Legal outlier, again? U.S. felon suffrage: comparative and international human rights perspectives

The judiciousness of American felon suffrage policies has long been the subject of scholarly debate, not least due to the large number of affected Americans: an estimated 5.3 million citizens are ineligible to vote as a result of a criminal conviction. This article offers comparative law and international human rights perspectives and aims to make two main contributions to the American and global discourse. After an introduction in Part I, Part II offers comparative law perspectives on challenges to disenfranchisement legislation, juxtaposing U.S. case law against recent judgments rendered by courts in Canada, South Africa, Australia, and by the European Court of Human Rights. The article submits that owing to its unique constitutional stipulations, as well as to a general reluctance to engage foreign legal sources, U.S. jurisprudence lags behind an emerging global jurisprudential trend that increasingly views convicts’ disenfranchisement as a suspect practice and subjects it to judicial review. This transnational judicial discourse follows a democratic paradigm and adopts a “residual liberty” approach to criminal justice that considers convicts to be rights-holders. The discourse rejects regulatory justifications for convicts’ disenfranchisement, and instead sees disenfranchisement as a penal measure. In order to determine its suitability as a punishment, the adverse effects of disenfranchisement are weighed against its purported social benefits, using balancing or proportionality review. Part III analyzes the international human rights treaty regime. It assesses, in particular, Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which proclaims that “every citizen” has a right to vote without “unreasonable restrictions.” The analysis concludes that the phrase “unreasonable restrictions” is generally interpreted in a manner which tolerates certain forms of disenfranchisement, whereas other forms (such as life disenfranchisement) may be incompatible with treaty obligations. This article submits that disenfranchisement is a normatively flawed punishment. It fails to treat convicts as politically-equal community members, degrades them, and causes them grave harms both as individuals and as members of social groups. These adverse effects outweigh the purported social benefits of disenfranchisement. Furthermore, as a core component of the right to vote, voter eligibility should cease to be subjected to balancing or proportionality review. The presumed facilitative nature of the right to vote makes suffrage less susceptible to deference-based objections regarding the judicial review of legislation, as well as to cultural relativity objections to further the international standardization of human rights obligations. In view of this, this article proposes the adoption of a new optional protocol to the ICCPR proscribing convicts’ disenfranchisement. The article draws analogies between the proposed protocol and the ICCPR’s “Optional Protocol Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty.” If adopted, the proposed protocol would strengthen the current trajectory towards expanding convicts’ suffrage that emanates from the invigorated transnational judicial discourse.

Emergence of the individual as an international juristic entity: enforcement of International Human Rights

In this article it is contended that state practice, as evidenced in the  declarations of the judiciary and the many treaties and conventions  guaranteeing human rights, reveals a consensus of opinion acknowledging the individual to be an international juristic entity. So extensive is this practice that it could be seen as marking the emergence of a new customary international norm; or at least a general principle of international law, yet to crystallise into a custom; acknowledging the individual as the beneficiary of international rights. This is important for individuals and minority groups because if they possess international rights independently of the State, enforcement of their rights will no longer depend on the interests of the State. Where the State is often the offender of human rights, international law will not effectively confer any real rights unless the individual is so recognised as an international juristic entity.

International human rights law: all show, no go

This article examines the following issues: (i) If international human rights  instruments are so worthwhile, why are much of the world’s people still living in conditions of destitution? and (ii) what can be done to make international law the best it can be at improving the living standards of the human species?

Tolling for the luckless, the abandoned and forsaked : therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights law as applied to prisoners and detainees by forensic psychologists

Objectives. There has been an explosion of interest in therapeutic jurisprudence as both a filter and lens for viewing the extent to which the legal system serves therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence on questions of international human rights law and the role of forensic psychologists. The paper aims to provide an intersection between human rights, therapeutic jurisprudence, and forensic psychology.

Method. Human rights are based on legal, social, and moral rules. Human rights literature generally considers legal rights but such policy statements do not provide principles to guide forensic psychologists in addressing moral or social rights. Therefore, a framework to guide forensic psychologists is required.

