Donald Ezekiel AM : passionate and innovative contact lens practitioner and manufacturer

Donald Ezekiel (known to all as ‘Don’) was born in Singapore on September 12, 1936, to a German mother and Iraqi father. His parents were Jewish refugees, who met in Batavia,1 married and alternately lived in Batavia and Singapore. The family established their primary residence in Singapore after Don’s older brother Eric (later to become a haematologist) was born in 1934. The Ezekiel family was forced to flee in 1941 when the Japanese bombed Singapore and were fortunate to obtain passage on a hospital ship to Perth. They returned to Singapore after the war but left again on their own accord in 1951 due to race riots. The Ezekiels sold up everything in Singapore and decided to settle in Perth...

Reconsidering Relativism and Intentionalism in Interpretation : Donald Davidson, Hermeneutics, and Pragmatism

This study focuses on two philosophical issues related to the interpretation of art. Firstly, it considers the role of authorial intentions in interpretation. Secondly, the study raises the issue of relativism in interpretation through a discussion of the relativistic tendencies apparent in the views of three major figures of contemporary philosophy: Joseph Margolis, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Richard Rorty. The major goal of the thesis is to develop a theory of interpretation supporting the role of authorial intentions in interpretation on the basis of Donald Davidson s late philosophy of language and the holistic account of interpretation that underlies different parts of his philosophy. It is my belief that an intentionalist view of interpretation built on Davidsonian elements manages to form the most convincing defense of that interpretive position against the skepticism present in the views of Margolis, Gadamer, and Rorty. The theoretical issues addressed in the thesis are illuminated by discussions of case-examples, most importantly Richard Wagner s The Valkyrie, Thomas Adés America: A Prophecy, and some symphonies by Dimitri Shostakovich. In chapter one, I present a critical discussion of Margolis robust relativism. While finding Margolis criticism of the self-refutive argument plausible, I, nevertheless, argue that the relativistic logic Margolis offers should not be favored in interpretation. The first parts of chapter two outline Davidsonian intentionalism by presenting a reading of Davidson s later work in philosophy of language and mind, and by indicating its relationship to Davidson s views of literature. Then, I shall compare Davidson s ideas with some recent modest forms of intentionalism found in analytic aesthetics, and argue that Davidsonian intentionalism is in many respects more satisfactory compared to them. Chapter three engages Gadamer s hermeneutics by defending E.D. Hirsch s criticism of Gadamer. Uncovering the shortcomings in the replies of Gadamer s followers to Hirsch s criticism serves as a basis for the defense of intentionalism in interpretation carried out in the chapter. That defense is then extended with a discussion of some recent hermeneutic readings of Davidson s views. Chapter four deals with the standing of intentionalism through Rorty s pragmatist approach to literature. By indicating the position of pragmatist notions of aesthetic experience and imagination in Davidsonian intentionalism, it is shown that an intentionalist approach need not be as impoverished with regard to the value Rorty attributes to literature as he assumes. The concluding chapter outlines some ways in which one can be a pluralist with regard to art and interpretation without falling into relativism.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Members of the Godshaw (Gottschalk) family, Anne, Donald, Molly, Freddy, Jan and Hal; Hannover, Germany. Portraits Family

The family was in Hannover, Germany, for the dedication of the memorial to the Holocaust, the Mahnmal am Opernplatz; from left to right: Anne Godshaw nee Pick, Donald Godshaw, Molly Godshaw nee Peck, Freddy Godshaw, Jan Godshaw nee McKay, and Hal (Hans Ludwig Gottschalk) Godshaw.

Members of the Godshaw (Gottschalk) family, Anne, Donald, Molly, Freddy, Jan and Hal; Hannover, Germany. Portraits Family

The family was in Hannover, Germany, for the dedication of the memorial to the Holocaust, the Mahnmal am Opernplatz; from left to right: Anne Godshaw nee Pick, Donald Godshaw, Molly Godshaw nee Peck, Freddy Godshaw, Jan Godshaw nee McKay, and Hal (Hans Ludwig Gottschalk) Godshaw.

The conversion of the Maoris, by Donald MacDougall

http://www.archive.org/details/conversionmaoris00macduoft

Patrick Mc Donald (USA), gagnant du poids [de 25 kg des Jeux olympiques d'Anvers] : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 60589

Dr. Donald J. Ursino

Professor of Biological Sciences.

Residence of Donald Robertson, Esq. - Vignette

A vignette of the residence of Donald Robertson, Esq. in Queenston Heights.