Políticas públicas no setor de turismo: utopia ou realidade?

Este trabalho pretende mostrar que a implementação de políticas públicas no setor de turismo não é utopia, e sim um instrumento essencial à dinamização deste segmento tão promissor e rentável, que no mundo todo vem apresentando resultados surpreendentes, e que pode contribuir de forma significativa para o desenvolvimento de uma região. Para auferir os dividendos da indústria do turismo é primordial que sejam realizados investimentos no setor, de modo a oferecer as condições básicas para que o mesmo possa se expandir. Estas condições vão desde a infra-estrutura básica até a capacitação da mão-de-obra local. Cabe aqui destacar que é fundamental também que se dê incentivos fiscais e monetários para atrair investidores. E, estas, são ações que cabem, fundamentalmente, à iniciativa governamental. Uma análise comparativa entre o desempenho da indústria do turismo no mundo, no Brasil e na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, pretendeu-se provar que nas circunstâncias atuais, a elaboração e a implementação de políticas públicas são essenciais para a expansão do setor de turismo, e que este é certamente um próspero caminho a ser trilhado pelo nosso país e pela nossa cidade, considerando o enorme potencial turístico de ambos, rumo ao desenvolvimento econômico-social.

Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment

Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract.

Gestão por resultados: proposta de desdobramento da estratégia e criação de incentivos para o alcance das metas na Prefeitura do Município de Osasco

Desde 2013, a Prefeitura do Município de Osasco iniciou a implantação de um modelo de gestão por resultados, com a utilização da metodologia do Balanced Scorecard (BSC) e a celebração de Acordos de Resultados entre o prefeito e respectivos secretários. A dissertação objetivou, inicialmente, responder à demanda da Secretaria de Planejamento e Gestão (Seplag), de realizar diagnóstico e propor soluções de incentivos prioritariamente não financeiros para estimular os funcionários a perseguirem o cumprimento dos objetivos e metas contidos no planejamento estratégico da prefeitura. Neste sentido, buscou-se estabelecer um modelo conceitual para embasar a adoção de políticas de reconhecimento no trabalho, especialmente no âmbito da gestão pública. Adicionalmente, verificou-se a necessidade de agregar dois novos objetivos àquele proposto de início: (1) avaliar o nível de disseminação e desdobramento até as equipes de ponta das metas estratégicas pactuadas nos Acordos de Resultados, utilizando-se como referência a metodologia do BSC; (2) verificar o nível de aderência do modelo de gestão atualmente praticado pela prefeitura de Osasco aos preceitos da chamada Nova Gestão Pública (NGP). Ao final, são propostas ações para o aperfeiçoamento e continuidade do modelo de gestão adotado.

Os fundamentos agrários do desenvolvimento da região tocantina

Os fundamentos agrários do desenvolvimento da Região Tocantina estão relacionados com a forma de ocupação do solo e como se articulam as diversas estruturas produtivas do agrário regional. A estratégia de intervenção econômica oficial na Região Tocantina privilegiou os grandes empreendimentos agroindustriais através de incentivos financeiros e monetários, gerando, acima de tudo, sérios problemas ambientais, conflitos agrários e desregionalizaçao da propriedade do capital. A base destas estruturas produtivas é a propriedade latifundiária, o trabalho assalariado de baixa qualificação e a produção homogênea. O processo de desenvolvimento caracterizado, então, pela exploração dos recursos naturais e pela monocultura, não levou em consideração outros aspectos importantes do desenvolvimento local, a formação de capital humano e social da região e consequentemente não foram capazes de melhorar as condições de vida da população. Como alternativa ao modelo concentrador e excludente, estão às estruturas camponesas, que utilizando pequenas unidades de terra, trabalho familiar, produção diversificada e capacidade de se relacionar com os recursos naturais de forma a não leva-lo ao esgotamento, atuam de forma tal que sua eficiência é determinada pela capacidade de trabalho de cada família, sua racionalidade interna define, assim, um modo de atuação, com elevada produtividade na Região Tocantina, podendo desta maneira contribuir com a geração de emprego e renda, bem como com o desenvolvimento regional.

