O estuda das relações internacionais no Brasil

O texto tece considerações sobe o desenvolvimento das relações internacionais como área de estudos no país; trata principalmente da política externa brasileira.

The Universality of Civil War Definitions: A Study of How Regional Considerations Impact Civil War in Somalia, Colombia, and Angola

Civil war is a socially intimate phenomenon. The viability of the conflict hinges on recruitment for the cause, military strategy, community support, and a variety of other conditional factors. Despite this dependence on local society, many researchers approach civil war from a global perspective, attempting to discover universal truths about this kind of conflict. This capstone project focuses on restricting the operating parameters of civil war research projects to the span of a single continent, hoping to achieve deeper insight by focusing the research using a more culturally sensitive set of parameters. By using cultural data to guide civil war research, conflict indicators can tailor conflict prevention to escalating violent scenarios.

La frontera marítima fortificada: de la vigilancia a la señalización (XVI-XIX)

During the 16th century an ambitious political programme for building towers and forts bordering the Spanish Empire’s littoral, to protect it, is materialised. This sighting network over the sea horizon had the essential mission of detecting the presence of vessels that supposed a threat. The network was organised through the strategic arrangement of watchtowers taking profit of the geographical features in the topography so that they could communicate among them with a system of visual signs. The virtual union of the stated settlements defined the fortified maritime borderline. At the same time, this network of sentinels was reinforced (in certain settlements) by the construction of fortifications that acted like centres of data reception and supplied the necessary personnel for detection and transmission. So, this mesh was established by observation points (watchtowers) and information and defense centres (fortifications) to make the news arrive to the decision centres. The present communication aims to demonstrate this military strategy providing the inventory of all defensive architectures that marked this limit between the Segura river mouth until the Huertas cape and that these are spotted from the ‘Flat’ island (later Nueva Tabarca). A riverside geography of approxi-mately 30 km long where 3 fortifications and 7 towers of diverse typologies successively took place. Among the most relevant documents of this research, we could mention the plans of the fortifycations in Guardamar and Santa Pola from the 16th century (drawn in the 18th). For this research, drawings of towers made by the Ministry of Public Works at the end of the 19th century are also important; these documents show the new military tactics, neither for attack neither for defense. At most, they replaced for maritime lighthouses for signage and help for navigation while the others towers were abandoned.

Muro Mediterráneo: búnkeres y baterías para la defensa del litoral (1936-1939)

The Mediterranean wall, which is a collection of defensive constructions along the coast, was built during the Spanish War (1936-39) to prevent enemy attacks. It´s called this way like the Atlantic Wall, which was built after the Second World War. These group of buildings consist of batteries, bunkers and barracks placed along the coastline, sometimes next to another kind of infrastructure. Its location (typical of a military strategy) and its peculiar morphology are like another ones: the historical watchtowers ones. They were built by the Kingdom of Spain in the same geography four centuries earlier although, in our case, the buildings are updated to the conditions of contemporary wars: camouflage against air raids. A collection of anti-aircraft devices, placed along the coast since the late 1937, were risen following the instructions of the Valencian State to defend both citizens and cities from the aviation´s bombings. The following military settlements, organized from North to South, are part of the most relevant ones of the coast of Alicante: the Denia and Javea ones, the North of Alicante and Southwest of Alicante ones, the Portichol one, the Galvany´s Clot one and, finally, the Cape and Bay of Santa Pola ones. Remains of more than 60 architectural elements, that document the first concrete´s ruins, are still there. This paper tries to document all of them (providing their location, their morphological genealogy and including some drawings of the current state) to contribute to their revaluation and to help to their necessary protection. They are a legacy of architectural heritage which consolidates and increases the memory of our culture.

Supreme Emergencies and the protection of non-combatants in war

Is it ever justifiable to target non-combatants deliberately? This article assesses Michael Walzer's claim that the deliberate targeting of non-combatants may be justifiable during 'supreme emergencies', a view that has received some support but that has elicited little debate. It argues that the supreme emergencies exception to the prohibition on targeting non-combatants is problematic for at least four reasons. First, its utilitarianism contradicts Walzer's wider ethics of war based on a conception of human rights. Second, the exception may undermine the principle of non-combatant immunity. Third, it is based on a historical fallacy. Finally, it is predicated on a strategic fallacy-the idea that killing noncombatants can win wars. The case for rejecting the exception, however, has been opposed by those who persuasively argue that it is wrong to tie leaders' hands when they confront supreme emergencies. The final part of the article addresses this question and suggests that the principle of proportionality may give political leaders room for manoeuvre in supreme emergencies without permitting them deliberately to target non-combatants.

