Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

An affective approach to moral motivation

Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called "moral psychology", which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an "affective picture": 'picture' because it remains strictly at the descriptive level and 'affective' because it has an important role for affects and emotions. This affective picture is grounded on a number of plausible and empirically supported hypotheses. The main idea is that we should distinguish between various kinds of value judgements by focusing on the sort of state of mind people find themselves in while uttering a judgement. "Reasoned judgements" are products of rational considerations and are based on preliminary acceptance of norms and values. On the contrary, "basic value judgements" are affective, primitive and non-reflective ways of assessing the world. As we shall see, this analysis has some consequences for the traditional internalism-externalism debate in philosophy; it highlights the fact that motivation is primarily linked to "basic value judgements" and that the judgements we openly defend might not have a particular effect on our actions, unless we are inclined to have an emotional attitude that conforms to them.

How family caregivers' medical and moral assumptions influence decision making for patients in the vegetative state: a qualitative interview study.

Background Decisions on limiting life-sustaining treatment for patients in the vegetative state (VS) are emotionally and morally challenging. In Germany, doctors have to discuss, together with the legal surrogate (often a family member), whether the proposed treatment is in accordance with the patient's will. However, it is unknown whether family members of the patient in the VS actually base their decisions on the patient's wishes. Objective To examine the role of advance directives, orally expressed wishes, or the presumed will of patients in a VS for family caregivers' decisions on life-sustaining treatment. Methods and sample A qualitative interview study with 14 next of kin of patients in a VS in a long-term care setting was conducted; 13 participants were the patient's legal surrogates. Interviews were analysed according to qualitative content analysis. Results The majority of family caregivers said that they were aware of aforementioned wishes of the patient that could be applied to the VS condition, but did not base their decisions primarily on these wishes. They gave three reasons for this: (a) the expectation of clinical improvement, (b) the caregivers' definition of life-sustaining treatments and (c) the moral obligation not to harm the patient. If the patient's wishes were not known or not revealed, the caregivers interpreted a will to live into the patient's survival and non-verbal behaviour. Conclusions Whether or not prior treatment wishes of patients in a VS are respected depends on their applicability, and also on the medical assumptions and moral attitudes of the surrogates. We recommend repeated communication, support for the caregivers and advance care planning.

Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services

This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a four-stage game divided into two periods. In each period there is (1) a contest stage à la Tullock in which the principal selects an agent and (2) a service stage in which the selected agent provides a service. Since this service effort is non-verifiable, the principal faces a moral hazard problem at the service stages. This work considers how the principal should design the period-two contest to mitigate the moral hazard problem in the period-one service stage and to maximize total service and contest efforts. It is shown that the principal must take account of the agent's past service effort in the period-two contest success function. The results indicate that the optimal way to introduce this `bias' is to choose a certain degree of complementarity between past service and current contest efforts. This result shows that contests with `additive bias' (`multiplicative bias') are optimal in incentive problems when effort cost is low (high). Furthermore, it is shown that the severity of the moral hazard problem increases with the cost of service effort (compared to the cost of contest effort) and the number of agents. Finally, the results are extended to more general contest success functions. JEL classification: C72; D82 Key words: Biased contests; Moral Hazard; Repeated Game; Incentives.

Distal and proximal influences on the use of business and moral frames in responsible decisions

We empirically contribute to the debate on business education in building on a decision frame perspective of decision making in corporate responsibility settings. Business schools have been accused to teach amoral theories, leading their students to behave less morally and engendering corporate responsibility scandals. Research has also pointed toward self-selection: business students would differ from non-business students before entering business school. We examine the role of socioeconomic status, core self-evaluations in this regard. Further, we investigate the belief in a free market as a distal influence triggering a business frame, and moral intensity as a proximal influence triggering a moral frame on responsible decision making by business and non-business students. Cross-sectional data obtained from 566 students on two decision making scenarios mostly supported our hypotheses. Socioeconomic status but not core self-evaluations explain the belief in a free market, and had indirect effects on the likelihood to make a less responsible decision. Importantly, the relationship between business studies and the belief in a free market remained significant after accounting for these variables. Our study thus contributes to the socialization and self-selection arguments. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for research on decision frames and for business education, respectively.