Explaining Scholarship Addressing Hispanic Children’s Issues

The purpose of this essay is to explain the dearth of scholarship in Hispanic and Latino children’s issues. To answer this question, a data set of all the scholarship addressing Hispanic and Latino children was created. This data set was used to test two hypotheses. The first of these is that scholarship on Hispanic children is created by Hispanic scholars. The second is that government incentives lead scholars to produce scholarship. This article will show that interest in Hispanic and Latino children can be explained by the existence of Hispanic and Latino scholars, the size of the Hispanic population and the existence of monetary incentives that encourage scholars to conduct research with a focus on this population.

Experiences with a voluntary surveillance system for early detection of equine diseases in Switzerland

Clinical observations made by practitioners and reported using web- and mobile-based technologies may benefit disease surveillance by improving the timeliness of outbreak detection. Equinella is a voluntary electronic reporting and information system established for the early detection of infectious equine diseases in Switzerland. Sentinel veterinary practitioners have been able to report cases of non-notifiable diseases and clinical symptoms to an internet-based platform since November 2013. Telephone interviews were carried out during the first year to understand the motivating and constraining factors affecting voluntary reporting and the use of mobile devices in a sentinel network. We found that non-monetary incentives attract sentinel practitioners; however, insufficient understanding of the reporting system and of its relevance, as well as concerns over the electronic dissemination of health data were identified as potential challenges to sustainable reporting. Many practitioners are not yet aware of the advantages of mobile-based surveillance and may require some time to become accustomed to novel reporting methods. Finally, our study highlights the need for continued information feedback loops within voluntary sentinel networks.

Wirkungen monetärer Anreize auf Antworten zur eigenen Delinquenz bei postalischer Befragung

Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden die Ergebnisse einer in dieser Zeitschrift erschienen Studie von Skarbek-Kozietulska, Preisendörfer & Wolter (2012) über die Validität der Antworten straffällig gewordener Befragter aufgegriffen. Die Autoren stellten einen negativen Effekt der Antwortlatenz fest, demzufolge spät Antwortende eher dazu neigen, ihre Straftaten zu leugnen. Die Gründe hierfür vermuten die Autoren in den Eigenheiten der TDM (tailored design method), speziell in wiederholten Nachfassaktionen. Wir untersuchen im Rahmen eines Methodenexperimentes, ob ebenfalls monetäre Anreize als weiterer zentraler Bestandteil der TDM diesen negativen Latenzeffekt für die Antwortbereitschaft verursachen können. Die These, dass der Zusammenhang von Latenz und Validität selbstberichteter Delinquenz über monetäre Anreize moderiert wird, wird dabei empirisch widerlegt.

