Preparers’ and non-preparers’ lobbying on the proposed prohibition of goodwill amortisation in ED3 ‘business combinations’

In this paper preparers’ and non-preparers’ positions regarding accounting for goodwill are examined through studying submitted comment letters on ED3 ‘Business Combinations’. Preparers have, because of economic consequences, incentives to lobby for the non-amortisation approach and non-preparers for the amortisation approach. As hypothesised, non-preparers are found to support amortisation of goodwill to a greater extent than do preparers. Moreover, the two groups’ supportive arguments, i.e. how they argue for or against the non-amortisation or amortisation approach, are studied. Again, as hypothesised, the results show that the two groups use the same type of ‘sophisticated’ framework based arguments instead of economic consequences arguments. Taken together the examination of the comment letters thus indicates that both preparers and non-preparers point at conceptual strengths and weaknesses, instead of pointing at the real cause of the lobbying activities, i.e. perceived economic consequences, when they try to affect the final outcome of the standard. These findings confirm earlier research which has suggested that self-interested lobbyists use accounting theories and concepts as useful justifications.

Lobbying defined and observed

The critical and most obvious component of lobbying is the interaction an entity has with government. The executive, parliament and bureaucracy are the key players in the field. On the opposing side, to extend a sporting analogy, are the lobbyists – who are identified or labelled, singularly or plurally, by a variety of names: pressure groups, policy consultants, tariff consultants, public relations consultants, interest groups, special interest groups, industrial and professional associations, government relations managers, public affairs managers and Lloyd’s qualified term, the ‘political lobbyist’ .
All these nomenclatures require further explanation – some are used interchangeably, others are now an historical term only, some fall from the common language only to reappear at a later date. Of all, the oldest and most widely recognised is lobbyist and lobbying. Lloyd (1989) states that the term ‘lobby agent’ was first used in Westminster in the mid-17th century. In the United States Schriftgiesser (1951) writes that the famous American journalist H L Mencken, the Sage of Baltimore, traced the first use of the word lobby, as we currently understand it, to Washington DC in 1829. At that time the term lobby-agent was in use but it was shortened, by journalists, to lobbyist by 1832.
It has been suggested that the concept of lobbying – of seeking influence among the powerful – is as old as government e itself. Lloyd (1989) cites examples of lobbying from the Old and New testaments – the most famous pressure group being those who petitioned Pontius Pilate to crucify Jesus Christ!
In the US the activities of lobbying were recognised before the term was coined when, according to Schriftgeisser (1951), ‘a little gang of painted –up merchants (who) pushed British tea into the salt water of Boston harbor’ (p4).
So the pedigree of lobbying activities is long and colourful. As the western form of parliamentary democracy has evolved and expanded among nations it seems that lobbying has been ever present on this journey. It is by its activities, its parts, that we can define and recognise lobbying most clearly and view the changes.

The discourse of public education: an urban campaign for a local public high school in Melbourne, Victoria

This paper explores the metonymic slippage surrounding the discourse of public education, through observations and interviews with Lawson High School active campaigners in the state of Victoria, Australia. The notion of campaigning for public education has become an ever-present issue on an international scale, and this article aims to contribute qualitative knowledge regarding the key concepts that lobbyists produce and articulate within their meetings concerning public education. Data have been obtained through direct participatory observation within a contextually specific campaigning site, lobbyists' publications and one-on-one interviews with active campaigners. Findings indicate that campaigners present distinct conceptualisations of public education as a discourse and a well-defined model of their school-of-choice.

Gestão de temas críticos e relacionamentos institucionais: um caso no Peru.

