919 resultados para Labor contract
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"A-130"--P. [4] of cover.
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"Prix Rossi 1894."
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"Paper read to the Civic society of Glasgow on 20th January, 1898."
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"The authors are Lawrence N. Bailis"... [and others]--T.p. verso.
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"This report ... was prepared under Department of Labor Contract no. 99-1-0805075-073-01 by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. ... The authors were Walter Corson and Marsha Silverberg ... "--P. iii.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"December 1988".
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"REA form 511, Rev. 10-73."
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Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.
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This paper is the first to examine the implications of switching to PT work for women's subsequent earnings trajectories, distinguishing by their type of contract: permanent or fixedterm. Using a rich longitudinal Spanish data set from Social Security records of over 76,000 prime-aged women strongly attached to the Spanish labor market, we find that PT work aggravates the segmentation of the labor market insofar there is a PT pay penalty and this penalty is larger and more persistent in the case of women with fixed-term contracts. The paper discusses problems arising in empirical estimation (including a problem not discussed in the literature up to now: the differential measurement error of the LHS variable by PT status), and how to address them. It concludes with policy implications relevant for Continental Europe and its dual structure of employment protection.