The Climate of War: Violence, Warfare and Climatic Reductionism

National security agencies and other interested parties now often regard conflict as the inevitable consequence of climate change. This inclination to reduce war to the vicissitudes of climate is not new however. Here I examine some of the earlier ways in which violence was attributed to climatic conditions, particularly in the United States, and trace links between these older advocates of climatic determinism and the recent writings of those insisting that climate change will usher in a grim world of chronic warfare. It ends by drawing attention to the writings of some critics who are troubled by the ease with which climatic reductionism is capturing the public imagination.

History of biological warfare and bioterrorism.

Bioterrorism literally means using microorganisms or infected samples to cause terror and panic in populations. Bioterrorism had already started 14 centuries before Christ, when the Hittites sent infected rams to their enemies. However, apart from some rare well-documented events, it is often very difficult for historians and microbiologists to differentiate natural epidemics from alleged biological attacks, because: (i) little information is available for times before the advent of modern microbiology; (ii) truth may be manipulated for political reasons, especially for a hot topic such as a biological attack; and (iii) the passage of time may also have distorted the reality of the past. Nevertheless, we have tried to provide to clinical microbiologists an overview of some likely biological warfare that occurred before the 18th century and that included the intentional spread of epidemic diseases such as tularaemia, plague, malaria, smallpox, yellow fever, and leprosy. We also summarize the main events that occurred during the modern microbiology era, from World War I to the recent 'anthrax letters' that followed the World Trade Center attack of September 2001. Again, the political polemic surrounding the use of infectious agents as a weapon may distort the truth. This is nicely exemplified by the Sverdlovsk accident, which was initially attributed by the authorities to a natural foodborne outbreak, and was officially recognized as having a military cause only 13 years later.

The orientalist sore : biomedical discourses, capital and urban warfare in the colonial present

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Introduction: towards a social archaeology of warfare

The recent explosion of interest in the archaeology of warfare is examined, and some possible reasons behind this trend are explored. Characteristics in the archaeology of warfare are identified in relation to prehistoric and historical archaeology and their contrasting sources of evidence. The androcentric tendency of the archaeology of warfare is discussed, and the major themes of the volume are introduced, including memorial landscapes, commemorative monuments and their conflicting meanings, and the social context of warfare.

Orde Wingate, 'Guerrilla' Warfare and Long-Range Penetration, 1940-44

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long-range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate's own official writings on this subject reveals that long-range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situations regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins' doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.