Hume, liberty and the object of moral evaluation

Hume's project concerning the conflict between liberty and necessity is ";reconciliatory";. But what is the nature of Hume's project? Does he solve a problem in metaphysics only? And when Hume says that the dispute between the doctrines of liberty and necessity is merely verbal, does he mean that there is no genuine metaphysical dispute between the doctrines? In the present essay I argue for: (1) there is room for liberty in Hume's philosophy, and not only because the position is pro forma compatibilist, even though this has importance for the recognition that Hume's main concern when discussing the matter is with practice; (2) the position does not involve a ";subjectivization"; of every form of necessity: it is not compatibilist because it creates a space for the claim that the operations of the will are non-problematically necessary through a weakning of the notion of necessity as it applies to external objects; (3) Hume holds that the ordinary phenomena of mental causation do not preempt the atribuition of moral responsibility, which combines perfectly with his identification of the object of moral evaluation: the whole of the character of a person, in relation to which there is, nonetheless, liberty. I intend to support my assertions by a close reading of what Hume states in section 8 of the first Enquiry.

The Influence of Arousal on Moral Decision-making for Individuals with and without Mild Head Injury

Recent research has shown that University students with a history of self-reported mild head injury (MHI) are more willing to endorse moral transgressions associated with personal, relative to impersonal, dilemmas (Chiappetta & Good, 2008). However, the terms 'personal' and 'impersonal' in these dilemmas have functionally confounded the 'intentionality' of the transgression with the 'personal impact' or 'outcome' of the transgression. In this study we used a modified version of these moral dilemmas to investigate decision-making and sympathetic nervous system responsivity. Forty-eight University students (24 with MHI, 24 with no-MHI) read 24 scenarios depicting moral dilemmas varying as a function of 'intentionality' of the act (deliberate or unintentional) and its 'outcome' (physical harm, no physical harm, non-moral) and were required to rate their willingness to engage in the act. Physiological indices of arousal (e.g., heart rate - HR) were recorded throughout. Additionally, participants completed several neurocognitive tests. Results indicated significantly lowered HR activity at baseline, prior to, and during (but not after) making a decision for each type of dilemma for participants with MHI compared to their non-injured cohort. Further, they were more likely than their cohort to authorize personal injuries that were deliberately induced. MHI history was also associated with better performance on tasks of cognitive flexibility and attention; while students' complaints of postconcussive symptoms and their social problem solving abilities did not differ as a function of MHI history. The results provide subtle support for the hypothesis that both emotional and cognitive information guide moral decision making in ambiguous and emotionally distressing situations. Persons with even a MHI have diminished physiological arousal that may reflect disruption to the neural pathways of the VMPFC/OFC similar to those with more severe injuries.

A Moral Stakeholder Theory of the Firm

To be a coherent and genuinely alternative conception to the shareholder model, any moral stakeholder theory must meet the following conditions: (1) It must be an ethical theory; (2) It must identify a limited group as stakeholders; (3) The group must be identified on morally relevant grounds; (4) Stakeholder claims must be non-universal; (5) And not held against everyone. A principle for identifying the stakeholder is suggested as a person who has much to lose – financially, socially, or psychologically – by the failure of the firm. The emerging picture contrasts sharply with the conventional conception of the firm.

