Recognition and moral progress : a case study about discourses on disability in the media

This article aims to discuss the notion of moral progress in the theory of recognition. It argues that Axel Honneth's program offers sophisticated theoretical guidance to observe and critically interpret emancipatory projects in contemporary politics based on ideas of individuality and social inclusiveness. Using a case study – the investigation, through frame analysis, of transformations in the portrayal of people with impairment as well as in public discourses on the issue of disability in major Brazilian news media from 1960 to 2008 – this article addresses three controversies: the notion of progress as a directional process; the problem of moral disagreement and conflict of interest in struggles for recognition; and the processes of social learning. By articulating empirically based arguments and Honneth's normative discussions, this study concludes that one can talk about moral progress without losing sight of value pluralism and conflict of interest.

Damned to fame: The moral rights of the Beckett estate

The Company B production of Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot raises important questions about copyright law, moral rights, and dramatic works. The playwright's nephew and executor, Edward Beckett, threatened to bring a legal action against the Sydney company for breach of contract on the grounds that unauthorised music appeared in the production. The Company B production denied that the contract made any such express provisions. The director Neil Armfield complained: 'In coming here with its narrow prescriptions, its dead controlling hand, the Beckett estate seems to me to be the enemy of art'. In the biography Damned to fame, James Knowlson documents a number of other proceedings taken by Beckett and his agents to control the productions of his work: 'He was often represented as a tyrannical figure, an arch-controller of his work, ready to unleash fiery thunderbolts onto the head of any bold, innovative director, unwilling to follow his text and stage directions to the last counted dot and precisely timed pause.' However, Knowlson notes that Beckett was inconsistent in his willingness to use legal action: 'It made a tremendous difference if he liked and respected the persons involved or if he had been able to listen to their reasons for wanting to attempt something highly innovative or even slightly different'. Famously, in 1988, Beckett brought legal action against a Dutch theatre company, which wanted to stage a production of Waiting for Godot, with women acting all the roles. His lawyer argued that the integrity of the text was violated because actresses were substituted for the male actors asked for in the text. The judge in the Haarlem court ruled that the integrity of the play had not been violated, because the performance showed fidelity to the dialogue and the stage directions of the play. By contrast, in 1992, a French court held a stage director was liable for an infringement of Beckett's moral right of integrity because the director had staged Waiting for Godot with the two lead roles played by women. In 1998, a United States production of Waiting for Godot with a racially mixed cast attracted legal threats amid accusations it had 'injected race into the play'. In the 2000 New York Fringe Festival, a company made light of this ongoing conflict between the Beckett estate and artistic directors. The work was entitled: The complete lost works of Samuel Beckett as found in an envelope (partially burned) in a dustbin in Paris labelled 'Never to be performed. Never. Ever. EVER! Or I'll sue! I'LL SUE FROM THE GRAVE!'. The plot concerned a fight between three producers and the Beckett estate. In the wake of such disputes, Beckett and later his estate sought to tighten production contracts to state that no additions, omissions or alterations should be made to the text of the play or the stage directions and that no music, special effects or other supplements should be added without prior consent.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

The Population Consequences of Sex and Conflict

Natural selection generally operates at the level of the individual, or more specifically at the level of the gene. As a result, individual selection does not always favour traits which benefit the population or species as a whole. The spread of an individual gene may even act to the detriment of the organism in which it finds. Thus selection at the level of the individual can affect processes at the level of the organism, group or even at the level of the species. As most behaviours ultimately affect births, deaths and the distribution of individuals, it seems inevitable that behavioural decisions will have an impact on population dynamics and population densities. Behavioural decisions can often involve costs through allocation of energy into behavioural strategies, such as the investment into armaments involved in fighting over resources or increased mortality due to injury or increased predation risk. Similarly, behaviour may act o to benefit the population, in terms of higher survival and increased fecundity. Examples include increased investment through parental care, choosing a mate based on the nuptial gifts they may supply and choosing territories in the face of competition. Investigating the impact of behaviour on population ecology may seem like a trivial task, but it is likely to have important consequences at different levels. For example, antagonistic behaviour may occasionally become so extreme that it increases the risk of extinction, and such extinction risk may have important implications for conservation. As a corollary, any such behaviour may also act as a macroevolutionary force, weeding out populations with traits which, whilst beneficial to the individuals in the short term, ultimately result in population extinction. In this thesis, I examine how behaviours, specifically conflict and competition over a resource and aspects of behaviour involved in sexual selection, can affect population densities, and what the implications are for the evolution and ecology of the populations in question. It is found that both behaviours related to individual conflict and mating strategies can have an effect at the level of the population, but that various factors, such as a feedback between selection and population densities or macroevolution caused by species extinctions, may act to limit the intensity of conflicts that we observe in nature.