O presente estudo se caracteriza como uma dissertação de Mestrado, e foi desenvolvido como parte das exigências para obtenção do grau de Mestre do curso de Master in International Management (MIM ). Seu objetivo concentra-se na análise da importância da gestão de temas críticos e relacionamentos institucionais nas empresas, tema pouco explorado por acadêmicos, pensadores e executivos de multinacionais brasileiras. Empresas em processo de internacionalização encontram diversos riscos e desafios quando decidem investir ou fazer negócios fora de sua área geográfica de domínio. Destaque costuma ser dado a variáveis tangíveis de avaliação, como logística, infra estrutura, marketing, vendas, energia, finanças, ativos e recursos humanos. Já as vertentes intangíveis, como uma avaliação de questões críticas de cunho institucional ou a percepção dos principais públicos de interesse da organização e consecutiva estratégia de engajamento, costuma ter pouca atenção e, muitas vezes, pode comprometer a viabilidade ou a sustentação de um empreendimento no longo prazo. O antigo jargão que diz que “informação é poder” continua sendo empregado nas grandes corporações e tido como uma vantagem competitiva dos funcionários que a possuem. Porém, pouco se reflete ou se procura normatizar sobre a importância da estruturação de uma rede de contatos ou banco de informações compartilhadas entre os executivos com responsabilidades de interlocução externa. Por meio de um modelo de gestão adotado por empresas globais, o issues management, este estudo procura chamar atenção para a imprescindibilidade de um processo mais austero na gestão de temas críticos e relacionamentos institucionais. Conceitos aplicados à realidade de empresas multinacionais, como lobby, negociações, diplomacia, diplomacia corporativa e relações institucionais serão explorados ao longo da 8 dissertação com o objetivo de apresentar uma clara relação entre as práticas institucionais de uma organização e sua imagem perante o público externo.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Legal and economic interfaces between antidumping and competition policy

Includes bibliography

A influência do lobby do etanol na definição da política agrícola e energética dos Estados Unidos (2002-2011)

Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais (UNESP - UNICAMP - PUC-SP) - FFC

A influência do Lobby do etanol na definição da política agrícola e energética dos Estados Unidos (2002-2011)

Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais (UNESP - UNICAMP - PUC-SP) - FFC

Using technology to enhance decision making

We focus here on decision making in the everyday clinical situation and do not address decision making in politics and administration, although obviously it affects clinical practice and vice versa. For example, decisions against providing sufficient face-to-face psychotherapy is one factor that may increase the demand for Internet therapy, and vice versa—that is, the use of technology for therapy, as in Internet therapy, might influence to what extent face-to-face therapy needs to be provided. It is obvious that the aggregation of information for political and administrative decisions can take advantage of technology. If technology is used professionally, this should contribute to better informed decisions and less dependency on information provided by lobbyists who might not work in the interest of high-quality service for those who need it. An optimistic view is thus that technology works in favor of patients on this level as well. In the interest of keeping the focus of this chapter manageable, we also do not address treatments fully delivered over the Internet or computers, as for the example described in Comer and Barlow (2014), although such treatments, as they unfold, of course also include decision making.

Directory of Illinois state officials.

Kept current with cumulative addenda.

Perley's reminiscences of sixty years in the national metropolis /

Includes index.

State legislative term limits and the law of unintended consequences: An examination of member behavior, power structures, and legislative organization in Florida

The implementation of term limits on state legislators has provided a wealth of data for study. Florida, the second largest state in the Union with term limits, has not been comprehensively studied. This research examines the effects of term limits on electoral competition, member composition, legislator career paths, legislative leadership, and intra- and inter-governmental influences on Florida's legislature. This study looks at the Florida legislature from 1992 when term limits were enacted through 2004, three electoral cycles in which term limits have been in effect. This study uses both quantitative and qualitative data where appropriate. Electoral data is used to assess electoral and demographic effects, as well as member career trajectories. Interview data with current and former legislators, lobbyists, and executive branch officials is used to analyze both changes in legislative organization and intra- and inter-governmental influences on the legislative process. Term limits has only created greater competition when a legislative seat opens and has actually created a greater advantage for incumbents. Women and minorities have only made minimal gains in winning seats post-term limits. Newly elected legislators are not political novices with a vast majority having previous elective experience. Leadership is more centralized under term limits and the Senate has gained an advantage over the more inexperienced House. Lastly, the influence of staff, lobbyists, and most importantly, the governor has greatly increased under term limits. This research finds that term limits have not produced the consequences that proponents had envisioned.^