Conclusion. As duty-bearers, forensic psychologists need to address the core values of freedom and well-being in rights holders (in this instance, prisoners and detainees with a mental illness). The paper proposes that human rights principles can add to the normative base of a therapeutic jurisprudence framework, and in-turn, therapeutic jurisprudence can assist forensic psychologists to actively address human rights.

Does Australia's treatment of non-citizens accord with its international human rights obligations? with specific reference to the treatment of on-shore refugees

The son of immigrants, I was motivated to write a paper addressing the issues of alienation and discrimination which confronts non-citizens upon arriving in Australia. Apart from descendants of Australia's indigenous population, the common bond shared by all citizens and permanent residents of Australia is that they are either themselves immigrants or are descended from immigrants. In this paper I will look at whether Australia's law and practice meets its international human rights treaty and convention obligations vis-a-vis non-citizens. To investigate this issue I trace the history of immigration to Australia and look at the political policies which influenced the treatment of non-citizens from 1788 to present times. In 1958 when my parents stepped upon Australian soil as displaced persons, Australia was a very different place from Australia in the 1990s. At that time Australia was still firmly under the influence of the 'White Australia Policy' which openly encouraged discrimination against non-anglo saxons. Since those times Australia has advanced to become one of the most culturally diverse nations in the world where multiculturalism is encouraged and a non-discriminatory immigration program is supported by both Australia's major political parties. However, notwithstanding the great social advances made in Australia in recent decades the traditional legal sources of law, namely, judicial pronouncements, statutes and the Commonwealth Constitution have not kept pace and it is my submission that Australia's body of law inadequately protects the rights of non-citizens when compared to Australia's international human rights convention and treaty obligations. This paper will consider these major sources of law and will investigate how they have been used in the context of the protection of the rights of non-citizens. It will be asserted that the weaknesses exposed in the Australian legal system can be improved by the adoption of a Bill of Rights1 which encompasses Australia's international human rights treaty and convention obligations. It is envisaged that a Bill of Rights would provide a framework applicable at the State, Territory and Federal levels within which issues pertaining to non-citizens could be resolved. The direction of this thesis owes much to the writings, advice and supervision of Dr. Imtiaz Omar who was always available to discuss the progress of this work. Dr. Omar is a passionate advocate of human rights and has been a tremendous inspiration to me throughout my writing. I owe a debt of thanks to the partners of Coulter Burke who with good nature ignored the sprawl of books and papers on the boardroom table, often for days at a time, thus enabling me to return to my writing from time to time as my inspirational juices ebbed and waned. Thanks also go to my typists Julie Pante, Vesna Dudas and Irene Padula who worked after hours and on weekends always without complaint, on the various versions of this thesis. My final acknowledgement goes to my wife Paula who during the years that I was working on this thesis encouraged me during my darker moments and listened to all my frustrations yet never doubted that I would one day complete the task successfully. I wish to thank her wholeheartedly for her motivation and belief in my abilities. The law relied upon in the thesis is as at the 30th June, 1998. Bill or Charter of Rights 'are taken to be enactments which systematically declare certain fundamental rights and freedoms and require that they be respected'. See Evans, G. 'Prospect and Problems for an Australian Bill of Rights' (1970) 3 Australian Year Book of International Law 1 at 16. Some such notable exception is the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, contained in an ordinary statute.

Can international human rights law accommodate bodily diversity?

This article considers recent efforts by international bodies and advocacy groups to secure the human rights of individuals with intersex variation. Identifying that these efforts are constrained by powerful assumptions about binary sex, it argues that international rights discourse looks set to regulate intersex individuals by the same protective strategies applied to the last four decades of the women's rights movement. A frank reading of legal feminist scholarship indicates several possible risks for the nascent intersex campaign. Efforts to ensure the substantive enjoyment of rights (for all) need to move beyond the constraints of a binary system in which women and sexed/sexual minorities will always be produced as other. Having argued that human rights are not contingent on biological determinants, the right to non-discrimination on the basis of sex traits is considered.