912 resultados para Monopolistic competition
Resumo:
This paper examines how the decline of communication costs between management and production facilities within firms and the decrease in trade costs of manufactured goods affect the spatial organization of a two-region economy with multi-unit/multi-plant firms. The development of information technology decreases the costs of communication and trade costs. Thus, the fragmentation of firms is promoted. Our result indicates that, with decreasing communication costs, firms producing low trade-cost products (such as consumer electronics) tend to concentrate their manufacturing plants in low wage countries. In contrast, firms producing high trade-cost products (such as automobiles) tend to have multiple plants serving to segmented markets, even in the absence of wage differentials.
Resumo:
In the present global era in which firms choose the location of their plants beyond national borders, location characteristics are important for attracting multinational enterprises (MNEs). The better access to countries with large market is clearly attractive for MNEs. For example, special treatments on tariffs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) are beneficial for MNEs whose home country does not have such treatments. Not only such country characteristics but also region characteristics (i.e. province-level or city-level ones) matter, particularly in the case that location characteristics differ widely between a nation's regions. The existence of industrial concentration, that is, agglomeration, is a typical regional characteristic. It is with consideration of these country-level and region-level characteristics that MNEs decide their location abroad. A large number of academic studies have investigated in what kinds of countries MNEs locate, i.e. location choice analysis. Employing the usual new economic geography model (i.e. constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function, Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, and ice-berg trade costs), the literature derives the profit function, of which coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood procedures. Recent studies are as follows: Head, Rise, and Swenson (1999) for Japanese MNEs in the US; Belderbos and Carree (2002) for Japanese MNEs in China; Head and Mayer (2004) for Japanese MNEs in Europe; Disdier and Mayer (2004) for French MNEs in Europe; Castellani and Zanfei (2004) for large MNEs worldwide; Mayer, Mejean, and Nefussi (2007) for French MNEs worldwide; Crozet, Mayer, and Mucchielli (2004) for MNEs in France; and Basile, Castellani, and Zanfei (2008) for MNEs in Europe. At the present time, three main topics can be found in this literature. The first introduces various location elements as independent variables. The above-mentioned new economic geography model usually yields the profit function, which is a function of market size, productive factor prices, price of intermediate goods, and trade costs. As a proxy for the price of intermediate goods, the measure of agglomeration is often used, particularly the number of manufacturing firms. Some studies employ more disaggregated numbers of manufacturing firms, such as the number of manufacturing firms with the same nationality as the firms choosing the location (e.g., Head et al., 1999; Crozet et al., 2004) or the number of firms belonging to the same firm group (e.g., Belderbos and Carree, 2002). As part of trade costs, some investment climate measures have been examined: free trade zones in the US (Head et al., 1999), special economic zones and opening coastal cities in China (Belderbos and Carree, 2002), and Objective 1 structural funds and cohesion funds in Europe (Basile et al., 2008). Second, the validity of proxy variables for location elements is further examined. Head and Mayer (2004) examine the validity of market potential on location choice. They propose the use of two measures: the Harris market potential index (Harris, 1954) and the Krugman-type index used in Redding and Venables (2004). The Harris-type index is simply the sum of distance-weighted real GDP. They employ the Krugman-type market potential index, which is directly derived from the new economic geography model, as it takes into account the extent of competition (i.e. price index) and is constructed using estimators of importing country dummy variables in the well-known gravity equation, as in Redding and Venables (2004). They find that "theory does not pay", in the sense that the Harris market potential outperforms Krugman's market potential in both the magnitude of its coefficient and the fit of the model to be estimated. The third topic explores the substitution of location by examining inclusive values in the nested-logit model. For example, using firm-level data on French investments both in France and abroad over the 1992-2002 period, Mayer et al. (2007) investigate the determinants of location choice and assess empirically whether the domestic economy has been losing attractiveness over the recent period or not. The estimated coefficient for inclusive value is strongly significant and near unity, indicating that the national economy is not different from the rest of the world in terms of substitution patterns. Similarly, Disdier and Mayer (2004) investigate whether French MNEs consider Western and Eastern Europe as two distinct groups of potential host countries by examining the coefficient for the inclusive value in nested-logit estimation. They confirm the relevance of an East-West structure in the country location decision and furthermore show that this relevance decreases over time. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the location choice of Japanese MNEs in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, and is closely related to the third topic mentioned above. By examining region-level location choice with the nested-logit model, I investigate the relative importance of not only country characteristics but also region characteristics. Such investigation is invaluable particularly in the case of location choice in those five countries: industrialization remains immature in those countries which have not yet succeeded in attracting enough MNEs, and as a result, it is expected that there are not yet crucial regional variations for MNEs within such a nation, meaning the country characteristics are still relatively important to attract MNEs. To illustrate, in the case of Cambodia and Laos, one of the crucial elements for Japanese MNEs would be that LDC preferential tariff schemes are available for exports from Cambodia and Laos. On the other hand, in the case of Thailand and Vietnam, which have accepted a relatively large number of MNEs and thus raised the extent of regional inequality, regional characteristics such as the existence of agglomeration would become important elements in location choice. Our sample countries seem, therefore, to offer rich variations for analyzing the relative importance between country characteristics and region characteristics. Our empirical strategy has a further advantage. As in the third topic in the location choice literature, the use of the nested-logit model enables us to examine substitution patterns between country-based and region-based location decisions by MNEs in the concerned countries. For example, it is possible to investigate empirically whether Japanese multinational firms consider Thailand/Vietnam and the other three countries as two distinct groups of potential host countries, by examining the inclusive value parameters in nested-logit estimation. In particular, our sample countries all experienced dramatic changes in, for example, economic growth or trade costs reduction during the sample period. Thus, we will find the dramatic dynamics of such substitution patterns. Our rigorous analysis of the relative importance between country characteristics and region characteristics is invaluable from the viewpoint of policy implications. First, while the former characteristics should be improved mainly by central government in each country, there is sometimes room for the improvement of the latter characteristics by even local governments or smaller institutions such as private agencies. Consequently, it becomes important for these smaller institutions to know just how crucial the improvement of region characteristics is for attracting foreign companies. Second, as economies grow, country characteristics become similar among countries. For example, the LCD preferential tariff schemes are available only when a country is less developed. Therefore, it is important particularly for the least developed countries to know what kinds of regional characteristics become important following economic growth; in other words, after their country characteristics become similar to those of the more developed countries. I also incorporate one important characteristic of MNEs, namely, productivity. The well-known Helpman-Melitz-Yeaple model indicates that only firms with higher productivity can afford overseas entry (Helpman et al., 2004). Beyond this argument, there may be some differences in MNEs' productivity among our sample countries and regions. Such differences are important from the viewpoint of "spillover effects" from MNEs, which are one of the most important results for host countries in accepting their entry. The spillover effects are that the presence of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) aises domestic firms' productivity through various channels such as imitation. Such positive effects might be larger in areas with more productive MNEs. Therefore, it becomes important for host countries to know how much productive firms are likely to invest in them. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 takes a brief look at the worldwide distribution of Japanese overseas affiliates. Section 3 provides an empirical model to examine their location choice, and lastly, we discuss future works to estimate our model.
Resumo:
A typical implicit assumption on monopolistic competition models for trade and economic geography is that firms can produce and sell only at one place. This paper fallows endogenous determination of the number of plants in a new economic geography model and examine the stable outcomes of organization choice between single-plant and multi-plant in two regions. We explicitly consider the firms' trade-off between larger economies of scale under single plant configuration and the saving in interregional transport costs under multi-plant configuration. We show that organization change arises under decreasing transportation costs and observe several organization configurations under a generalized cost function.
Resumo:
This paper explains how the Armington-Krugman-Melitz supermodel developed by Dixon and Rimmer can be parameterized, and demonstrates that only two kinds of additional information are required in order to extend a standard trade model to include Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms. Further, it is shown how specifying too much additional information leads to violations of the model constraints, necessitating adjustment and reconciliation of the data. Once a Melitz-type model is parameterized, a Krugman-type model can also be parameterized using the calibrated values in the Melitz-type model without any additional data. Sample code for the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) has also been prepared to promote the innovative supermodel in the AGE community.
Resumo:
This paper shows how an Armington-Krugman-Melitz encompassing module based on Dixon and Rimmer (2012) can be calibrated, and clarifies the choice of initial levels for two kinds of number of firms, or parameter values for two kinds of fixed costs, that enter a Melitz-type specification can be set freely to any preferred value, just as the cases we derive quantities from given value data assuming some of the initial prices to be unity. In consequence, only one kind of additional information, which is on the shape parameter related to productivity, just is required in order to incorporate Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms into a standard applied general equilibrium model. To be a Krugman-type, nothing is needed. This enables model builders in applied economics to fully enjoy the featured properties of the theoretical models invented by Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) in practical policy simulations at low cost.