What's in the Numbers? Child Welfare Statistics and the Children (NI) Order

This article draws attention to the importance of routinely collected administrative data as an important source for understanding the characteristics of the Northern Ireland child welfare system as it has developed since the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 became its legislative base. The article argues that the availability of such data is a strength of the Northern Ireland child welfare system and urges local politicians, lobbyists, researchers, policy-makers, operational managers, practitioners and service user groups to make more use of them. The main sources of administrative data are identified. Illustration of how these can be used to understand and to ask questions about the system is provided by considering some of the trends since the Children Order was enacted. The “protection” principle of the Children Order provides the focus for the illustration. The statistical trends considered relate to child protection referrals, investigations and registrations and to children and young people looked after under a range of court orders available to ensure their protection and well-being.

Pourquoi et comment désarmer? Le discours public de la SFIO et du Labour sur le désarmement (1925-1932) : étude d'histoire comparée

Pour les partis politiques attachés à des idéaux pacifiques et internationalistes, comme les partis socialistes, la période de préparation à la Conférence mondiale du désarmement, soit entre 1925 et 1932, put paraître pleine de possibilités pour la réduction des armements nationaux. Bien que ces partis aient partagé un lien transnational, par leur adhésion à l’Internationale ouvrière socialiste, ils étaient avant tout des organisations évoluant dans des cadres nationaux différents. Ainsi, les positions qu’ils mirent de l’avant afin de convaincre leur électorat respectif ne purent être totalement semblables. Dans ce mémoire, le discours public, ainsi que les arguments le sous-tendant, de la SFIO et du Labour concernant le désarmement entre le 12 décembre 1925 et le 3 février 1932 est décrit, analysé et comparé. Les raisons du désarmement, les appréciations des développements sur la question autant dans le contexte de la SDN que dans les autres réunions internationales ainsi qu’au niveau strictement national pour les deux partis sont l’objet de cette étude. Il apparaît que la SFIO et le Labour ont présenté des arguments similaires afin de justifier le désarmement. De plus, bien qu’ils aient tous deux appuyé un potentiel rôle d’arbitrage pour la SDN, alors que les socialistes ont insisté sur leur rôle de lobbyistes, les travaillistes tablèrent plutôt sur les responsabilités des chefs d’État et des « grands hommes » dans le processus, tout particulièrement lorsque leur parti fut au pouvoir. Les travaillistes démontrèrent également une ouverture pour toute avancée du désarmement, même minime, alors que les socialistes préférèrent manifestement les ententes globales. Finalement, des approches nationales aux implications différentes furent promues : l’organisation de la nation en temps de guerre en France et la promotion d’un esprit de paix en Grande-Bretagne.

Lobbying in a transatlantic comparison: opportunity structures and lobbying content in the US and the EU

Despite vast literatures on interest representation in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), few studies have tried to compare lobbying across the two cases. Those who do are interested primarily in the existence of different lobbying styles and distinguish between an aggressive pressure group approach in the US and a more consensus oriented informational lobbying in the EU. However, the origins of these differences have received little attention and references most often point to different political “cultures” and lobbying traditions. This paper takes issue with this cultural explanation and links the observed lobbying styles with differences in the design of the political institutions that private actors have to interact with. It argues that divided policy authority in the US allows for interest group bargaining while shared policy competencies in the EU constrain not only policy-makers but also lobbyists to adopt a more consensus-oriented approach. The effect of political institutions on the form of lobbying, in turn, can have important implications for the comparison of different policy areas across countries, because the policy stances of private actors cannot always be assumed to be exogenous to the policy process in which they are active.