Nonparametric estimation of the leverage effect: a trade-off between robustness and efficiency

We consider two new approaches to nonparametric estimation of the leverage effect. The first approach uses stock prices alone. The second approach uses the data on stock prices as well as a certain volatility instrument, such as the CBOE volatility index (VIX) or the Black-Scholes implied volatility. The theoretical justification for the instrument-based estimator relies on a certain invariance property, which can be exploited when high frequency data is available. The price-only estimator is more robust since it is valid under weaker assumptions. However, in the presence of a valid volatility instrument, the price-only estimator is inefficient as the instrument-based estimator has a faster rate of convergence. We consider two empirical applications, in which we study the relationship between the leverage effect and the debt-to-equity ratio, credit risk, and illiquidity.

High leverage interventions: three cases of defensive action and their lessons for OR/MS today.

This paper has two aims. First, to present cases in which scientists developed a defensive system for their homeland: Blackett and the air defense of Britain in WWII, Forrester and the SAGE system for North America in the Cold War, and Archimedes’ work defending Syracuse during the Second Punic War. In each case the historical context and the individual’s other achievements are outlined, and a description of the contribution’s relationship to OR/MS is given. The second aim is to consider some of the features the cases share and examine them in terms of contemporary OR/MS methodology. Particular reference is made to a recent analysis of the field’s strengths and weaknesses. This allows both a critical appraisal of the field and a set of potential responses for strengthening it. Although a mixed set of lessons arise, the overall conclusion is that the cases are examples to build on and that OR/MS retains the ability to do high stakes work.

The effect of financial leverage on real and accrual-based earnings management

Past research has documented a substitution effect between real earnings management (RM) and accrual-based earnings management (AM), depending on relative costs. This study contributes to this research by examining whether levels of (and changes in) financial leverage have an impact on this empirically documented trade-off. We hypothesise that in the presence of high leverage, firms that engage in earnings manipulation tactics will exhibit a preference for RM due to a lower possibility—and subsequent costs—of getting caught. We show that leverage levels and increases positively and significantly affect upward RM, with no significant effect on income-increasing AM, while our findings point towards a complementarity effect between unexpected levels of RM and AM for firms with very high leverage levels and changes. This is interpreted as an indication that high leverage could attract heavy outsider scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use both forms of earnings management in order to achieve earnings targets. Furthermore, we document that equity investors exhibit a significantly stronger penalising reaction to AM vs. RM, indicating that leverage-induced RM is not as easily detectable by market participants as debt-induced AM, despite the fact that the former could imply deviation from optimal business practices.

Leverage analysis for linear mixed models

We consider a generalized leverage matrix useful for the identification of influential units and observations in linear mixed models and show how a decomposition of this matrix may be employed to identify high leverage points for both the marginal fitted values and the random effect component of the conditional fitted values. We illustrate the different uses of the two components of the decomposition with a simulated example as well as with a real data set.

Investment opportunities and leverage: some Australian evidence on the role of board monitoring and director equity ownership

This paper tests the hypothesis that the negative relationship between investment opportunity set (IOS) and debt is moderated by board monitoring and director equity ownership. According to contracting theory, firms with high growth opportunities (high IOS) are associated with lower levels of debt as a result of the asset substitution and the under-investment problem. However, our hypotheses test the conjecture that the negative debt / IOS relationship will be moderated by the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board and director equity ownership. NEDs provide higher monitoring which reduces management discretion while director equity ownership provides incentives for managers to maximize the value of the firm. More specifically, we expect that high growth firms with a higher proportion of non-executive directors and director equity ownership are less likely to be associated with asset substitution and under investment. Thus, the negative investment opportunity set / debt relationship will be weaker for firms with higher levels of non-executive directors and high director equity ownership. Data collected from Australian companies support both these two hypotheses. Results have significant implications for corporate finance theory.

Leveraging leverage : how strategies can really work for you

The theme of the new Strategic Plan 2008-12 for Deakin University is the delivery of effective partnerships with a key focus on enhancing student experience. The Library has a key role in seeking new and improved ways to support the university’s teaching, learning, scholarship and research activities. Investigations of Web 2.0 technologies have pinpointed suitable applications to enhance student engagement with the Library and with information resources. Along with digital initiatives, the Library is creating intelligent collaborative and contemporary spaces to support and enhance students’ informal learning. Spaces will accommodate student-centred problem-based pedagogy and offer options for interactive group learning, quiet study and reflective zones.

