Using Behavioral Insights For a Better Understanding of Economic Decisions (Regarding Savings, Inequality and Dishonesty)

This dissertation consists of three essays on behavioral economics, with a general aim of enriching our understanding of economic decisions using behavioral insights and experimental methodology. Each essay takes on one particular topic with this general aim.

The first chapter studies savings behavior of the poor. In this project, partnering with a savings product provider in Kenya, we tested the extent to which behavioral interventions and financial incentives can increase the saving rate of individuals with low and irregular income. Our experiment lasted for six months and included a total of twelve conditions. The control condition received weekly reminders and balance reporting via text messages. The treatment conditions received in addition one of the following interventions: (1) reminder text messages framed as if they came from the participant’s kid (2) a golden colored coin with numbers for each week of the trial, on which participants were asked to keep track of their weekly deposits (3) a match of weekly savings: The match was either 10% or 20% up to a certain amount per week. The match was either deposited at the end of each week or the highest possible match was deposited at the start of each week and was adjusted at the end. Among these interventions, by far the most effective was the coin: Those in the coin condition saved on average the highest amount and more than twice as those in the control condition. We hypothesize that being a tangible track-keeping object; the coin made subjects remember to save more often. Our results support the line of literature suggesting that saving decisions involve psychological aspects and that policy makers and product designers should take these influences into account.

The second chapter is related to views towards inequality. In this project, we investigate how the perceived fairness of income distributions depends on the beliefs about the process that generated the inequality. Specifically, we examine how two crucial features of this process affect fairness views: (1) Procedural justice - equal treatment of all, (2) Agency - one's ability to determine his/her income. We do this in a lab experiment by varying the equality of opportunity (procedural justice), and one's ability to make choices, which consequently influence subjects’ ability to influence their income (agency). We then elicit ex-post redistribution decisions of the earnings as a function of these two elements. Our results suggest both agency and procedural justice matter for fairness. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Highlighting the importance of agency, we find that inequality resulting from risk is considered to be fair only when risk is chosen freely; (2) Highlighting the importance of procedural justice, we find that introducing inequality of opportunity significantly increases redistribution, however the share of subjects redistributing none remain close to the share of subjects redistributing fully revealing an underlying heterogeneity in the population about how fairness views should account for inequality of opportunity.

The third chapter is on morality. In this project, we study whether religious rituals act as an internal reminder for basic moral principles and thus affect moral judgments. To this end, we conducted two survey experiments in Turkey and Israel to specifically test the effect of Ramadan and Yom Kippur. The results from the Turkish sample how that Ramadan has a significant effect on moral judgments to some extent for those who report to believe in God. Those who believe in God judged the moral acceptability of ten out of sixty one actions significantly differently in Ramadan, whereas those who reported not to believe in God significantly changed their judgments only for one action in Ramadan. Our results extends the hypothesis established by lab experiments that religious reminders have a significant effect on morality, by testing it in the field in the natural environment of religious rituals.

This thesis is part of a broader collaborative research agenda with both colleagues and advisors. The programming, analyses, and writing, as well as any errors in this work, are my own.

Historians and their duties

We need to specify what ethical responsibility historians, as historians, owe, and to whom. We should distinguish between natural duties and (non-natural) obligations, and recognize that historians' ethical responsibility is of the latter kind. We can discover this responsibility by using the concept of “accountability”. Historical knowledge is central. Historians' central ethical responsibility is that they ought to tell the objective truth. This is not a duty shared with everybody, for the right to truth varies with the audience. Being a historian is essentially a matter of searching for historical knowledge as part of an obligation voluntarily undertaken to give truth to those who have a right to it. On a democratic understanding, people need and are entitled to an objective understanding of the historical processes in which they live. Factual knowledge and judgments of value are both required, whatever philosophical view we might have of the possibility of a principled distinction between them. Historians owe historical truth not only to the living but to the dead. Historians should judge when that is called for, but they should not distort historical facts. The rejection of postmodernism's moralism does not free historians from moral duties. Historians and moral philosophers alike are able to make dispassionate moral judgments, but those who feel untrained should be educated in moral understanding. We must ensure the moral and social responsibility of historical knowledge. As philosophers of history, we need a rational reconstruction of moral judgments in history to help with this.