Modelling and estimating models of physician labour supply and productivity

Ma thèse s’intéresse aux politiques de santé conçues pour encourager l’offre de services de santé. L’accessibilité aux services de santé est un problème majeur qui mine le système de santé de la plupart des pays industrialisés. Au Québec, le temps médian d’attente entre une recommandation du médecin généraliste et un rendez-vous avec un médecin spécialiste était de 7,3 semaines en 2012, contre 2,9 semaines en 1993, et ceci malgré l’augmentation du nombre de médecins sur cette même période. Pour les décideurs politiques observant l’augmentation du temps d’attente pour des soins de santé, il est important de comprendre la structure de l’offre de travail des médecins et comment celle-ci affecte l’offre des services de santé. Dans ce contexte, je considère deux principales politiques. En premier lieu, j’estime comment les médecins réagissent aux incitatifs monétaires et j’utilise les paramètres estimés pour examiner comment les politiques de compensation peuvent être utilisées pour déterminer l’offre de services de santé de court terme. En second lieu, j’examine comment la productivité des médecins est affectée par leur expérience, à travers le mécanisme du "learning-by-doing", et j’utilise les paramètres estimés pour trouver le nombre de médecins inexpérimentés que l’on doit recruter pour remplacer un médecin expérimenté qui va à la retraite afin de garder l’offre des services de santé constant. Ma thèse développe et applique des méthodes économique et statistique afin de mesurer la réaction des médecins face aux incitatifs monétaires et estimer leur profil de productivité (en mesurant la variation de la productivité des médecins tout le long de leur carrière) en utilisant à la fois des données de panel sur les médecins québécois, provenant d’enquêtes et de l’administration. Les données contiennent des informations sur l’offre de travail de chaque médecin, les différents types de services offerts ainsi que leurs prix. Ces données couvrent une période pendant laquelle le gouvernement du Québec a changé les prix relatifs des services de santé. J’ai utilisé une approche basée sur la modélisation pour développer et estimer un modèle structurel d’offre de travail en permettant au médecin d’être multitâche. Dans mon modèle les médecins choisissent le nombre d’heures travaillées ainsi que l’allocation de ces heures à travers les différents services offerts, de plus les prix des services leurs sont imposés par le gouvernement. Le modèle génère une équation de revenu qui dépend des heures travaillées et d’un indice de prix représentant le rendement marginal des heures travaillées lorsque celles-ci sont allouées de façon optimale à travers les différents services. L’indice de prix dépend des prix des services offerts et des paramètres de la technologie de production des services qui déterminent comment les médecins réagissent aux changements des prix relatifs. J’ai appliqué le modèle aux données de panel sur la rémunération des médecins au Québec fusionnées à celles sur l’utilisation du temps de ces mêmes médecins. J’utilise le modèle pour examiner deux dimensions de l’offre des services de santé. En premierlieu, j’analyse l’utilisation des incitatifs monétaires pour amener les médecins à modifier leur production des différents services. Bien que les études antérieures ont souvent cherché à comparer le comportement des médecins à travers les différents systèmes de compensation,il y a relativement peu d’informations sur comment les médecins réagissent aux changementsdes prix des services de santé. Des débats actuels dans les milieux de politiques de santé au Canada se sont intéressés à l’importance des effets de revenu dans la détermination de la réponse des médecins face à l’augmentation des prix des services de santé. Mon travail contribue à alimenter ce débat en identifiant et en estimant les effets de substitution et de revenu résultant des changements des prix relatifs des services de santé. En second lieu, j’analyse comment l’expérience affecte la productivité des médecins. Cela a une importante implication sur le recrutement des médecins afin de satisfaire la demande croissante due à une population vieillissante, en particulier lorsque les médecins les plus expérimentés (les plus productifs) vont à la retraite. Dans le premier essai, j’ai estimé la fonction de revenu conditionnellement aux heures travaillées, en utilisant la méthode des variables instrumentales afin de contrôler pour une éventuelle endogeneité des heures travaillées. Comme instruments j’ai utilisé les variables indicatrices des âges des médecins, le taux marginal de taxation, le rendement sur le marché boursier, le carré et le cube de ce rendement. Je montre que cela donne la borne inférieure de l’élasticité-prix direct, permettant ainsi de tester si les médecins réagissent aux incitatifs monétaires. Les résultats montrent que les bornes inférieures des élasticités-prix de l’offre de services sont significativement positives, suggérant que les médecins répondent aux incitatifs. Un changement des prix relatifs conduit les médecins à allouer plus d’heures de travail au service dont le prix a augmenté. Dans le deuxième essai, j’estime le modèle en entier, de façon inconditionnelle aux heures travaillées, en analysant les variations des heures travaillées par les médecins, le volume des services offerts et le revenu des médecins. Pour ce faire, j’ai utilisé l’estimateur de la méthode des moments simulés. Les résultats montrent que les élasticités-prix direct de substitution sont élevées et significativement positives, représentant une tendance des médecins à accroitre le volume du service dont le prix a connu la plus forte augmentation. Les élasticitésprix croisées de substitution sont également élevées mais négatives. Par ailleurs, il existe un effet de revenu associé à l’augmentation des tarifs. J’ai utilisé les paramètres estimés du modèle structurel pour simuler une hausse générale de prix des services de 32%. Les résultats montrent que les médecins devraient réduire le nombre total d’heures travaillées (élasticité moyenne de -0,02) ainsi que les heures cliniques travaillées (élasticité moyenne de -0.07). Ils devraient aussi réduire le volume de services offerts (élasticité moyenne de -0.05). Troisièmement, j’ai exploité le lien naturel existant entre le revenu d’un médecin payé à l’acte et sa productivité afin d’établir le profil de productivité des médecins. Pour ce faire, j’ai modifié la spécification du modèle pour prendre en compte la relation entre la productivité d’un médecin et son expérience. J’estime l’équation de revenu en utilisant des données de panel asymétrique et en corrigeant le caractère non-aléatoire des observations manquantes à l’aide d’un modèle de sélection. Les résultats suggèrent que le profil de productivité est une fonction croissante et concave de l’expérience. Par ailleurs, ce profil est robuste à l’utilisation de l’expérience effective (la quantité de service produit) comme variable de contrôle et aussi à la suppression d’hypothèse paramétrique. De plus, si l’expérience du médecin augmente d’une année, il augmente la production de services de 1003 dollar CAN. J’ai utilisé les paramètres estimés du modèle pour calculer le ratio de remplacement : le nombre de médecins inexpérimentés qu’il faut pour remplacer un médecin expérimenté. Ce ratio de remplacement est de 1,2.

Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

Financial incentives in academia: research versus development

This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher's time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the skewing problem would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

Essays on monetary and banking theory

Esta tese de Doutorado é dedicada ao estudo de instabilidade financeira e dinâmica em Teoria Monet ária. E demonstrado que corridas banc árias são eliminadas sem custos no modelo padrão de teoria banc ária quando a popula ção não é pequena. É proposta uma extensão em que incerteza agregada é mais severa e o custo da estabilidade financeira é relevante. Finalmente, estabelece-se otimalidade de transições na distribui ção de moeda em economias em que oportunidades de trocas são escassas e heterogêneas. Em particular, otimalidade da inflação depende dos incentivos dinâmicos proporcionados por tais transi ções. O capí tulo 1 estabelece o resultado de estabilidade sem custos para economias grandes ao estudar os efeitos do tamanho populacional na an álise de corridas banc árias de Peck & Shell. No capí tulo 2, otimalidade de dinâmica é estudada no modelo de monet ário de Kiyotaki & Wright quando a sociedade é capaz de implementar uma polí tica inflacion ária. Apesar de adotar a abordagem de desenho de mecanismos, este capí tulo faz um paralelo com a an álise de Sargent & Wallace (1981) ao destacar efeitos de incentivos dinâmicos sobre a interação entre as polí ticas monet ária e fiscal. O cap ítulo 3 retoma o tema de estabilidade fi nanceira ao quanti car os custos envolvidos no desenho ótimo de um setor bancário à prova de corridas e ao propor uma estrutura informacional alternativa que possibilita bancos insolventes. A primeira an álise mostra que o esquema de estabilidade ótima exibe altas taxas de juros de longo prazo e a segunda que monitoramento imperfeito pode levar a corridas bancárias com insolvência.

Monetary policy and risk taking. Bruegel Working Paper 2010/00, February 2010

We assess, through VAR evidence, the effects of monetary policy on banks’ risk exposure and find the presence of a risk-taking channel. A model combining fragile banks prone to risk mis-incentives and credit constrained firms, whose collateral fluctuations generate a balance sheet channel, is used to rationalize the evidence. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage. With two consequences: on the one side this exacerbates risk exposure; on the other, the risk spiral depresses output, therefore dampening the conventional amplification effect of the financial accelerator. Keywords: monetary policy, bank behavior, leverage, financial accelerator.

Hegemony Without Stability: The fiscal and political vulnerabilities of monetary union. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

The crisis has forced the Euro area to establish an emergency fund that supports member states experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. The difficulties of coming up with such a fund for Greece and other Euro area members stands in marked contrast to the balance of payments support that non-Euro members like Hungary received, swiftly and quietly. In order to solve this puzzle, we first establish the difference between EU interventions and IMF programs and, second, trace the evolution of crisis management with France and Germany in the lead. The lens of hegemonic stability theory suggests that the Franco-German leadership is too weak to provide stability and the extensive use of conditionality is one symptom of this weakness. Providing incentives for cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane) is the unresolved issues troubling the monetary union. Its dominant powers must acknowledge that markets perceive monetary union to be already politically more integrated than its lack of fiscal integration suggests.

Channel incentives as unilateral and bilateral governance processes

The authors investigate channel incentives as extra-contractual governance processes that maintain and extend marketing channel relationships. More specifically, instrumental incentives are monetary-based payments made by a manufacturer in a unilateral channel arrangement to motivate distributor compliance, while equity incentives are bilateral expectations of fair treatment that motivate both parties to continue to cooperate with one another. A model of the antecedents and performance consequences of channel incentives is conceptualized and tested on 314 marketing channel relationships using a structural equation modeling methodology. The findings support the conceptual model and suggest that unique facets of the channel relationship explain the type of incentive mechanism in use.