Endogenous Price Flexibility and Optimal Monetary Policy

Much of the literature on optimal monetary policy uses models in which the degree of nominal price flexibility is exogenous. There are, however, good reasons to suppose that the degree of price flexibility adjusts endogenously to changes in monetary conditions. This paper extends the standard New Keynesian model to incorporate an endogenous degree of price flexibility. The model shows that endogenising the degree of price flexibility tends to shift optimal monetary policy towards complete inflation stabilisation, even when shocks take the form of cost-push disturbances. This contrasts with the standard result obtained in models with exogenous price flexibility, which show that optimal monetary policy should allow some degree of inflation volatility in order to stabilise the welfarerelevant output gap.

Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations

This paper studies the implications for monetary policy of heterogeneous expectations in a New Keynesian model. The assumption of rational expectations is replaced with parsimonious forecasting models where agents select between predictors that are underparameterized. In a Misspecification Equilibrium agents only select the best-performing statistical models. We demonstrate that, even when monetary policy rules satisfy the Taylor principle by adjusting nominal interest rates more than one for one with inflation, there may exist equilibria with Intrinsic Heterogeneity. Under certain conditions, there may exist multiple misspecification equilibria. We show that these findings have important implications for business cycle dynamics and for the design of monetary policy.

On monetary policy and stock market anomalies

This study utilizes a macro-based VAR framework to investigate whether stock portfolios formedon the basis of their value, size and past performance characteristics are affected in a differentialmanner by unexpected US monetary policy actions during the period 1967-2007. Full sample results show that value, small capitalization and past loser stocks are more exposed to monetary policy shocks in comparison to growth, big capitalization and past winner stocks. Subsample analysis, motivated by variation in the realized premia and parameter instability, reveals that monetary policy shocks’ impact on these portfolios is significant and pronounced only during the pre-1983 period.

Notes on Agents’ Behavioral Rules Under Adaptive Learning and Studies of Monetary Policy

These notes try to clarify some discussions on the formulation of individual intertemporal behavior under adaptive learning in representative agent models. First, we discuss two suggested approaches and related issues in the context of a simple consumption-saving model. Second, we show that the analysis of learning in the NewKeynesian monetary policy model based on “Euler equations” provides a consistent and valid approach.

On Measuring the Efficiency of Monetary Policy

Cecchetti et al. (2006) develop a method for allocating macroeconomic performance changes among the structure of the economy, variability of supply shocks and monetary policy. We propose a dual approach of their method by borrowing well-known tools from production theory, namely the Farrell measure and the Malmquist index. Following FÄare et al (1994) we propose a decomposition of the efficiency of monetary policy. It is shown that the global efficiency changes can be rewritten as the product of the changes in macroeconomic performance, minimum quadratic loss, and efficiency frontier.

Realised and Optimal Monetary Policy Rules in an Estimated Markov-Switching DSGE Model of the United Kingdom

This paper investigates underlying changes in the UK economy over the past thirtyfive years using a small open economy DSGE model. Using Bayesian analysis, we find UK monetary policy, nominal price rigidity and exogenous shocks, are all subject to regime shifting. A model incorporating these changes is used to estimate the realised monetary policy and derive the optimal monetary policy for the UK. This allows us to assess the effectiveness of the realised policy in terms of stabilising economic fluctuations, and, in turn, provide an indication of whether there is room for monetary authorities to further improve their policies.

The Monetary policy rules in EU-15: before and after the euro

The objective of this paper is to identify empirically the logic behind short-term interest rates setting

Monetary policy under the Labour government 1997- 2010: the first 13 years of the MPC

This paper examines the performance of monetary policy under the new framework established in 1997 up to the end of the Labour government in May 2010. Performance was relatively good in the years before the crisis, but much weaker from 2008. The new framework largely neglected open economy issues, while the Treasury’s EMU assessment in 2003 can be interpreted in different ways. inflation targeting in the UK and elsewhere may have contributed in some way to the eruption and depth of the financial crisis from 2008, but UK monetary policy responded in a bold and innovative way. Overall, the design and operation of monetary policy were much better than in earlier periods, but there remains scope for significant further evolution.

The Monetary policy rules in Europe: heterogeneity and common patters

The objective of this study is the empirical identification of the monetary policy rules pursued in individual countries of EU before and after the launch of European Monetary Union. In particular, we have employed an estimation of the augmented version of the Taylor rule (TR) for 25 countries of the EU in two periods (1992-1998, 1999-2006). While uniequational estimation methods have been used to identify the policy rules of individual central banks, for the rule of the European Central Bank has been employed a dynamic panel setting. We have found that most central banks really followed some interest rate rule but its form was usually different from the original TR (proposing that domestic interest rate responds only to domestic inflation rate and output gap). Crucial features of policy rules in many countries have been the presence of interest rate smoothing as well as response to foreign interest rate. Any response to domestic macroeconomic variables have been missing in the rules of countries with inflexible exchange rate regimes and the rules consisted in mimicking of the foreign interest rates. While we have found response to long-term interest rates and exchange rate in rules of some countries, the importance of monetary growth and asset prices has been generally negligible. The Taylor principle (the response of interest rates to domestic inflation rate must be more than unity as a necessary condition for achieving the price stability) has been confirmed only in large economies and economies troubled with unsustainable inflation rates. Finally, the deviation of the actual interest rate from the rule-implied target rate can be interpreted as policy shocks (these deviation often coincided with actual turbulent periods).

How Optimal is US Monetary Policy?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis assume that policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow policy to be described by various forms of optimal policy - commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment. We find that, even after allowing for Markov switching in shock variances, the inflation target and/or rule parameters, the data preferred description of policy is that the US Fed operates under discretion with a marked increase in conservatism after the 1970s. Parameter estimates are similar to those obtained under simple rules, except that the degree of habits is significantly lower and the prevalence of cost-push shocks greater. Moreover, we find that the greatest welfare gains from the ‘Great Moderation’ arose from the reduction in the variances in shocks hitting the economy, rather than increased inflation aversion. However, much of the high inflation of the 1970s could have been avoided had policy makers been able to commit, even without adopting stronger anti-inflation objectives. More recently the Fed appears to have temporarily relaxed policy following the 1987 stock market crash, and has lost, without regaining, its post-Volcker conservatism following the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000.

Monetary Policy Delegation and Equilibrium Coordination

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.

Imperfect Credibility and Robust Monetary Policy

This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets-Wouters model as the central bank.s approximating model, the paper's main findings are as follows. First, a central bank.s credibility can have large consequences for how policy responds to shocks. Second, central banks that have low credibility can bene.t from a desire for robustness because this desire motivates the central bank to follow through on policy announcements that would otherwise not be time-consistent. Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility can produce important declines in policy performance. Finally, as a technical contribution, the paper develops a numerical procedure to solve the decision-problem facing an imperfectly credible policymaker that seeks robustness.

Monetary Policy in Times of Financial Stress.

Some studies argue that the Fed reacts to financial market developments. Using data covering the period 1985:Q1 - 2008:Q4 and employing an augmented Taylor rule specification, we re-examine that conjecture. We find that evidence in favour of such a reaction is largely driven by the Fed’s behaviour during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.