Nomo-lexikon : a law dictionary, interpreting such difficult and obscure words and terms, as are found either in our common or statute, ancient or modern lawes. With references to the several statutes, records, registers, law-books, charters, ancient deeds, and manuscripts, wherein the words are used: and etymologies, where they properly occur ... /

Corrigenda, [1] leaf, inserted before sign. B.

Manusmṛti. [Ancient Sanskrit code of law, with the commentary of Kullūka,

Mode of access: Internet.

The ancient law /

Red cloth

The argvments upon the writ of habeas corpus, in the Court of Kings bench. Wherein, are learnedly discussed, not onely the severall branches of the said writ, but also many authorities as well of the common as statute law: and divers ancient and obscure records most amply and elaborately debated and cleared. Together, with the opinion of the court thereupon. Whereunto is annexed, the petition of Sir Iohn Elliot knight, in behalf of the liberty of the subject.

Arguments delivered November, 1627, in the cases of Sir Thomas Darnell, Sir John Corbet, Sir Walter Earle, Sir John Henningham or Heveningham, and Sir Edmund Hampden, imprisoned for having refused to subscribe to a forced loan.

The law of election in the ancient cities and towns of Ireland traced from original records. With an appendix of documents.

Mode of access: Internet.

Brief remarks regarding modern encroachments on the ancient rights of females, according to the Hindoo law of inheritance,

Paper watermarked 1820.

Alexander's Hebrew ritual, an doctrinal explanation of the whole ceremonial law, oral and traditional, of the Jewish community in England and foreign parts: being a necessary companion to the Holy Scriptures. Together with several remarkable events relative to the people of the Jews, from the most ancient records.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Law journal; consisting of original communications on legal subjects, opinions of counsel, account and analysis of new law books, ancient readings, etc., etc.

Subtitle varies.

Panem et circenses : law, law and power in The Hunger Games

Like many cautionary tales, The Hunger Games takes as its major premise an observation about contemporary society, measuring its ballistic arc in order to present graphically its logical conclusions. The Hunger Games gazes back to the panem et circenses of Ancient Rome, staring equally cynically forward, following the trajectory of reality television to its unbearably barbaric end point – a sadistic voyeurism for an effete elite of consumers. At each end of the historical spectrum (and in the present), the prevailing social form is Arendt’s animal laborans. Consumer or consumed, Panem’s population is (with the exception of the inner circle) either deprived of the possibility of, or distracted from, political action. Within the confines of the Games themselves, Law is abandoned or de‐realised: Law – an elided Other in the pseudo‐Hobbesian nightmare that is the Arena. The Games are played out, as were gladiatorial combats and other diversions of the Roman Empire, against a background resonant of Juvenal’s concern for his contemporaries’ attachment to short term gratification at the expense the civic virtues of justice and caring which are (or would be) constitutive of a contemporary form of Arendt’s homo politicus. While the Games are, on their face, ‘reality’ they are (like the realities presented in contemporary reality television) a simulated reality, de‐realised in a Foucauldian set design constructed as a distraction for Capitol, and for the residents of the Districts, a constant reminder of their subservience to Capitol. Yet contemporary Western culture, for which manipulative reality TV is but a symptom of an underlying malaise, is inscribed at least as an incipient Panem, Its public/political space is diminished by the effective slavery of the poor, the pre‐occupation with and distractions of materiality and modern media, and the increasing concentration of power/wealth into a smaller proportion of the population.

Administrative authorization for the demolition of urban rental units pursuant to the law of 1964: a spanish example of problematic over-activity in the application of transitional laws

Transitional provisions are defined as the set of regulations that rule juridical relationships on the occasion of a legislative change. Out of this context of law succession, their indiscriminate application can lead to serious inconsistencies. The analysis of a Spanish private law example is offered to illustrate this fact. It concerns the administrative authorization for the demolition of rented buildings in the cities. A regulation repealed more than fifteen years ago and however widespread utilised on ancient constructions that, after recent urban development, have acquired great economic value; something that in the end explains the current importance of such provisions. What is happening in Spain: denaturalization of the original  figure due to a mixture of formalist interpretations and speculative market interests, is presented here to call the attention on the necessary limitation of transitional provisions’ effects.

The philosopher's courtly love? Leo Strauss, Eros, and the law

This essay poses a critical response to Strauss' political philosophy that takes as its primary object Strauss' philosophy of Law. It does this by drawing on recent theoretical work in psychoanalytic theory, conceived after Jacques Lacan as another, avowedly non-historicist theory of Law and its relation to eros. The paper has four parts. Part I, `The Philosopher's Desire: Making an Exception, or “The Thing Is...''', recounts Strauss' central account of the complex relationship between philosophy and `the city'. Strauss' Platonic conception of philosophy as the highest species of eros is stressed, which is that aspect of his work which brings it into striking proximity with the Lacanian-psychoanalytic account of the dialectic of desire and the Law. Part II, `Of Prophecy and Law', examines Strauss' analysis of Law as first presented in his 1935 book, Philosophy and Law, and central to his later `rebirth of classical political philosophy'. Part III, `Primordial Repression and Primitive Platonism', is the central part of the paper. Lacan's psychoanalytic understanding of Law is brought critically to bear upon Strauss' philosophy of Law. The stake of the position is ultimately how, for Lacanian psychoanalysis, the Law is transcendental to subjectivity, and has a founding symbolic force, which mitigates against speaking of it solely or primarily in terms of more or less inequitable `rules of thumb', as Plato did. Part IV, `Is the Law the Thing?' then asks the question of what eros might underlie Strauss' paradoxical defense of esoteric writing in the age of `permissive' modern liberalism - that is, outside of the `closed' social conditions which he, above all, alerts us to as the decisive justification for this ancient practice.

Tale of Gresham's law

Gresham’s law, which says that bad money tends to drive good money out of circulation, may account for many nations’ episodes of money troubles, as far back as ancient Athens. This Commentary discusses the two main explanations for Gresham’s law and suggests some circumstances in which the law does not apply.

What is so ‘primitive’ about ‘primitive democracy’? Comparing the ancient Middle East and classical Athens

This chapter seeks to delve deeper into the ancient history of democracy than is normally permitted, back to a time preceding the developments of classical Athens, when the earliest signs of organized society and complex governmental systems emerged across the ancient Middle East. It then seeks to compare and contrast these ancient Middle Eastern examples with those of classical Athens and to offer new insights into, and questions about, the nature and history of democracy. Building on some recent work (Fleming, 2004; Isakhan, 2007a; Keane, 2009: 78–155), this chapter also hopes to move the discussion beyond the phrase usually associated with ancient Middle Eastern democracies, that of ‘primitive democracy’. This chapter also argues that, while the Middle Eastern experiments were less rigid and formalized, they were in no measurable sense more ‘primitive’ than the later example offered by classical Athens. However, this essay also cautiously notes that, while not all of the elements which made ancient Athens significant occurred in the same way and at the same time in the ancient Middle East, all of them did exist at varying times and in varying guises across these earlier civilizations. To demonstrate this thesis, the remainder of the chapter utilizes several of the key criteria by which we commonly measure Athenian democracy – the functioning of its assembly, the mechanisms of justice and of the law, the varying voting and elective procedures, the rights and freedoms of the citizens, and the systematic exclusion of ‘non-citizens’ – and discusses precedents and parallels drawn from the extant evidence concerning the ancient Middle East.