Intentionality, morality, and the incest taboo in Madagascar

In a recent article (Astuti & Bloch, 2015), cognitive anthropologists Rita Astuti and Maurice Bloch claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent as to whether considerations of intentionality are relevant to moral judgments concerning incest and its presumed catastrophic consequences: when making moral judgments about those who commit incest, the Malagasy take into account whether the incest is intentional or not, but, when making moral judgments relating to incest’s catastrophic consequences, they do not take intentionality into account. Astuti & Bloch explain the irrelevance of intentionality in terms of incest entailing such a fundamental attack on the transcendental social order that the Malagasy become dumbfounded and leave aside considerations of intentionality. Finally, they claim that a similar dumbfound reaction is what is involved in the moral dumbfounding concerning incest that social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has found in the US. In this article, we argue that (i) Astuti & Bloch are unclear about many aspects of their claims (in particular, about the moral judgments at stake), (ii) they do not provide sufficient evidence that considerations of intentionality are deemed irrelevant to moral judgments relating to incest’s presumed catastrophic consequences (and hence for the claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent), (iii) their hypothesis that conceiving of incest as an attack on the transcendental social renders considerations of intentionality irrelevant lacks coherence, and (iv) the extension of their explanatory account to the moral dumfounding of American students in Haidt’s well-known scenario of intentional incest is unwarranted.

Efeitos da composição domiciliar e da escala equivalente sobre as medidas de desigualdade de renda e pobreza no Brasil

MARIANO, J. L. ; FIGUEIREDO, ERIK A. . Efeitos da composição domiciliar e da escala equivalente sobre as medidas de desigualdade de renda e pobreza no Brasil. In: XXXVI Encontro Nacional de Economia,Salvador 2008.

Prazer com razão: análise e crítica da ética sexual Kantiana

This work aims to present the foundations of Kantian ethics concerning to moral judgments about sexual practices. It shows that the sexual act, for the philosopher, inevitably degrades individuals who are taking part of it, given its objectifying nature, manifested in the usage of individuals as mere means to obtain pleasure. To solve this quandary of nature since humanity is an end in itself, by the virtue of being bearer of rationality and cannot, therefore, be treated as mere means Kant claims that marriage is morally the appropriate locus for the exercise of sexuality, given the reciprocity forged there, preventing degradation. In marriage, the bond established between the impulse of nature to the conservation of the species achieved through the sexual intercourse opened to procreation and the duty of man in regarding himself as an animal being preserving the species without degrading the person is accomplished in a fully moral way. This text clarifies that the justification for the assumption of this solution is fixed at two developments of the categorical imperative: the formulas of the law of nature and humanity. Despite the fact the first brings significant contributions to human relations through the concept of reciprocity, the second establishes a normative role for the teleological argument of sexuality, becoming an obstacle in kantian's practical philosophy. To overcome that obstacle, we outline a critics which relies on the studies of Michel Foucault about sex and the power techniques related to them, producer of a scientia sexualis in the Western, demonstrating that the moral of the philosopher from Königsberg is also present in this project somehow. Finally, in a foucaultian's reading of kantian Aufklärung, we recognize that, to propose new ethical possibilities of the experience of sexuality, it is necessary to think and create new relational spaces in which the subject takes autonomously the government of self.

Mundo da vida e intersubjetividade linguística à luz da teoria evolutiva de Habermas

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

A traição na canção de Gesta Renaut de Montauban: herança neotestamentária, ética cavaleiresca e evolução política na França do século XIII

Pós-graduação em História - FCLAS

O ceticismo em John Dewey: a busca da certeza

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Conhecimentos e juízos morais de crianças e de adolescentes sobre o meio ambiente: considerações acerca da educação ambiental

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Concepções de graduandos de pedagoaia sobre sua formação ética e a relação com seu trabalho pedagógico