Le dommage moral et le préjudice extrapatrimonial

Notre recherche visait au départ l'analyse de la substance du dommage moral: retrouver les sentiments à l'intérieur des chefs de dommage moral. Une première lecture des jugements québécois publiés, rendus entre le 1er janvier 1950 et le 31 décembre 2008 et à l'intérieur desquels des dommages et intérêts ont été octroyés pour réparer un dommage moral en matière de responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, laisse une impression de confusion et de désordre, tant au plan terminologique qu'au plan conceptuel. Dommage moral, préjudice extrapatrimonial, dommage non pécuniaire, préjudice moral: autant de termes qui rendent impossible une synthèse des chefs de préjudice. C'est finalement à l'analyse des raisons de cette confusion, aux formes qu'elle prend, aux moyens déployés par les juristes pour, sinon la surmonter, du moins la contenir, que la présente thèse est consacrée. Malgré cette confusion et ce désordre, un constat général d'homogénéité et de stabilité des discours judiciaire et juridique sur le préjudice extrapatrimonial peut d'abord être tracé. Le dommage moral et le préjudice extrapatrimonial (les deux étant couramment assimilés) sont réputés difficilement réparables. Afin de contenir l'arbitraire et la subjectivité qui caractérisent le préjudice extrapatrimonial, un discours dominant rationnel et raisonnable s'est construit et une évaluation globale du préjudice est pratiquée par les juges. Il en résulte une stabilité des montants des dommages et intérêts octroyés à titre de réparation. Mais pourquoi autant de mots pour décrire une même réalité? Dommage et préjudice sont actuellement employés en droit québécois comme s'ils étaient terminologiquement et conceptuellement indistincts; il en résulte une sursimplification de la responsabilité civile. Nous proposons que le dommage (qu'il soit corporel, matériel ou moral) et le préjudice (qu'il soit extrapatrimonial ou patrimonial) sont distincts. Le dommage se qualifie au siège de l'atteinte (des corps, des choses, des sentiments et valeurs) et le préjudice se qualifie au regard de la nature des répercussions du dommage (répercussions patrimoniales ou extrapatrimoniales). Ainsi distingués, dommage et préjudice retrouvent un sens tout en faisant ressortir les deux temps composant la responsabilité civile: l'établissement d'une responsabilité à l'aide de la faute, du dommage et du lien de causalité les unissant (1er temps) et la réparation du préjudice accompagnant le dommage (2e temps). Par une telle distinction, la sursimplification de la responsabilité civile est dépassée et force est de constater que bien peu de choses sont dites dans les jugements sur la substance du dommage moral et même sur le dommage moral tout court. Le discours dominant porte essentiellement sur la difficile détermination de la quotité des dommages et intérêts pour réparer le préjudice extrapatrimonial. Si le dommage moral et le préjudice extrapatrimonial n'étaient pas confondus et employés par les juristes avec une apparente cohérence, une synthèse des chefs de préjudice extrapatrimonial, telle qu'envisagée au départ, aurait peut-être été possible…

Liberté? : réflexion sur un problème dans l'éthique de Theodor Adorno

La réflexion morale de Theodor Adorno est manifestement traversée par une tension : l’exigence paradoxale d’enraciner pleinement la morale à la fois dans les impulsions les plus vives et dans la raison la plus lucide. Plus qu’une excentricité parmi d’autres de la figure de proue de l’École de Francfort, le présent mémoire donne à penser que ce problème pourrait être une des principales charnières de son éthique. L’objectif de ma recherche est de dégager une voie pour articuler conjointement, «sans sacrifice aucun», ces deux exigences. Pour ce faire, je tenterai d’étayer l’hypothèse suivante : l’analyse du problème de la liberté et de la non-liberté que développe le premier des trois «modèles» de Dialectique négative permet de comprendre à la fois le lien et l’écart entre la dimension impulsive et rationnelle de l’éthique d’Adorno. L’argument qui sera déployé se penchera d’abord sur le problème de la non-liberté et son incarnation à travers le phénomène concret de l’antisémitisme ainsi que de la peur et de la rage animale dans lesquelles il s’enracine, pour ensuite examiner la conception adornienne de la liberté dans ses deux dimensions de «pleine conscience théorique» et «d’impulsion spontanée», et pour finalement tenter d’apprécier la portée plus générale pour la compréhension de l’éthique d’Adorno de cette interprétation du problème de la liberté en tentant de comprendre sur cette base son «nouvel impératif catégorique».

The interest rates and performance of MFIs in the MENA region: is there a moral issue?

