The rights approach to local public management: experiences from Brazil

The Fundação Getulio Vargas, São Paulo, Public Management and Citizenship Program was set up in 1996 with Ford Foundation support to identify and disseminate Brazilian subnational government initiatives in service provision that have a direct effect on citizenship. Already, the program has 2,500 different experiences in its data bank, the results of four annual cycles. The article draws some initial conclusions about the possibilities of a rights-based approach to public management and about the engagement of other agencies and civil society organizations.

Clean Development Mechanism and Sustainable Development: a discussion on the link between the CDM and Sustainable Development, an analysis of the current status of the CDM portfolio, and an multicriteria evaluation of the effects of additional incentives in order to foster broad local Sustainable Development dividends from the CDM projects

vegeu resum en el fitxer adjunt a l'inici del treball de recerca

Report on the Local Public Health Services Grant administered by the Bureau of Local Public Health Services, a division of Health Promotion and Chronic Disease Prevention of the Iowa Department of Public Health for the period July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2008

Report on the Local Public Health Services Grant administered by the Bureau of Local Public Health Services, a division of Health Promotion and Chronic Disease Prevention of the Iowa Department of Public Health for the period July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2008

Citizens' control and the efficiency of local public services

Està àmpliament acceptat que la descentralització fiscal incrementa el control dels ciutadans sobre els polítics, fomenta el rendiment de comptes i augmenta l¿eficiència. Aquest treball té per objectiu identificar les característiques socio-econòmiques dels ciutadans (votants potencials) que generen un major control sobre els responsables polítics locals provocant, així, un major nivell d'eficiència en un context descentralitzat.També s'analitzen les característiques fiscals dels governs locals que fomenten aquest control i eficiència. L'estudi s'ha aplicat a una mostra de municipis catalans seguint la metodologia convencional basada en l'estimació en dues etapes. A la primera etapa s'estima l'eficiència en que operen els municipis mitjançant la tècnica DEA. La novetat rau en el càlcul d'una nova versió d'indicador global d¿output municipal. En la segona etapa, a través d¿una estimació tipus Tobit (models censurats) i de mètodes bootstrap, es mostra com els factors abans comentats poden influir sobre l¿eficiència. Els resultats suggereixen que la forta presencia de comerciants, jubilats i persones amb dret a vot afavoreixen el control dels ciutadans, el rendiment de comptes i l¿eficiència. Un factor que facilita aquest control, i per tant una major eficiència, és la presència de baixos costos d'oportunitat d'obtenir informació sobre la gestió local dels serveis públics.

Citizens' control and the efficiency of local public services

Està àmpliament acceptat que la descentralització fiscal incrementa el control dels ciutadans sobre els polítics, fomenta el rendiment de comptes i augmenta l¿eficiència. Aquest treball té per objectiu identificar les característiques socio-econòmiques dels ciutadans (votants potencials) que generen un major control sobre els responsables polítics locals provocant, així, un major nivell d'eficiència en un context descentralitzat.També s'analitzen les característiques fiscals dels governs locals que fomenten aquest control i eficiència. L'estudi s'ha aplicat a una mostra de municipis catalans seguint la metodologia convencional basada en l'estimació en dues etapes. A la primera etapa s'estima l'eficiència en que operen els municipis mitjançant la tècnica DEA. La novetat rau en el càlcul d'una nova versió d'indicador global d¿output municipal. En la segona etapa, a través d¿una estimació tipus Tobit (models censurats) i de mètodes bootstrap, es mostra com els factors abans comentats poden influir sobre l¿eficiència. Els resultats suggereixen que la forta presencia de comerciants, jubilats i persones amb dret a vot afavoreixen el control dels ciutadans, el rendiment de comptes i l¿eficiència. Un factor que facilita aquest control, i per tant una major eficiència, és la presència de baixos costos d'oportunitat d'obtenir informació sobre la gestió local dels serveis públics.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Local Public Health Guidebook, September 2011

The local board of health is described in law in Iowa Code Chapter 137. It is described in rule in Iowa Administrative Code chapter 641.77. Law and rule define the structure, powers, and duties of the local board of health. The following information is a summation of the two. LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH JURISDICTION AND APPOINTMENT: There are three types of local boards of health. 1. City (has to have been in existence before July 1, 2010) 2. County 3. District • City boards of health have jurisdiction over public health matters within the city. City board members are appointed by the city council. • County boards of health have jurisdiction over public health matters within the county. County board members are appointed by the county board of supervisors. • District boards of health have jurisdiction over public health matters within the district. District board of health members are appointed by the county boards of supervisors from the counties represented by the district.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Why do municipalities cooperate to provide local public services? An empirical analysis

Intermunicipal cooperation is being increasingly adopted in various countries as a part of local service delivery reforms. This paper draws on survey data from Spain’s municipalities to examine the reasons underpinning the decisions of local governments to engage in intermunicipal cooperation and privatisation. Our empirical analysis indicates that small municipalities prefer to rely on cooperation for reducing costs, while their larger counterparts prefer to privatise the delivery of services. By cooperating, scale economies can be achieved with lower transaction costs and fewer concerns for competition than is the case via private production.

De-agrarianization, re-agrarianization and local economic development: re-orientating livelihoods in African artisanal mining communities

This article contributes to the debate on livelihood diversification in rural sub-Saharan Africa, focusing specifically on the growing economic importance of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in the region. The precipitous decline in the value of many export crops and the removal of subsidies on crucial inputs such as fertilizers have made smallholder production unviable, forcing many farmers to ‘branch out’ into non-farm activities to supplement their incomes. One of the more popular destinations for poor farmers is the low-tech ASM sector which, because of its low barriers to entry, has absorbed millions of rural Africans over the past two decades, the majority of whom are engaged in the extraction of near-surface mineral deposits located on concessions that have been demarcated to multinational corporations. The efforts made hitherto to control this illegal mining activity, both through force and regulation, however, have had little effect, forcing many of the region’s governments and private sector partners to ‘re-think’ their approaches. One strategy that has gained considerable attention throughout the region is intensified support for agrarian-orientated activities, many of which, despite the problems plaguing smallholder agricultural sector and challenges with making it more economically sustainable, are being lauded as appropriate ‘alternative’ sources of employment to artisanal mining. After examining where artisanal mining fits into the de-agrarianization ‘puzzle’ in sub-Saharan Africa, the article critiques the efficacy of ‘re-agrarianization’ as a strategy for addressing the region’s illegal mining problem. A case study of Ghana is used to shed further light on these issues.

Are local economic development incentives promoting job growth? An empirical case study

At a time when cities are competing with one another to attract or retain jobs within a globalizing economy, city governments are providing an array of financial incentives to stimulate job growth and retain existing jobs, particularly in high cost locations. This paper provides the first systematic and comprehensive analysis of datasets on economic development incentives in New York City over the last fifteen years. The evidence on job retention and creation is mixed. Although many companies do not meet their agreed-upon job targets in absolute terms, the evidence suggests that companies receiving subsidies outperform their respective industries in terms of employment growth, that is, the grow more, or decline less. We emphasize that this finding is difficult to interpret, since firms receiving incentives may not be representative of the industry as a whole. In other words, their above-average performance may simply reflect the fact that the Economic Development Corporation (EDC) selects economically promising companies within manufacturing (or other industries) when granting incentives. At the same time, it is also possible that receiving incentives helps these companies to become stronger.