The Psychology of Morality is an area that has to be strengthened in the academic environment for social, political and scientific. The research of Jean Piaget (1932) on the development of moral judgments are the main sources for this area of knowledge, followed by studies of Lawrence Kohlberg (1981), Jose Maria Puig (1998) and others. This project intends to investigate and analyze the conception of the ethical training of graduate students of Pedagogy, Unesp, Campus Bauru, in order to see how these conceive their ethical, what importance they give to the subject and how to relate such training to the work that will develop with their students. Some research has shown a total lack of respect for the theories and concepts related to the issue by presenting a framework of moral indifference since graduation, space in which there is discussion about major educational theories. Through the proposed research is to analyze whether such a deficiency exists and educate future educators of the fundamental importance of its role in moral education and ethics of their students

Prática e consciência das regras no jogo de Bola Queimada: contribuições para a educação física

Pós-graduação em Educação - FFC

La formación de competencias de pensamiento histórico

Este artículo presenta una propuesta para la formación de competencias de pensamiento histórico. 1) La conciencia histórica-temporal relacionada con la temporalidad humana, el cambio y el poder sobre el tiempo futuro. 2) La representación de la historia, como la narración y la explicación histórica, para la reconstrucción del pasado. 3) La imaginación histórica, como la empatía y la contextualización, unidas a la formación del pensamiento crítico y creativo, y el juicio moral en la historia. 4) La interpretación histórica basada en el análisis de les fuentes históricas, en la comparación o contraste de textos históricos, y en el conocimiento del proceso de trabajo de la ciencia histórica. Nuestra propuesta de formación del pensamiento histórico está relacionada con la formación democrática de la ciudadanía

La formación de competencias de pensamiento histórico

Este artículo presenta una propuesta para la formación de competencias de pensamiento histórico. 1) La conciencia histórica-temporal relacionada con la temporalidad humana, el cambio y el poder sobre el tiempo futuro. 2) La representación de la historia, como la narración y la explicación histórica, para la reconstrucción del pasado. 3) La imaginación histórica, como la empatía y la contextualización, unidas a la formación del pensamiento crítico y creativo, y el juicio moral en la historia. 4) La interpretación histórica basada en el análisis de les fuentes históricas, en la comparación o contraste de textos históricos, y en el conocimiento del proceso de trabajo de la ciencia histórica. Nuestra propuesta de formación del pensamiento histórico está relacionada con la formación democrática de la ciudadanía

La formación de competencias de pensamiento histórico

Este artículo presenta una propuesta para la formación de competencias de pensamiento histórico. 1) La conciencia histórica-temporal relacionada con la temporalidad humana, el cambio y el poder sobre el tiempo futuro. 2) La representación de la historia, como la narración y la explicación histórica, para la reconstrucción del pasado. 3) La imaginación histórica, como la empatía y la contextualización, unidas a la formación del pensamiento crítico y creativo, y el juicio moral en la historia. 4) La interpretación histórica basada en el análisis de les fuentes históricas, en la comparación o contraste de textos históricos, y en el conocimiento del proceso de trabajo de la ciencia histórica. Nuestra propuesta de formación del pensamiento histórico está relacionada con la formación democrática de la ciudadanía

Habermas y el problema de la verdad

El texto revisa los problemas que ha suscitado el abandono, por parte de Habermas, de una concepción epistémica de la verdad. Este autor ha sostenido que los enunciados descriptivos pueden ser verdaderos o falsos (en un sentido no epistémico) y los juicios morales correctos o incorrectos (en un sentido epistémico). Las expresiones evaluativas no se encontrarían en ninguno de esos casos y no podrían aspirar a una validez independiente del contexto. El artículo examina —a la luz de la literatura— las críticas que esa posición ha suscitado. En general, se ha sostenido que mientras un enunciado descriptivo podría ser verdadero aunque no sepamos cómo justificarlo, no tendría sentido decir que un enunciado moral es correcto aunque no sepamos cómo justificarlo. Ello ocurriría porque mientras el concepto de verdad de Habermas es no epistémico, el concepto de corrección lo es. Para superar esa asimetría, McCarthy ha sugerido un concepto de corrección puramente procedimental; Putnam un concepto de verdad deflacionada; y Lafont una tesis realista tanto en el plano natural como moral.