El doble aislamiento de la política exterior de Venezuela (Otros Temas)

Este artículo aborda la política exterior del presidente Hugo Chávez Frías a partir de las ambigüedades planteadas por su programa de "revolución democrática". Dado que lo revolucionario tiene un carácter política y económicamente anti-liberal, Chavéz está expuesto permanentemente a un aislamiento con respecto al mundo y a la sociedad venezolana. Los rasgos contradictorios de su política exterior aparecen reflejados en las relaciones bilaterales con Colombia, Estados Unidos y Cuba.

Report of the Caribbean Forum: Shaping a Sustainable Development Agenda to Address the Caribbean Reality in the Twenty-first Century

Includes a statement of condolences presented to the Government and People of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on the occasion of the passing of President Hugo Chavez

ALBA-TCP: uma cultura de integração regional alternativa para a América Latina?

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Os Projetos regionais de Brasil e Venezuela para América do Sul nos anos Lula da Silva (2003-2010)

Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais (UNESP - UNICAMP - PUC-SP) - FFC

As relações entre Brasil e Venezuela durante os governos de Lula e Chávez - 2003 a 2010

This work examines the political-economic relations between Brazil and Venezuela from 2003 to 2010, during the mandates of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Hugo Chavez Frías. After a historical overview of Venezuela, by showing the first approximations, it sets out the cooperation projects and makes a categorization and study of the International Acts signed during the studied period. The graphs and tables allowed a quantitative and qualitative analysis. The growth of the international trade is also considered and studied. The results show prospects that may contribute to cooperation and international trade between the two countries

Colômbia: o conflito interno e as fronteiras com o Equador e a Venezuela

The article presents a brief panorama of the relations between the government of Alvaro Uribe and the governments of Rafael Correa and Hugo Chavez of the impacts of the Columbian conflict on the Colombia- Equator-Venezuela borders.

Indigene Repräsentation im neuen Venezolanischen Fernsehen

Die politischen Transformationen in Venezuela, im Zuge derer Hugo Chavez Frias eine neue Ära 'sozialer Kommunikation' ankündigte, haben zu einer extremen Polarisierung der Medien, im Speziellen des Fernsehens, geführt. In diesem Buch werden aus kultur- und sozialanthropologischer Perspektive gesellschaftliche Dynamiken unter dem Kriterium der medialen Präsenz, Ausbreitung und Wirkung in den Mittelpunkt gestellt. Am Beispiel der indigenen Warao werden bolivarianische Konzepte partizipativer Repräsentation vorgestellt und diskutiert. Dabei sollen Vorgehensweisen und Prozesse audio-visueller Repräsentation mit der Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung der zu Repräsentierenden in Beziehung gesetzt werden.

The Sandinista Revolution and Post-Conflict Development--Key Issues

Following Daniel Ortega's victory in the presidential election held in November 2006, Nicaragua has been undergoing a transition from a democratic to authoritarian system. In the 1980s, Ortega served as President of the Sandinista government and implemented a Cuban-type socialist system, but the system failed and democracy was established during 1990-2007. Considering this failure, why did Ortega succeed in taking power again? This paper provides a brief history of modern Nicaragua and gives some insights into the twists of Latin American politics. The paper was prepared for the international seminar on Helping Failed States Recover: The Role of Business in Promoting Stability and Development, organized by the University of Kansas Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER), held on April 4-6, 2007 in Lawrence. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the author. All mistakes and/or errors are entirely the author's responsibility.

