Residential property loans and bank performance during property price booms: evidence from Europe

Understanding the performance of banks is of the utmost importance due to the impact the sector may have on economic growth and financial stability. Residential mortgage loans constitute a large proportion of the portfolio of many banks and are one of the key assets in the determination of their performance. Using a dynamic panel model, we analyse the impact of residential mortgage loans on bank profitability and risk, based on a sample of 555 banks in the European Union (EU-15), over the period from 1995 to 2008. We find that an increase in residential mortgage loans seems to improve bank’s performance in terms of both profitability and credit risk in good market, pre-financial crisis, conditions. These findings may aid in explaining why banks rush to lend to property during booms because of the positive effect it has on performance. The results also show that credit risk and profitability are lower during the upturn in the residential property cycle.

Are Good or Bad Borrowers Discouraged From Applying for Loans?

This paper takes the concept of a discouraged borrower originally formulated by Kon and Storey [Kon, Y., Storey, D.J., 2003. A theory of discouraged borrowers. Small Business Economics 21, 37–49] and examines whether discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism. Using US data it finds riskier borrowers have higher probabilities of discouragement, which increase with longer financial relationships, suggesting discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism. It also finds low risk borrowers are less likely to be discouraged in concentrated markets than in competitive markets and that, in concentrated markets, high risk borrowers are more likely to be discouraged the longer their financial relationships. We conclude discouragement is more efficient in concentrated, than in competitive, markets.

State ownership, bank loans, and corporate investment

We study the effect of bank loans on Chinese publicly listed firms' investment decisions based on the underinvestment and overinvestment theories of leverage. Evidence from China is of particular importance because China is the world's largest emerging and transitional economy. At first we show that there is a negative relationship between bank loan ratios and investment for Chinese publicly listed firms. And this negative relationship is much stronger for firms with low growth than firms with high growth. Secondly, we find that both short-term and long-term loan ratios are negatively correlated with investment. However, the higher the long-term loan ratios are, the weaker the negative relationship between long-term loan ratios and investment is. Thirdly, firm ownership only matters to the effect of short-term bank loans on investment in our sample. That is, the negative relationship between short-term loan ratios and investment is weaker for SOEs than for non-SOEs. Lastly, we show that the reform of China's banking system in 2003 has not strengthened the negative relationship between bank loans and investment. Our findings suggest that although Chinese state-owned banks are severely intervened by government policies, they still have a disciplining role on firms' investment, especially in firms with low growth.

Mercado brasileiro de non-performing loans (NPL): uma abordagem teórica e prática na precificação de ativos

O estudo objetiva dar os primeiros passos em direção ao desenvolvimento do campo de distress credit no Brasil via a estimação da taxa de recuperação (liquidação) e sua respectiva precificação. Para isso, foi selecionado o segmento de crédito para pessoa física, inadimplido, com atraso superior a trezentos e sessenta dias que não possuam garantia; ou seja, crédito direto ao consumidor não performado (NPL). No estudo será analisada a dinâmica do ativo e as variáveis que impactam no valor do mesmo, visando a proposição de metodologias e arcabouço teórico para sua precificação.

Information asymmetry and competition in credit markets: the pricing of overdraft loans in Brazil

This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

Mortgage loans and access to housing for low-income households in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Resolución 5: Préstamos del Banco Internacional = Resolution 5: Loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development = Résolution 5: Prêts de la Banque Internationale pour la Reconstruction et le Développement

El símbolo E/840/Rev.1 corresponde a la edición bilingüe inglés/francés publicada en 1953

Background Checks for Firearms Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy

This article examines past and present systems requiring that a person receive permission before buying or borrowing a firearm. The article covers laws from the eighteenth century to the present. Such laws have traditionally been rare in the United States. The major exceptions are antebellum laws of the slaves states, and of those same states immediately after the Civil War, which forbade gun ownership by people of color, unless the individual had been granted government permission. Today “universal background checks” are based on a system created by former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and his “Everytown” lobby. Such laws have been enacted in several states, and also proposed as federal legislation. Besides covering the private sale of firearms, they also cover most loans of firearms and the return of loaned firearms. By requiring that almost all loans and returns may only be processed by a gun store, these laws dangerously constrict responsible firearms activities, such as safety training and safe storage. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and California are among the jurisdictions which have enacted less restrictive, more effective legislation which create controls on private firearms sales, without inflicting so much harm on firearms safety.