Full Text / Article complet

Educación moral y literatura infantil : estudio de la formación moral en la infancia a partir de algunas teorías de los sentimientos morales

Este trabajo realizado como requisito de grado del programa de Filosofía de la Universidad Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario, aborda el tema de la educación moral en la infancia a partir del análisis y discusión de algunas teorías de la moral. También hace un acercamiento a la literatura infantil en lo relativo a la función que se le puede atribuir como recurso o herramienta para la formación moral. De este modo, el trabajo se estructura siguiendo una argumentación que primero pretende esclarecer los conceptos que se vinculan con el tema de la educación moral como los son el de socialización, el de infancia, el de desarrollo, el mismo concepto de educación moral, y otros que permiten identificar y problematizar esta cuestión en relación con los niños y las particularidades de su comportamiento, sus procesos cognitivos y el modo en que se dan sus relaciones sociales. Por ello el trabajo recoge aportes de la sociología y de la psicología que complementan el tema, que es observado aquí, principalmente, desde la filosofía moral. Estos conceptos ayudan a estructurar el problema que se plantea relativo a la manera cómo se construye lo moral en la infancia. A partir de ellos se desarrolla el resto del texto, primero, con el análisis crítico que se hace en el capítulo dos a la teoría racionalista de la moral, la cual se pone en discusión con los planteamientos de algunas teorías de los sentimientos morales y del desarrollo emocional. Luego, en el capítulo tres se examina la teoría de las virtudes de Aristóteles, destacando la mayor capacidad que tiene de comprender comportamientos morales no racionales, como los de la infancia, que se relacionan con lo que desde la sociología se entiende como el entorno social en el que se desarrolla la moral individual. Finalmente, en el capítulo cuatro, se examina la literatura infantil como un recurso que sirve para la formación moral en los niños, debido a los procesos cognitivos y sociales, que esta literatura favorece. En este capítulo se retoman las cuestiones tratadas a lo largo del trabajo acerca de lo moral y la formación en la infancia para ponerlas en relación con ejemplos de la literatura infantil tomados de los Cuentos de los Hermanos Grimm que permiten identificar algunos elementos que vinculan la lectura de estos cuentos con los procesos de formación moral.

À procura da identidade de Heinz : um modelo de compreensão da motivação moral

RESUMO: As teorias psicológicas da moralidade dividem-se na conceptualização da motivação moral, o tema desta dissertação. Os modelos construtivistas, apoiados na epistemologia genética, privilegiam a cognição como factor determinante mas, as teorias que enfatizam o funcionamento individual admitem que as emoções e a identidade interferem na tendência de cada pessoa agir moralmente. Particularmente apoiados na segunda perspectiva, testámos um modelo preditor da motivação moral com três variáveis, identidade, identidade moral e integridade, todas avaliadas por medidas psicométricas, em duas amostras. A primeira era composta por 320 estudantes do 12º ano de uma escola do concelho de Lisboa, com idades compreendidas entre 18 e 20 anos (M=18,22; Dp=0,49), 108 masculinos e 194 femininos e a segunda era composta por 174 sujeitos, estudantes finalistas de cursos profissionais de uma escola do concelho de Lisboa frequentada por alunos provenientes de ambientes sociais caracterizados pelo stresse sócio-económico e familiar, e até, em bastantes casos, que já tinham participado em actos ilegais relacionados com furto, vandalismo, tráfico de drogas, e agressões, com idades compreendidas entre 18 e 22 anos (M=18,98; Dp=1,075), 104 masculinos e 70 femininos. A primeira amostra foi considerada normativa e a segunda de risco psicossocial. Para avaliar a motivação moral foi construída uma medida que incluiu dois aspectos: a consciência moral, relativa à avaliação objectiva e subjectiva que os indivíduos fazem das situações morais que através de processos de análise de conteúdo foi distinguida em três categorias exclusivas: não transgressão, transgressão relativizada e transgressão; e a autoatribuição de emoções que indica a probabilidade objectiva dos indivíduos cometerem acções morais. Foi verificada a existência de diferenças individuais em ambas as medidas da motivação moral e, também, a existência de diferenças na atribuição de emoções em função da consciência moral: os sujeitos da categoria transgressão apresentaram atribuições mais negativas do que os sujeitos de transgressão relativizada e estes, por sua vez, apresentaram atribuições mais negativas que os sujeitos da categoria não transgressão. Estes resultados confirmam o papel da identidade na motivação moral. A análise da predição confirmou que a integridade, a identidade e a identidade moral, em ordem decrescente de capacidade explicativa, constituem factores preditores tanto da consciência moral como da auto-atribuição de emoções. ABSTRACT: Moral motivation, the subject of this thesis, is differently viewed by several psychological perspectives. Constructivist models supported by genetic epistemology define cognition as the determinant factor while theories that emphasize individual functioning admit that emotions and identity have a central role in the way that persons could morally act. Particularly supported in this second approach we tested a predictive model of moral motivation with three variables, identity, moral identity and integrity, all evaluated by psychometric scales, in two samples. The first sample had 320 graduate high school students with age between 18 and 20 (M=18,22; SD=0,49), 108 male and 194 female and the second sample had 174 graduate students of vocational courses in high school of a risk social and familiar environment, many of them had already done illegal acts such as stealing, vandalism, drug traffic and aggressions; they had ages between 18 and 22 (M=18,98; SD=1,08), 104 male and 70 female. The first sample was considered normative and the second one was classified as psychosocial risk. To evaluate moral motivation we developed a measure that assesses two aspects: moral conscience, who includes both objective and subjective evaluation of moral situations that was distinguished in three exclusive categories by procedures of content analysis: non-transgression, justifiable transgression and transgression; and self-attribution of emotion that indicates the likelihood of committing moral actions. We observed individual differences in both measurements of moral motivation and also verified differences in emotional attribution on the basis of moral conscience: the individuals of transgression category presented more negative attributions than those of justifiable transgression and in turn the latter presented more negative attributions than individuals of non-transgression category. These results confirm the role of identity in moral motivation. The predictor analysis confirmed integrity, identity and moral identity, in descending order of explanatory power, as predictive variables of moral consciousness and self-attribution of emotions.

