Higher education as formation of the self and citizenship: an ethnography of the University Students from Amman, Jordan

My interest in higher education and citizenship in the Middle East at large and in Jordan in particular is fostered by some of the reflections Eickelman proposed (1992). Being a quite recent phenomenon, intimately linked with the more general topic of state formation it seemed to me more suitable to study it in a little country with a recent history (a field study left almost unexplored until now as far as Jordan is concerned, to the best of my knowledge, since Antoun 1994 focuses on the migration as a quest for higher education). The process of state formation in Jordan is quite studied. I thus intended to study the higher education policies as an attempt both to create a national citizenry and more recently as a way of controlling the more problematic part of the population (youth, which constitutes more than the double of the population. See UNDP and Ministry of Planning 2000). How do the young students enter the university system, and in which way does this system work? How is this system designed, in order to retain social control of the students (since they are usually perceived to be a factor of social and political instability, as in Iran or in Egypt)? Is there any significant difference between different faculties? And if so, why? My conclusions at this stage are that the university system is an integral part of the survival of the regime. The system works quite well, and Jordan has one of the best educational position in the region. Yet there are important distinctions to be made: the access to the better faculties is socially selective while the less valued faculties are left to the poorer and less wealthy youth. This results in a different treatment of the students and of the courses that I analysed. In the better faculties the teaching standards are quite high, and the relationship between professors and students is almost on a same-level base, while in the less privileged faculties the opposite is true. Thus we can observe a concrete politics of divide et impera intended to split the youth in two. For the more privileged there are some freedoms, both within and outside classes, designed I guess at forging them as autonomous individuals. On the opposite the less privileged are kept under tight control, even if also these students are a privileged category among youth at large.

Accounting for Big City Growth in Low Paid Occupations: Immigration and/or Service Class Consumption

Growth of 'global cities' in the 1980s was supposed to have involved an occupational polarisation, including growth of low paid service jobs. Though held to be untrue for European cities, at the time, some such growth did emerge in London a decade later than first reported for New York. The question is whether there was simply a delay before London conformed to the global city model, or whether another distinct cause was at work in both cases. This paper proposes that the critical factor in both cases was actually an upsurge of immigration from poor countries providing an elastic supply of cheap labour. This hypothesis and its counterpart based on growth in elite jobs are tested econometrically for the British case with regional data spanning 1975-2008, finding some support for both effects, but with immigration from poor countries as the crucial influence in late 1990s London. Keywords: regional labour markets; wages; employment; international migration; consumer demand JEL Codes: J21, J23, F22, R12

Immigration and the school system

Immigration is an important problem in many societies, and it has wide-ranging effects on the educational systems of host countries. There is a now a large empirical literature, but very little theoretical work on this topic. We introduce a model of family immigration in a framework where school quality and student outcomes are determined endogenously. This allows us to explain the selection of immigrants in terms of parental motivation and the policies which favor a positive selection. Also, we can study the effect of immigration on the school system and how school quality may self-reinforce immigrants' and natives' choices.

Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmission in a country with low tuberculosis incidence: role of immigration and HIV infection.

Immigrants from high-burden countries and HIV-coinfected individuals are risk groups for tuberculosis (TB) in countries with low TB incidence. Therefore, we studied their role in transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in Switzerland. We included all TB patients from the Swiss HIV Cohort and a sample of patients from the national TB registry. We identified molecular clusters by spoligotyping and mycobacterial interspersed repetitive-unit-variable-number tandem-repeat (MIRU-VNTR) analysis and used weighted logistic regression adjusted for age and sex to identify risk factors for clustering, taking sampling proportions into account. In total, we analyzed 520 TB cases diagnosed between 2000 and 2008; 401 were foreign born, and 113 were HIV coinfected. The Euro-American M. tuberculosis lineage dominated throughout the study period (378 strains; 72.7%), with no evidence for another lineage, such as the Beijing genotype, emerging. We identified 35 molecular clusters with 90 patients, indicating recent transmission; 31 clusters involved foreign-born patients, and 15 involved HIV-infected patients. Birth origin was not associated with clustering (adjusted odds ratio [aOR], 1.58; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.73 to 3.43; P = 0.25, comparing Swiss-born with foreign-born patients), but clustering was reduced in HIV-infected patients (aOR, 0.49; 95% CI, 0.26 to 0.93; P = 0.030). Cavitary disease, male sex, and younger age were all associated with molecular clustering. In conclusion, most TB patients in Switzerland were foreign born, but transmission of M. tuberculosis was not more common among immigrants and was reduced in HIV-infected patients followed up in the national HIV cohort study. Continued access to health services and clinical follow-up will be essential to control TB in this population.