This paper outlines a holistic approach adopted by Deakin University Library and reports on successes and challenges in meeting strategic outcomes to enhance student experience and learning discovery.

Helping business leverage web 2.0 to generate social capital

Businesses large and small are keen to leverage Web 2.0 applications to interact with customers, suppliers and other stakeholders. Whilst some have achieved success, others are still struggling to understand the opportunities and threats associated with using Web 2.0 in business. This paper discusses the development of a conceptual framework to help businesses understand how they could leverage Web 2.0 applications to generate social capital. The proposed framework helps businesses (i) identify opportunities to leverage the strengths and features of various Web 2.0 applications, and (ii) develop business strategies for Web 2.0. As a positional paper, it contributes to theory by proposing a systematic and structured approach for understanding how social capital is created, captured, distributed, and consumed online.

Controlling shareholder, expropriations and firm’s leverage decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable share reform

This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for tunneling rather than investing in positive NPV projects. We also find that excess leverage in firms with excess control rights decreases and the market reaction to announcements of related party transactions are more positive after NTS reform. This confirms that tunneling by the controlling shareholders actually reduced. We argue that in emerging markets where legal protection for creditors and shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders borrow excess debt to tunnel through inter-corporate loans and related party transactions. Furthermore the privatization of these economies can reduce the controlling shareholders' tunneling activities and associated excess leverage which destroys firm value.

The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new evidence from Chinese listed firms

This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on the leverage decision of firms listed in the Chinese stock market. Our results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher leverage ratios than SOEs in better regions. We also show that the largest shareholding (the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder) in the SOEs has a negative relationship with the leverage ratio, while the largest shareholding in non-SOEs has a non-linear relationship with the short-term and long-term debt ratios. Finally, this study also shows that the share split reform and the improvement of institutional environment both weaken the negative relationship and strengthen the positive relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of SOEs and non-SOEs to some extent. This paper documents how the financing behaviour of SOEs is more influenced by government intervention, while the financing behaviour of non-SOEs is more market oriented.

Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper extends prior work on the linkage between politically connected (PCON) firms and capital structure in developing countries. Specifically, this paper focuses on the association between Malaysian PCON firms and leverage, and is motivated by the results of Fraser et al. (2006) who report a positive association between leverage and political patronage. Controlling for a potential misspecification in that paper, this study documents that a significant proportion (almost 12%) of the Malaysian PCON firms have negative equity, and builds on the previous paper by providing fresh evidence that market to book ratio is positively associated with leverage, and that borrowing PCON firms have significantly lower ROA compared to non-PCON firms. © 2012.

The role of leverage in cross-border mergers and acquisitions

We examine the relationship between leverage and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Using a sample of 85,560 cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 57 countries over the period 1990 to 2010, we find that firms with higher leverage are less likely to acquire foreign targets, whereas firms with lower leverage tend to be targets acquired by foreign firms. These effects are more pronounced in Asian countries than North America. Acquisition premium, the likelihood of all-cash offer and the percentage of cash in the acquisition offer decrease with leverage in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Foreign targets gain positive abnormal returns in the both short run and long run, while acquirers earn positive abnormal returns in the short-run, but negative returns in the long run. We also find that firms adjust their capital structure after the acquisition by issuing more equity if they were overleveraged, or issuing more debt if they were underleveraged before the acquisition. Our results provide international evidence on how leverage affects managerial decision to acquire foreign targets, payment method and acquisition premium in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This study shows that the interdependent relationship between investment decision and financing decision exists worldwide.

Managerial turnover and leverage under a takeover threat

How do shareholders perceive managers who lever up under a takeover threat? Increasing leverage conveys good news if it reflects management's ability to enhance value. It conveys bad news, though, if inefficient managers are more pressured to lever up. This paper demonstrates that negative (positive) updating prevails when takeover costs are small (large). Managers who leve r up to end a takeover threat thus may commit to an increase in the firm's value and yet increase their chances of being replaced by their shareholders. The model predicts that intraindustry leverage is less dispersed when takeover costs are low.