Resumo:
This paper explore how simulation results change with different choice of trade specification, and the strength of preference for traded variety by economic agent differs, utilizing two types of three-region, three-sector AGE model that includes the Armington-Krugman-Melitz Encompassing module based on Dixon and Rimmer (2012). Simulation experiments reveal that: (1) the Melitz-type specification does not always enhance effectiveness of a certain policy change more than the one obtained with the Krugman-type, especially when economic agents' preference for traded variety is not so strong; (2) there are likely to be points where the volumes of effects obtained with the Melitz-type exceed the ones with the Krugman-type; and (3) the preference of the producers, those who are in the sectors that exhibit increasing returns to scale, for traded variety might be the engine of explosive effects as suggested by Fujita, et al. (2000).
Resumo:
This paper proposes a general equilibrium model of a monocentric city based on Fujita and Krugman (1995). Two rates of transport costs per distance and for the same good are introduced. The model assumes that lower transport costs are available at a few points on a line. These lower costs represent new transport facilities, such as high-speed motorways and railways. Findings is that new transport facilities connecting the city and hinterlands strengthen the lock-in effects, which describes whether a city remains where it is forever after being created. Furthermore, the effect intensifies with better agricultural technologies and a larger population in the economy. The relationship between indirect utility and population size has an inverted U-shape, even if new transport facilities are used. However, the population size that maximizes indirect utility is smaller than that found in Fujita and Krugman (1995).
Resumo:
János Kornai’s DRSE theory (Kornai, 2014) follows the ex post model philosophy which radically rejects the ex ante set of conditions laid down by the dominant neoclassical school and the stringent limits of equilibrium, and defines its own premises for the functioning of capitalist economy. In other words, the DRSE theory represents an extremely novel trend among the various schools of economics. The theory is still only a verbal model with the following supporting pillars as the immanent features of the capitalist system: dynamism, rivalry and the surplus economy. (The English name of the theory uses the initial letters of the terms Dynamism, Rivalry, Surplus Economy). The dominance of the surplus economy, that is, oversupply is replaced by monopolistic competition, uncertainty over the volume of demand, Schumpeterian innovation, dynamism, technological progress, creative destruction and increasing return to scale with rivalry between producers and service providers for markets. This paper aims to examine whether the DRSE theory can be formulated as a formal mathematical model. We have chosen a special route to do this: first we explore the unreal ex ante assumptions of general equilibrium theory (Walras, 1874; Neumann, 1945), and then we establish some of the possible connections between the premises of DRSE, which include the crucial condition that just like in biological evolution, there is no fixed steady state in the evolutionary processes of market economy, not even as a point of reference. General equilibrium theory and DRSE theory are compared in the focus of Schumpeterian evolutionary economics.
Resumo:
This study aims to analyze the relationship between average price with the concentration in the markets (municipalities) in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, is using a little tool applied to the Brazilian market is the spatial econometric model. A data base contains all the stations of the major cities in the state of Rio Grande do Norte and includes 142 observations on stations was used. Theoretical models predict the relationship between the number of competitors in a market and the average price; these theoretical models include: the monopolistic competition of Perloff and Salop (1985), and the search-theoretic, of Carlson and McAfee (1983) and Varian (1980). The empirical results showed that a higher density within a geographic area is associated with a lower average price, thus converging with the monopolistic competition model and with the search-theoretic of Carlson and McAfee (1983). The parameters varied little with the inclusion / exclusion of control variables, showing the robustness of them.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the determinants of international R&D outsourcing, in particular the role of trade. We construct a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms where outsourcing increases a firm’s fixed transaction as well as its productivity. Financial constraints affect the decision to outsource R&D more to non-exporters than to exporters. In contrast, exporters are more sensitive to a lack of information because they have higher losses when there is technology leakage. We test these predictions using a panel database of Spanish companies. The results highlight the relevance of information in competitive markets, and the role of trade to induce companies to engage in other globalization strategies.
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This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).
Resumo:
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
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This paper presents an assessment innovation which used a tournament style competition to challenge and engage first year marketing students. The course-wide competition required student teams to solve real-world marketing problems for industry sponsors. Student feedback reflects enjoyment of the task and the competition, with students welcoming the opportunity to put theory into practice. Student attendance in the lectures and tutorials involving team presentations was improved. This structure can be adapted for any course with large enrolments. We recommend that instructors adopting a tournament structure consider grading mechanisms that promote equal effort and additional rewards, such as bonus marks, for teams progressing in subsequent rounds.