across loci, 10.7 alleles per locus) mainly accounted for by the within-breed component (G(ST) = 5.9%). Positive and highly significant F-IS values in the Naini, Turki-Ghashghaei, Abadeh and Markhoz breeds indicate some level of inbreeding in these populations. Multivariate analyses cluster Iranian goats into northern, central and western groups, with the western breeds relatively distinct from the others. Pakistani breeds show some relationship with Iranian populations, even if their position is not consistent across analyses. Gene flow was higher within regions (west, north, central) compared to between regions but particularly low between the western and the other two regions, probably due to the isolating topography of the Zagros mountain range. The Turki-Ghashghaei, Najdi and Abadeh breeds are reared in geographic areas where mtDNA provided evidence of early domestication. These breeds are highly variable, located on basal short branches in the neighbor-joining tree, close to the origin of the principal component analysis plot and, although highly admixed, they are quite distinct from those reared on the western side of the Zagros mountain range.Conclusions: These observations call for further investigation of the nuclear DNA diversity of these breeds within a much wider geographic context to confirm or re-discuss the current hypothesis (based on maternal lineage data) of an almost exclusive contribution of the eastern Anatolian bezoar to the domestic goat gene pool.

Sviluppo di metodologie di localizzazione nel contesto del Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

Since the first underground nuclear explosion, carried out in 1958, the analysis of seismic signals generated by these sources has allowed seismologists to refine the travel times of seismic waves through the Earth and to verify the accuracy of the location algorithms (the ground truth for these sources was often known). Long international negotiates have been devoted to limit the proliferation and testing of nuclear weapons. In particular the Treaty for the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT), was opened to signatures in 1996, though, even if it has been signed by 178 States, has not yet entered into force, The Treaty underlines the fundamental role of the seismological observations to verify its compliance, by detecting and locating seismic events, and identifying the nature of their sources. A precise definition of the hypocentral parameters represents the first step to discriminate whether a given seismic event is natural or not. In case that a specific event is retained suspicious by the majority of the State Parties, the Treaty contains provisions for conducting an on-site inspection (OSI) in the area surrounding the epicenter of the event, located through the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the CTBT Organization. An OSI is supposed to include the use of passive seismic techniques in the area of the suspected clandestine underground nuclear test. In fact, high quality seismological systems are thought to be capable to detect and locate very weak aftershocks triggered by underground nuclear explosions in the first days or weeks following the test. This PhD thesis deals with the development of two different seismic location techniques: the first one, known as the double difference joint hypocenter determination (DDJHD) technique, is aimed at locating closely spaced events at a global scale. The locations obtained by this method are characterized by a high relative accuracy, although the absolute location of the whole cluster remains uncertain. We eliminate this problem introducing a priori information: the known location of a selected event. The second technique concerns the reliable estimates of back azimuth and apparent velocity of seismic waves from local events of very low magnitude recorded by a trypartite array at a very local scale. For the two above-mentioned techniques, we have used the crosscorrelation technique among digital waveforms in order to minimize the errors linked with incorrect phase picking. The cross-correlation method relies on the similarity between waveforms of a pair of events at the same station, at the global scale, and on the similarity between waveforms of the same event at two different sensors of the try-partite array, at the local scale. After preliminary tests on the reliability of our location techniques based on simulations, we have applied both methodologies to real seismic events. The DDJHD technique has been applied to a seismic sequence occurred in the Turkey-Iran border region, using the data recorded by the IMS. At the beginning, the algorithm was applied to the differences among the original arrival times of the P phases, so the cross-correlation was not used. We have obtained that the relevant geometrical spreading, noticeable in the standard locations (namely the locations produced by the analysts of the International Data Center (IDC) of the CTBT Organization, assumed as our reference), has been considerably reduced by the application of our technique. This is what we expected, since the methodology has been applied to a sequence of events for which we can suppose a real closeness among the hypocenters, belonging to the same seismic structure. Our results point out the main advantage of this methodology: the systematic errors affecting the arrival times have been removed or at least reduced. The introduction of the cross-correlation has not brought evident improvements to our results: the two sets of locations (without and with the application of the cross-correlation technique) are very similar to each other. This can be commented saying that the use of the crosscorrelation has not substantially improved the precision of the manual pickings. Probably the pickings reported by the IDC are good enough to make the random picking error less important than the systematic error on travel times. As a further justification for the scarce quality of the results given by the cross-correlation, it should be remarked that the events included in our data set don’t have generally a good signal to noise ratio (SNR): the selected sequence is composed of weak events ( magnitude 4 or smaller) and the signals are strongly attenuated because of the large distance between the stations and the hypocentral area. In the local scale, in addition to the cross-correlation, we have performed a signal interpolation in order to improve the time resolution. The algorithm so developed has been applied to the data collected during an experiment carried out in Israel between 1998 and 1999. The results pointed out the following relevant conclusions: a) it is necessary to correlate waveform segments corresponding to the same seismic phases; b) it is not essential to select the exact first arrivals; and c) relevant information can be also obtained from the maximum amplitude wavelet of the waveforms (particularly in bad SNR conditions). Another remarkable point of our procedure is that its application doesn’t demand a long time to process the data, and therefore the user can immediately check the results. During a field survey, such feature will make possible a quasi real-time check allowing the immediate optimization of the array geometry, if so suggested by the results at an early stage.