"It's not the Jedi way!": Moral ambivalence and delivering the 'good' in Star Wars

This article examines the nature of good and evil through the prism of Star Wars, arguing that the ostensible dichotomy between the ‘good’ Jedi and the ‘evil’ Sith is false, and instead both the Jedi and the Sith engage in violence, which is evil. Anakin Skywalker then arrives as the Christ-figure who becomes evil and ‘dies’ to destroy the old rigid law of the letter adhered to by the Jedi, before resurrecting and sacrificing himself to defeat the Sith transgressors. As Milbank argues, the act of selfless love by Anakin as the Christ-figure therefore produces the good, the end of violent conflict which is ontological peace, and institutes the law of love which leads to life and peace.

The corporate social responsibility movement and law's empire: Is there a conflict?

At the heart of corporate governance and social responsibility discourse is recognition of the fact that the modern corporation is primarily governed by the profit maximisation imperative coupled with moral and ethical concerns that such a limited imperative drives the actions of large and wealthy corporations which have the ability to act in influential and significant ways, shaping how our social world is experienced. The actions of the corporation and its management will have a wide sphere of impact over all of its stakeholders whether these are employees, shareholders, consumers or the community in which the corporation is located. As globalisation has become central to the way we think it is also clear that ‘community’ has an ever expanding meaning which may include workers and communities living very far away from Corporate HQ. In recent years academic commentators have become increasingly concerned about the emphasis on what can be called short-term profit maximisation and the perception that this extremist interpretation of the profit imperative results in morally and ethically unacceptable outcomes.1 Hence demands for more corporate social responsibility. Following Cadbury’s2 classification of corporate social responsibility into three distinct areas, this paper will argue that once the legally regulated tier is left aside corporate responsibility can become so nebulous as to be relatively meaningless. The argument is not that corporations should not be required to act in socially responsible ways but that unless supported by regulation, which either demands high standards, or at the very least incentivises the attainment of such standards such initiatives are doomed to failure. The paper will illustrate by reference to various chosen cases that law’s discourse has already signposted ways to consider and resolve corporate governance problems in the broader social responsibility context.3 It will also illustrate how corporate responsibility can and must be supported by legal measures. Secondly, this paper will consider the potential conflict between an emphasis on corporate social responsibility and the regulatory approach.4 Finally, this paper will place the current interest in corporate social responsibility within the broader debate on the relationship between law and non-legally enforceable norms and will present some reflections on the norm debate arising from this consideration of the CSR movement.

Punishment, blame and stigma after conflict: the experience of politically motivated former prisoners in Northern Ireland

This paper examines the relationship between the politics of blame in post-conflict Northern Ireland and the treatment of politically motivated former prisoners. Using the examples of direct and indirect discrimination in the areas of employment and access to mental health services, the paper considers how the discursive operation of blaming produces evasions and attributions of guilt. It argues that such blaming practices have very real material consequences for the allocation or withholding of goods and burdens in the community. The paper notes also that the ‘cause of victims’ is often appropriated by the press and other political actors for their own purposes, frequently to block the provision of public goods to one particular group of ex-combatants: ex-politically motivated prisoners. It concludes by posing a series of questions about blaming, justice and the moral authority of the victim in a transitional justice context. The claim of the paper is simply to offer some starting points for understanding the relationship between processes of blame, stigma and social exclusion.

Prevention and insurance of conflict and terrorism: issues and evidence for Latin America

Includes bibliography

Competência moral e perfil de profissionais que atendem o adolescente em conflito com a lei

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Relações entre desenvolvimento moral, percepção da manifestação de condutas agressivas e estilos de resoluções de conflitos em crianças e adolescentes

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

O desenvolvimento sócio-moral no contexto escolar em crianças do ciclo I - ensino fundamental

Pós-graduação em Educação - FFC

Estudo sócio-moral sobre a agressão com crianças de risco

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

A importância da linguagem do educador no processo de construção da autonomia moral da criança pré-escolar

This paper demonstrates that in every society there are limits and these are imposed on its members. However, the awareness and the determination of theses limits are necessarily how they are transmitted by the educator to the learners. Its purpose is to show that autonomous, critical and cooperative individuals are result of the form they were educated and instructed in the classroom. Schools and educators should be concerned with the education of individuals able to reflect, discuss and solve the social and moral conflicts through dialogue, exposition of ideas, suggesting alternatives and the preparation and reworking of the principles and norms that govern society. The goal of this study is identify and highlight the importance of educator language in conflict resolution, its consequences and effects on the process of building the moral autonomy of children in preschool, as well as discussing, in theory the two types of language, evaluative and descriptive. In the same way, show the importance of descriptive language on the construction process from moral autonomy of learner. Several existing research about the chosen subject led to face this challenge, deepening the study to show that and educational system focused on cooperative environment, where teacher actions encourage social interaction, giving the student opportunity to talk, argue and present his thoughts, causes a significant development toward the construction of moral autonomy on the learner

Desenho animado e desenvolvimento moral: uma proposta de intervenção na forma de resolução de conflitos

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)