Intergovernmental relations in the administration of mental health programs in the New York metropolitan area

Bibliographical footnotes.

Fiscal disparities : hearing[s] before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session.

Pt. 1: "May 13, 1981" ; pt. 3: "November 4, 1981."

State implementation of federal standards : hearing before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session.

"November 24, 1981"--Pt. 3.

Alternative service delivery : hearings before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session.

"October 26, 1981, St. Paul, Minnesota"--Pt. 3.

Corporate disclosure : hearings before the Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures and the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations, Ninety-third Congress, second session.

Pt. 1. March 21, 26, and 28, 1974 -- pt. 2. April 23, 24, and May 20, 21, 1974 -- pt. 3. June 25, 27, and August 14, 1974.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

"M-17."

State legislative program of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

Description based on: Oct. 1963.

An Aging society : meeting the needs of the elderly while responding to rising federal costs : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives /

"B-223880"--P. [1].

Federalism and health policy: the intergovernmental committees in Brazil

OBJECTIVE To analyze the dynamics of operation of the Bipartite Committees in health care in the Brazilian states.METHODS The research included visits to 24 states, direct observation, document analysis, and performance of semi-structured interviews with state and local leaders. The characterization of each committee was performed between 2007 and 2010, and four dimensions were considered: (i) level of institutionality, classified as advanced, intermediate, or incipient; (ii) agenda of intergovernmental negotiations, classified as diversified/restricted, adapted/not adapted to the reality of each state, and shared/unshared between the state and municipalities; (iii) political processes, considering the character and scope of intergovernmental relations; and (iv) capacity of operation, assessed as high, moderate, or low.RESULTS Ten committees had advanced level of institutionality. The agenda of the negotiations was diversified in all states, and most of them were adapted to the state reality. However, one-third of the committees showed power inequalities between the government levels. Cooperative and interactive intergovernmental relations predominated in 54.0% of the states. The level of institutionality, scope of negotiations, and political processes influenced Bipartite Committees’ ability to formulate policies and coordinate health care at the federal level. Bipartite Committees with a high capacity of operation predominated in the South and Southeast regions, while those with a low capacity of operations predominated in the North and Northeast.CONCLUSIONS The regional differences in operation among Bipartite Interagency Committees suggest the influence of historical-structural variables (socioeconomic development, geographic barriers, characteristics of the health care system) in their capacity of intergovernmental health care management. However, structural problems can be overcome in some states through institutional and political changes. The creation of federal investments, varied by regions and states, is critical in overcoming the structural inequalities that affect political institutions. The operation of Bipartite Committees is a step forward; however, strengthening their ability to coordinate health care is crucial in the regional organization of the health care system in the Brazilian states.

Federal-provincial relations and the environment : attaining sustainable development through cooperation /

A study of intergovernmental relations in the area of the environment will determine whether the current Canadian federal structure represents a dangerous impediment to the promotion of sustainable development. This paper examines the interjurisdictional quagmire that has developed from the fact that authority over the environment is a functionally concurrent field for the two orders of government. A history of federal-provincial relations in the area of environmental protection is followed by an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages associated with competitive and cooperative federalism. For the purpose of this paper, cooperative federalism is characterized by the presence of a formal institutional system to facilitate interaction between politicians and bureaucrats from both orders of government. Competitive federalism is defined as a system that lacks a formal institutional structure to promote discussion and coordination between federal and provincial officials in a specific field of interest. Last, I examine thirty sustainable development issues following the structure established in Agenda 21 to determine the impact of the present federal system on the development of these objectives. This study concludes that Canadian federalism is not a dangerous impediment to the promotion of sustainable development. Cooperative federalism in a form that does not eliminate the ability of governments to revert to competition promotes the emergence of an institutional system that facilitates information-sharing and discussion between the two orders of government, thus leading to coordinated efforts in the field of the environment. Respect for the current division of powers in this area is also essential to the cohesiveness of Canadian society. Policy-makers and advocates for a sustainable society should focus on working within the present system.

The intergovernmental allocation of revenue from natural resources: finding a balance between centripetal and centrifugal pressure

Includes bibliography

Could European Governance Ideas Improve Federal-provincial Relations in Canada? EDAP 6/2013

Over the past seventeen years Canada has decentralized many social programmes, moving responsibility from the federal government to 13 provinces and territories through bilateral federal-provincial agreements. In contrast, the European Union (EU) has moved in the opposite direction, building pan-European approaches and establishing new processes to facilitate multilateral collaboration among the 28 EU member states. This has been done through a new governance approach called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Using a detailed case study − employment policy − this paper explores whether Canada could learn from OMC governance ideas to re-build a pan-Canadian dimension to employment policy and improve the performance of its intergovernmental relations system. Concrete lessons for Canada to improve decentralized governance are suggested: consolidating the different bilateral agreements; using benchmarking instead of controls in fiscal transfers; undertaking research, analysis, and comparisons in order to facilitate mutual learning; revitalizing intergovernmental structures in light of devolution; and engaging social partners, civil society and other stakeholders. Post-devolution Canada is not doing badly in managing employment policy, but could do better. Looking to the EU for ideas on new ways to collaborate provides a chance for setting a forward looking agenda that could ultimately result not only in better labour market outcomes, but also improvements to one small part of Canada’s often fractious federation.

Intergovernmental regulation of telecommunications : a Commission report.

"A-115."

Intergovernmental responsibilities for water supply and sewage disposal in metropolitan areas.

"A-13*"

State-local relations in the criminal justice system; a Commission report.

Mode of access: Internet.