China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

E3+3 coercive diplomacy towards Iran: Do the economic sanctions add up? CEPS Policy Brief No. 292, 6 June 2013

More than ten years of international negotiations have brought no resolution to the nuclear dispute with Iran. In January 2012 the EU and US autonomously adopted an unprecedented sanctions package, mainly directed at the Iranian oil industry. Eighteen months later, figures show that the Iranian economy has been hit hard. Sanctions have not changed the regime’s calculus, however. Instead of further upping the pressure on Iran, the authors argue for a return to a more balanced dual-track approach so as to reinforce the moderate narrative within the Iranian ruling elite.

Diplomatic Spin: EU3+3 talks on Iran’s nuclear file. CEPS Commentary, 21 November 2014

The Joint Plan of Action agreed upon with Iran on 24 November 2013 gave negotiators one year to forge a comprehensive agreement that restricts the country’s ability to militarise its nuclear programme. That deadline will lapse in the next few days and diplomats involved in the talks have been trying to rein in expectations that a deal will be struck on time. Satisfying domestic constituencies in Iran and the US is what makes the politics of dealing with the nuclear file so much harder than the physics of slowing down the nuclear programme. Any future deal will have to stand on its own merits, enabling Iran and the EU3+3 to cooperate on the other geopolitical challenges they face. Both parties should therefore balance their demands with what they can realistically offer and make concessions to reach a compromise. The author of this CEPS Commentary argues that if no deal is reached on November 24th, then diplomacy should be allowed to keep on spinning for a few more months.

The war of nerves with Iran - consequences for the South Caucasus and Russia. OSW Commentary No. 75, 2012-04-25

Tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme have risen considerably in recent months. This has been visible in numerous threats of – and much speculation about – an imminent Israeli (and US) attack on Iran’s nuclear installations. In this context, the support for the attacks that the countries of the South Caucasus (and Azerbaijan in particular) could provide has been the subject of lively debate, as has been the prospect of a Russian political and military offensive in the Caucasus in response to the attacks on Iran. It seems that the ongoing war campaign in the media has been aimed primarily at putting pressure on Iran and the international community to find a political solution to the Iranian problem. This also applies to the Caucasus’s involvement in the campaign. Given the outcome of the Istanbul round of talks on a political solution to the Iranian issue (14 April), which warrants moderate optimism, the threat of a conflict now appears more distant and this also indirectly proves the effectiveness of the campaign. The war of nerves with Iran, however, is already now actually affecting the stability of the Southern Caucasus. While it seems that Azerbaijan is not Israel’s partner in the preparations to attacks, and that there is no real link between the Iranian problem and the ongoing and planned movements of Russian troops in the Caucasus, the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan are indeed high. Moreover, the global image of the Caucasus is deteriorating, the USA’s position in the region is becoming more complicated, and Russia’s room for manoeuvre is expanding.

Toward international peace and security: Addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation in a globalized world. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

With a growing number of threats to governance in the international system that result from globalization and technological innovation, it is no surprise that states have come to rely more heavily on each other and the global community for support. While the EU is partially constrained by the ultimate outcome of its own integration process, limited knowledge on this issue, and the national interests of its Member States, other governments are also experiencing difficulty in domestic implementation of international resolutions. To better understand the impact of the most recent sanctioning efforts, this paper will explore the development of the non-proliferation regime, examine implementation mechanisms of non-proliferation agreements, and analyze the impact of increased cooperation among states to thwart the spread of WMD technology and material. Case studies of unilateral measures undertaken by the US and EU against Iran will provide insight into the political and economic implications of economic sanctions from individual governments. New and emerging methods for limiting rogue states and non-state actors from acquiring the means to develop WMD will also be discussed in an effort to further discussion for future policy debates on this critical topic.

After a nuclear deal: What next for Iranian oil and gas? EPC Policy Brief, 23 June 2015

On 2 April in Lausanne, after months of intense negotiations, Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany, and the UK plus China, Russia, and the US) agreed on a framework deal for the resolution of the nuclear dispute. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and Iran's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, issued a joint statement announcing that "solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" have been found. While differences remain on several issues, including the scope of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and sanctions relief, the statement has nevertheless raised hopes that a final deal may be reached this summer. If accomplished, an agreement would bring an end to more than a decade of tensions between Iran and the international community. This would result in the lifting of several sanctions, which were adopted against Iran by the United Nations, the EU, and the US. Unsurprisingly therefore, Iran's economy and in particular its energy sector are now the subject of worldwide attention.

EU-Iran relations post-Vienna: the way forward. EPC Commentary, 16 July 2015

From the Introduction. After 18 days of marathon talks over Iran’s nuclear programme, the E3 plus 3 (US, Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany) and Iran agreed on the final text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), opening a new chapter in relations between Iran and the West after a 12-year standoff.

Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) /

"As currently interpreted, it is difficult to see why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) warrants much support as a nonproliferation convention. Most foreign ministries, including that of Iran and the United States, insist that Article IV of the NPT recognizes all states' "inalienable right" of all states to develop "peaceful nuclear energy". This includes money-losing activities, such as nuclear fuel reprocessing, which can bring countries to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. If the NPT is intended to ensure that states share peaceful "benefits" of nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear bomb making technologies, it is difficult to see how it can accomplish either if the interpretation identified above is correct."--P. 3