The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.

Gérer la ville au Bénin : la mise en œuvre du Registre foncier urbain à Cotonou, Porto-Novo et Bohicon

La gestion des villes d’Afrique de l’Ouest pose problème à la période contemporaine : extension urbaine non maitrisée, services de base insuffisants, insécurité foncière. À travers l’aide internationale, d’importantes réformes visant à améliorer son efficacité ont pourtant été mises en place, mais elles semblent avoir été inefficaces. Dépassant ce constat d’échec, la thèse vise à comprendre comment se déroule l’acte de gérer la ville dans les circonstances particulières des villes d’Afrique de l’Ouest. La mise en œuvre du Registre foncier urbain (RFU), système d’information foncière municipal multi-fonctions introduit au Bénin à travers des programmes de développement au début des années 1990, constitue le prisme à travers lequel la gestion urbaine est analysée. Celle-ci est ainsi approchée par les actes plutôt que par les discours. S’appuyant sur une démarche socio-anthropologique, la mise en œuvre de l’instrument est analysée depuis le point de vue des acteurs locaux et selon une double grille de lecture : d’une part, il s’agit de saisir les logiques de l’appropriation locale dont le RFU a fait l’objet au sein des administrations; d’autre part, il s’agit de comprendre son interaction avec le territoire, notamment avec les dynamiques complexes d’accès au sol et de sécurisation foncière. Une étude de cas multiple a été menée dans trois communes : Cotonou, Porto-Novo et Bohicon. Deux ensembles de conclusions en découlent. Tout d’abord, le RFU s’est imposé comme l’instrument pivot de la fiscalité locale, mais est mis en œuvre de manière minimale. Ce fonctionnement particulier est une adaptation optimale à un contexte fait de rivalités professionnelles au sein d’administrations cloisonnées, d’enjeux politico-financiers liés aux différentes sources de revenus communaux et de tensions politico-institutionnelles liées à une décentralisation tardive. Les impacts du RFU en termes de développement des compétences professionnelles nationales sont insuffisants pour réformer la gestion urbaine depuis l’intérieur de l’administration municipale. Ensuite, alors qu’il vise à centraliser l’information sur les propriétaires présumés de la terre, le RFU se heurte à la marchandisation de cette information et à la territorialisation de la régulation foncière. La mise en œuvre du RFU s’en trouve affectée de deux manières : d’une part, elle s’insère dans ces circuits marchands de l’information foncière, avec cependant peu de succès ; d’autre part, elle a un impact différencié selon les territoires de la régulation foncière. En définitive, l’acte de gérer la ville au Bénin n’est pas devenu automatique avec l’introduction d’instruments comme le RFU. La municipalité se repose plutôt sur les piliers classiques de l’action publique, l’administration et le politique, pour gérer la ville plurielle de manière différenciée. À l’endroit des concepteurs d’action publique, cette thèse plaide pour une prise en compte des modes de régulation existant dans les sociétés africaines, fussent-ils pluriels, reconnaissant les voies originales que prend la construction des institutions en Afrique.

Impuestos locales a las transferencias de dominio de bienes inmuebles (Tema Central)

Este artículo versa sobre los impuestos municipales y metropolitanos a la transferencia de dominio de bienes inmuebles en el contexto ecuatoriano como parte de la tributación local, y examina con un enfoque teórico los elementos cardinales de esta específica imposición, así como de aspectos formales y de gestión, a remolque del marco normativo vigente. En esta línea se exponen algunas inconsistencias del régimen jurídico de la materia con el correlativo planteamiento de varios supuestos que podrían considerarse para la depuración del régimen en cuestión.

Tax wealth in fifty states, supplement /

Chiefly tables.

Illinois property tax rate & levy manual /

Description based on: Feb. 1991.

Illinois tax rate and levy manual.

Mode of access: Internet.

Illinois tax rate and levy manual /

Mode of access: Internet.

Municipal finance series /

Section 1. Municipal revenue sources. -- Section 2. Budget request. -- Section 3. Operating budget. -- Section 4. Appropriation ordiance. -- Section 5. Tax levy ordinance. -- Section 6. Truth in taxation, all taxing districts. -- Section 7. Monthly reports. -- Section 8. Annual reports. -- Section 9. Chart of accounts. -- Section 10. Municipal budget officer.

1977 census of governments.

"GC77(P)-2"--v.2.

Extension of the Internet tax moratorium : hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, first session, March 14, 2001.

Issued on shipping list no. 2006-0110-P after being pulled from original shipping list no. 2006-0011-P.

Municipal ownership; four lectures delivered at Harvard University 1907,

"Printed in Great Britain."

Report on the methods of assessment used by Denver, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, New York, Newark, Boston, Rochester, Buffalo, Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee.

Authorized by the Board of Supervisors.

Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 25, 1985.

Shipping list no. 86-321-P.

Aggregates of Polls, Property and Taxes as Assessed

1914-1940 In 2 Parts; Pt.1, as Assessed Jan1 (1914-34, Apr.1); Pt.2, as Assessed In Dec. (with Title: Aggregates of Property and Taxes)

Interjurisdictional tax and policy competition : good or bad for the federal system?

"M-177."