Immigration and contested nation-building : explaining the political salience of immigration in multi-national societies

Multi-national societies present a complex setting for the politics of immigration, as migration’s linguistic, economic and cultural effects may coincide with existing contestation over nationhood between sub-units and the central state. Empirically, though, political actors only sometimes, and in some places, explicitly connect the politics of immigration to the stakes of multi-level politics. With reference to Canada, Belgium and the United Kingdom, this paper examines the conditions under which political leaders link immigration to ongoing debate about governance in multi-national societies. The paper argues that the distribution of policy competencies in the multi-level system is less important for shaping immigration and integration politics than is the perceived impact (positive or negative) on the sub-unit’s societal culture or its power relationship with the center. Immigration and integration are more often politicized where center and sub-unit hold divergent views on migration and its place in national identity.

Identity, immigration, and prejudice in Europe: a recognition approach

Social identity is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, identifying with a social group is a prerequisite for the sharing of common norms and values, solidarity, and collective action. On the other hand, in-group identification often goes together with prejudice and discrimination. Today, these two sides of social identification underlie contradictory trends in the way European nations and European nationals relate to immigrants and immigration. Most European countries are becoming increasingly multicultural, and anti-discrimination laws have been adopted throughout the European Union, demonstrating a normative shift towards more social inclusion and tolerance. At the same time, racist and xenophobic attitudes still shape social relations, individual as well as collective behaviour (both informal and institutional), and political positions throughout Europe. The starting point for this chapter is Sanchez-Mazas' (2004) interactionist approach to the study of racism and xenophobia, which in turn builds on Axel Honneth's (1996) philosophical theory of recognition. In this view, the origin of attitudes towards immigrants cannot be located in one or the other group, but in a dynamic of mutual influence. Sanchez-Mazas' approach is used as a general framework into which we integrate social psychological approaches of prejudice and recent empirical findings examining minority-majority relations. We particularly focus on the role of national and European identities as antecedents of anti-immigrant attitudes held by national majorities. Minorities' reactions to denials of recognition are also examined. We conclude by delineating possible social and political responses to prejudice towards immigrants.

Immigration and housing booms: Evidence from Spain

We estimate empirically the effect of immigration on house prices and residentialconstruction activity in Spain over the period 1998-2008. This decade is characterized by both aspectacular housing market boom and a stunning immigration wave. We exploit the variation inimmigration across Spanish provinces and construct an instrument based on the historicallocation patterns of immigrants by country of origin. The evidence points to a sizeable causaleffect of immigration on both prices and quantities in the housing market. Between 1998 and2008, the average Spanish province received an immigrant inflow equal to 17% of the initialworking-age population. We estimate that this inflow increased house prices by about 52% andis responsible for 37% of the total construction of new housing units during the period. Thesefigures imply that immigration can account for roughly one third of the housing boom, both interms of prices and new construction.

Immigration and the survival of the welfare state

This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in a model where immigration policy is also endogenous. In the model, the skills of the native population are affected by immigration and skill accumulation. Moreover, immigrants affect future policies, once they gain the right to vote. The main finding is that the long-run survival of redistributive policies is linked to an immigration policy specifying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, in steady state the unskilled majority admits a limited inflow of unskilled immigrants in order to offset growth in the fraction of skilled voters and maintain a high degree of income redistribution.Interestingly, equilibrium immigration policy shifts from unrestricted skilled immigration,when the country is skill-scarce, to restricted unskilled immigration, as the fraction of native skilled workers increases. The analysis also suggests a new set of variables that may help explain international differences in immigration restrictions.

Hypothesis on immigration and welfare

The number of hypothesis trying to explain which are the reasons behind the decision to migrate to work into a developed country are diverse and at the same time, difficult to test due to the multiplicity of factors which affect it. This papers attempts to move forward trying to disentangle which are the socio-economic factors that explain the differences in the figures of immigrants in the OECD countries. We show empirical evidence about the determinants of the migratory flows to 17 OECD countries from 65 countries in the 1980-2000 period. Our results reveal the importance to differentiate the inflows composition by at least income in the origin countries. Thus, regarding inflows from non-high-income countries, the results suggest that there is a pull effect from monetary and not real income, and then, the welfare magnets hypothesis should be rejected. This group reacts more to the migratory policy than the inflows coming from high-income countries, although those policies designed to slow down the inflows have not been able, in the aggregate, to reduce them.