Identifying and implementing adaptive strategy in the U.S. military

Changes in the environment, including increased environmental complexity, require military supply units to employ a more adaptive strategy in order to enhance military agility. We extend the Lumpkin and Dess (1996) model and develop propositions that explore the interrelationships between/amongst entrepreneurial orientation (EO); opportunity recognition, evaluation and exploitation; environmental and organizational factors; and organizational performance. We propose that the innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking dimensions of EO are of primary importance in identifying adaptive solutions and that these relationships are moderated by environmental factors. The autonomy and competitive aggressiveness dimensions of EO are important in implementing solutions as adaptive strategies, especially in a military context, and these relationships are moderated by organizational factors. This chapter extends existing theory developed primarily for the civilian sector to the military. Military organizations are more rigid hierarchical structures, and have different measures of performance. At an applied level, this research provides insights for military commanders that can potentially enhance agility and adaptability.

Summary of the art of war, or a new analytical compend of the principal combinations of strategy, of grand tactics and of military policy

UANL

Naval strategy compared and contrasted with the principles and practice of military operations on land : lectures delivered at the U.S. Naval war college, Newport, R.I., between the years 1887 and 1911 /

Mode of access: Internet.

Stakeholder service delivery expectations of military facilities management

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the quality of service of a South East Asian country's military facilities management organisation. Design/methodology/approach – An interview survey and questionnaire survey were used to obtain a description and summary of stakeholders’ expectations and the extent to which they were being satisfied by the services provided. Findings – The method provides a useful means of identifying and prioritising varying expectations between stakeholder groups and of indicating any mismatch in expectations in the management of military facilities. Social implications – The development and use of a method to test and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the management of military facilities helps in providing better value for money. Originality/value – In addition to re-affirming Parasuraman's overall dimensions of service expectation, the empirical summary of the stakeholders’ expectations obtained in this way is of practical value for the service provider in developing a strategy for expectation management. For the case studied, it is also apparent that although the current processes in service delivery are well understood by all involved stakeholders, there is a need for further improvement with regards to their expectation levels. It is also one of the very few reported studies on the management of military facilities.

Developing and implementing an environmental performance index for the Portuguese military

Business Strategy and the Environment nº 15, p. 71–86

The evolution of strategy: thinking war from antiquity to the present

Latin had no word for "strategy", but the East Romans, whom we call the Byzantines, did. This book tracks the evolution of the concept of warfare being subjected to higher political aims from Antiquity to the Present, using Greek, Latin, French, Spanish, Italian, English and German sources. It tracks the rise, fall, and resurrection of the belief in the Roman and later the medieval and early modern world that warfare was only legitimate if it pursued the higher goal of a just peace, which in the 19th century gave way to a blinkered concentration on military victory as only war aim. It explains why one school of thought, from Antiquity to the present, emphasised eternal principles of warfare, while others emphasised, in Clausewitz's term, the "changing character of war". It tracks ideas from land warfare to naval warfare to air power and nuclear thinking, but it also stresses great leaps and discontinuities in thinking about strategy. It covers asymmetric wars both from the point of view of the weaker power seeking to overthrow a stronger power, and from the stronger power dealing with insurgents and other numerically inferior forces. It concludes with a commentary of the long-known problems of bureaucratic politics, non-centralised command and inter-service rivalry, which since the 16th century or earlier has created obstacles to coherent strategy making.

‘Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives’

This article draws on Warsaw Treaty Organisation and East German military archives to demonstrate that the WTO's military exercises until the mid-1990s always envisaged an offensive strategy with the aim of reaching the Channel in a few days. Only gradually did this change under Gorbachev and to include also defensive strategies, very much against the opposition of East Germany.

‘Clausewitz’ Ideas of Strategy and Victory’

Clausewitz's definition of "strategy" does not greatly differ from the original definition of the term in the 6th century East Roman Empire. His ideas of "victory" are limited to the military arena. Nevertheless, there are elements in his writing which have led subsequent authors, especially Andre Beaufre, to take them further and make them very useful tools for the analysis of conflicts and war aims in subsequent centuries.