Civilian casualties – do we really care? The failure of the revolution in military affairs of non-lethal weapons in the U.S., Russia and Israel

Causing civilian casualties during military operations has become a much politicised topic in international relations since the Second World War. Since the last decade of the 20th century, different scholars and political analysts have claimed that human life is valued more and more among the general international community. This argument has led many researchers to assume that democratic culture and traditions, modern ethical and moral issues have created a desire for a world without war or, at least, a demand that contemporary armed conflicts, if unavoidable, at least have to be far less lethal forcing the military to seek new technologies that can minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) – weapons that are intended to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage – are based on the technology that, during the 1990s, was expected to revolutionise the conduct of warfare making it significantly less deadly. The rapid rise of interest in NLW, ignited by the American military twenty five years ago, sparked off an entirely new military, as well as an academic, discourse concerning their potential contribution to military success on the 21st century battlefields. It seems, however, that except for this debate, very little has been done within the military forces themselves. This research suggests that the roots of this situation are much deeper than the simple professional misconduct of the military establishment, or the poor political behaviour of political leaders, who had sent them to fight. Following the story of NLW in the U.S., Russia and Israel this research focuses on the political and cultural aspects that have been supposed to force the military organisations of these countries to adopt new technologies and operational and organisational concepts regarding NLW in an attempt to minimise enemy civilian casualties during their military operations. This research finds that while American, Russian and Israeli national characters are, undoubtedly, products of the unique historical experience of each one of these nations, all of three pay very little regard to foreigners’ lives. Moreover, while it is generally argued that the international political pressure is a crucial factor that leads to the significant reduction of harmed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure, the findings of this research suggest that the American, Russian and Israeli governments are well prepared and politically equipped to fend off international criticism. As the analyses of the American, Russian and Israeli cases reveal, the political-military leaderships of these countries have very little external or domestic reasons to minimise enemy civilian casualties through fundamental-revolutionary change in their conduct of war. In other words, this research finds that employment of NLW have failed because the political leadership asks the militaries to reduce the enemy civilian casualties to a politically acceptable level, rather than to the technologically possible minimum; as in the socio-cultural-political context of each country, support for the former appears to be significantly higher than for the latter.