Exploring the construction of social class in educational discourse: the rational order of the nation state vs. global uncertainties

This article aims to create intellectual space in which issues of social inequality and education can be analyzed and discussed in relation to the multifaceted and multi-levelled complexities of the modern world. It is divided into three sections. Section One locates the concept of social class in the context of the modern nation state during the period after the Second World War. Focusing particularly on the impact of ‘Fordism’ on social organization and cultural relations, it revisits the articulation of social justice issues in the United Kingdom, and the structures put into place at the time to alleviate educational and social inequalities. Section Two problematizes the traditional concept of social class in relation to economic, technological and sociocultural changes that have taken place around the world since the mid-1980s. In particular, it charts some of the changes to the international labour market and global patterns of consumption, and their collective impact on the re-constitution of class boundaries in ‘developed countries’. This is juxtaposed with some of the major social effects of neo-classical economic policies in recent years on the sociocultural base in developing countries. It discusses some of the ways these inequalities are reflected in education. Section Three explores tensions between the educational ideals of the ‘knowledge economy’ and the discursive range of social inequalities that are emerging within and beyond the nation state. Drawing on key motifs identified throughout, the article concludes with a reassessment of the concept of social class within the global cultural economy. This is discussed in relation to some of the major equity and human rights issues in education today.

The Family Novel in the Emerging Nation-State: A Comparative Study of Ba Jin’s Jia and Lev Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina

The theme of family in literature and in popular discourse occurs at times when the family as an institution is under attack. Attacks against the family coupled with defence of the family are viewed as the barometer of people’s satisfaction with the society in which they live. This outpouring of emotion, whether it is in defence of or attacking the family, is the result of the family’s position on the bridge between nature and society – a fortunate (or a detrimental) link between an individual and the units that make up a society. Across the United States and much of the western world, the battle for gay marriage and inclusive civil unions has revealed the fissures in our collective moral view of the family. The conservative concern about the absence of ‘family values’ is magnified by our situation in a world of flux. Inflation, war, terrorist threats, and the depletion of natural resources are but a few examples. When so much is unknown, how do we position ourselves? What anchors us to the past, gives us comfort in the present, and supports us in the future if not the family? Alternatively, what coddles us more in the past, shackles us more to the present, and lulls us more into a fixed conception of the future than the family? My research is not a sociological survey into the family nor does it stake any claims to understanding the present state of the family in society. The study seeks, however, to shed light on the rhetorical uses of the family by analysing two novels that are inextricably concerned with the theory of the family in times of heightened social change. In particular, my research focuses upon the social role and political meaning of the family in Anna Karenina and Jia.

Nation-state belonging among Asian Australians and the question of transnationalism

Research shows that migrants are likely to develop multiple attachments to local and global allegiances that lie beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Drawing on the Asian Australian experience as a point of departure, this article explores whether Asian Australian migrants from a range of different social and cultural backgrounds are more or less likely than the rest of the Australian population to feel a sense of belonging to the nation-state. Using the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2003, the results show that Asian Australian migrants have similar views towards the nation-state as the rest of the Australian population. Given that research on the Asian Australian migrant experience is predominantly located in cultural studies, the results suggest the importance of using survey research as another avenue to understand the migrant experience.

Educational reform in North Cyprus : towards the making of a nation/state?

The Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) aspires to take its place in Europe and the global ‘knowledge economy’. In order to do so, it needs not only to be politically recognised as legitimate and to develop the kinds of economic and governance structures that signify a functional state, but also to produce a cultural imaginary of itself as a nation. In this paper, we mobilise Appadurai’s theorisation of deterritorialisation, flows and context generation in order to examine the ways in which the implementation of educational reforms inTRNC might contribute to this ambition.We show that the ethnoscape and financescape combine to make education reform difficult, with specific challenges arising from the mixed commitment of the workforce, the capacity of the education bureaucracy to align support with policy mandates, and the ‘fit’ between the policy and local needs. We conclude by suggesting that TRNC faces the dilemma of working with cultural heterogeneity: Appadurai identifies this as a key ideoscape challenge for all nation/states.

Decentralization in Nation State Building of Indonesia

Introduction：Today, many countries, regardless of developed or developing, are trying to promote decentralization. According to Manor, as his quoting of Nickson’s argument, decentralization stems from the necessity to strengthen local governments as proxy of civil society to fill the yawning gap between the state and civil society (Manor [1999]: 30). With the end to the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union rendering the cause of the “leadership of the central government to counter communism” meaningless, Manor points out, it has become increasingly difficult to respond flexibly to changes in society under the centralized system. Then, what benefits can be expected from the effectuation of decentralization? Litvack-Ahmad-Bird cited the four points: attainment of allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for local public goods; improvement to government competitiveness; realization of good governance; and enhancement of the legitimacy and sustainability of heterogeneous national states (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird [1998]: 5). They all contribute to reducing the economic and social costs of a central government unable to respond to changes in society and enhancing the efficiency of state administration through the delegation of authority to local governments. Why did Indonesia have a go at decentralization? As Maryanov recognizes, reasons for the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia have never been explicitly presented (Maryanov [1958]: 17). But there was strong momentum toward building a democratic state in Indonesia at the time of independence, and as indicated by provisions of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, there was the tendency in Indonesia from the beginning to debate decentralization in association with democratization. That said debate about democratization was fairly abstract and the main points are to ease the tensions, quiet the complaints, satisfy the political forces and thus stabilize the process of government (Maryanov [1958]: 26-27). 　　　What triggered decentralization in Indonesia in earnest, of course, was the collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The Soeharto regime, regarded as the epitome of the centralization of power, became incapable of effectively dealing with problems in administration of the state and development administration. Besides, the post-Soeharto era of “reform (reformasi)” demanded the complete wipeout of the Soeharto image. In contraposition to the centralization of power was decentralization. The Soeharto regime that ruled Indonesia for 32 years was established in 1966 under the banner of “anti-communism.” The end of the Cold War structure in the late 1980s undermined the legitimate reason the centralization of power to counter communism claimed by the Soeharto regime. The factor for decentralization cited by Manor is applicable here. 　　　Decentralization can be interpreted to mean not only the reversal of the centralized system of government due to its inability to respond to changes in society, as Manor points out, but also the participation of local governments in the process of the nation state building through the more positive transfer of power (democratic decentralization) and in the coordinated pursuit with the central government for a new shape of the state. However, it is also true that a variety of problems are gushing out in the process of implementing decentralization in Indonesia. 　　　This paper discusses the relationship between decentralization and the formation of the nation state with the awareness of the problems and issues described above. Section 1 retraces the history of decentralization by examining laws and regulations for local administration and how they were actually implemented or not. Section 2 focuses on the relationships among the central government, local governments, foreign companies and other actors in the play over the distribution of profits from exploitation of natural resources, and examines the process of the ulterior motives of these actors and the amplification of mistrust spawning intense conflicts that, in extreme cases, grew into separation and independence movements. Section 3 considers the merits and demerits at this stage of decentralization implemented since 2001 and shed light on the significance of decentralization in terms of the nation state building. Finally, Section 4 attempts to review decentralization as the “opportunity to learn by doing” for the central and local governments in the process of the nation state building. 　　　In the context of decentralization in Indonesia, deconcentration (dekonsentrasi), decentralization (desentralisasi) and support assignments (tugas pembantuan; medebewind, a Dutch word, was used previously) are defined as follows. Dekonsentrasi means that when the central government puts a local office of its own, or an outpost agency, in charge of implementing its service without delegating the administrative authority over this particular service. The outpost agency carries out the services as instructed by the central government. A head of a local government, when acting for the central government, gets involved in the process of dekonsentrasi. Desentralisasi, meanwhile, occurs when the central government cedes the administrative authority over a particular service to local governments. Under desentralisasi, local governments can undertake the particular service at their own discretion, and the central government, after the delegation of authority, cannot interfere with how local governments handle that service. Tugas pembantuan occur when the central government makes local governments or villages, or local governments make villages, undertake a particular service. In this case, the central government, or local governments, provides funding, equipment and materials necessary, and officials of local governments and villages undertake the service under the supervision and guidance of the central or local governments. Tugas pembantuan are maintained until local governments and villages become capable of undertaking that particular service on their own.

Europe as International Actor: Maximizing Nation-State Sovereignty. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 06.3, 1996

The continually increasing literature on foreign- and security-policy dimensions of the European Union (EU) has provided no remedy for the widespread helplessness in gaining a purchase on Europe as an international actor. The basic hindrance to understanding this policy comes from an all-too-literal interpretation of the acronym involved: the CFSP is understood as a total or partial replacement of the nation-states' foreign and security policy. This article aims to point the way to a new understanding of the CFSP in which this policy is not based on the integration of nation­ state foreign and security policy. I suggest that the proper way to grasp the phenomenon of the CFSP is to describe it as an international regime whose goal is to administer links between economic integration and foreign- and security­ policy cooperation in the sense of maximizing the sovereignty of member states. This requires, on the one hand, the prevention of "spillovers" from the economic area that could interfere with the foreign- and security-policy indepen­ dence of member states. On the other hand, it demands applying the EU's economic potential to reinforce the foreign- and security-policy range of member states. Due to the logic of this policy, CFSP priorities and fields of ac­ tion differ profoundly from those of a national foreign and security policy. Expectations on the evolution of the CFSP must be aware of these basic characteristics of this policy.

The frontier of loyalty : political exiles in the age of the nation-state /

Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--Yale.