The Re-Emergence of Suriname’s Désiré (Desi) Bouterse: Political Acumen and Geopolitical Anxiety

This study examines some concerns that derive from Suriname‘s May-July 2010 elections, which resulted in the re-emergence of erstwhile military ruler and convicted drug trafficker, Désiré (Desi) Bouterse, as President of the Republic. The victory reflects Bouterse‘s political acumen in aggregating disparate political interests and in establishing a viable coalition government. But because of his history and profile, this triumph has generated anxiety in some places internationally. In this respect, the study examines anxieties related to three matters: (a) relations with Guyana, where there is an existing territorial dispute and a recently resolved maritime dispute, (b) illegal drug trafficking operations, and (c) foreign policy engagement with Venezuela. There has been a flurry of bilateral activities—including several presidential summits—with Guyana since President Bouterse‘s inauguration, albeit seemingly more about symbolism than substance. Although the maritime dispute was settled by a Tribunal of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 2007, the 15,000 km2 New River Triangle is still unresolved. Indeed, in June 2011 President Bouterse reasserted Suriname‘s claim to the Triangle. Suriname has upped the ante in that dispute by portraying internationally the map of Suriname as inclusive of the disputed area. In all likelihood that self-redefinition slowly will become the country‘s cartographic definition in the eyes of the world if Guyana does not successfully rebuff that move or pursue the definitive settlement of the dispute. A geonarcotics assessment shows Suriname to be still heavily implicated in trafficking, because of geography, law enforcement limitations, corruption, and other factors. But despite Bouterse‘s drug-related history and that of former senior military officers, several reasons suggest the inexpediency of a narco-state being created by Bouterse. As well, as part of Suriname‘s pursuit of increased Caribbean and South American engagement, it has boosted relations with Venezuela, which has included it in PetroCaribe and provided housing and agricultural aid. However, the engagement appears to be driven more by pragmatism and less by any ideological affinity with Hugo Chavez.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting for: Pan-African Consciousness Raising and Organizing in the United States and Venezuela

We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting for: Pan-African Consciousness Raising and Organizing in the United States and Venezuela, draws on fifteen months of field research accompanying organizers, participating in protests, planning/strategy meetings, state-run programs, academic conferences and everyday life in these two countries. Through comparative examination of the processes by which African Diaspora youth become radically politicized, this work deconstructs tendencies to deify political s/heroes of eras past by historicizing their ascent to political acclaim and centering the narratives of present youth leading movements for Black/African liberation across the Diaspora. I employ Manuel Callahan’s description of “encuentros”, “the disruption of despotic democracy and related white middle-class hegemony through the reconstruction of the collective subject”; “dialogue, insurgent learning, and convivial research that allows for a collective analysis and vision to emerge while affirming local struggles” to theorize the moments of encounter, specifically, the moments (in which) Black/African youth find themselves becoming politically radicalized and by what. I examine the ways in which Black/African youth organizing differs when responding to their perpetual victimization by neoliberal, genocidal state-politics in the US, and a Venezuelan state that has charged itself with the responsibility of radically improving the quality of life of all its citizens. Through comparative analysis, I suggest the vertical structures of “representative democracy” dominating the U.S. political climate remain unyielding to critical analyses of social stratification based on race, gender, and class as articulated by Black youth. Conversely, I contend that present Venezuelan attempts to construct and fortify more horizontal structures of “popular democracy” under what Hugo Chavez termed 21st Century Socialism, have resulted in social fissures, allowing for a more dynamic and hopeful negation between Afro-Venezuelan youth and the state.

Entrevista a James Petras

Contacto principal para correspondencia editorial.

Manejo de la simbología en el ascenso y consolidación de Hugo Chávez en el poder

Los proyectos políticos están en constante necesidad de legitimidad para llevar a cabo las acciones que planean y para mantenerse en el poder mientras las desarrollan, de esto no ha escapado la política latinoamericana y menos aún la venezolana. En su recorrido de más de dos décadas Hugo Chávez utilizó la simbología para hacerse al poder y lograr encaminar los deseos (y los votos) de los venezolanos hacia la idea de revolución y reconstrucción del país que él representa. El proyecto Chávez es de carácter expansionista y el manejo de la simbología que se utiliza en él va encaminado también hacia el posicionamiento a lo largo y ancho del continente de la doctrina promulgada por su líder.

El discurso político del presidente Hugo Chávez Frías como constituyente de identidad política en Venezuela: antagonismo y representación

En esta monografía de grado se pretende hacer un análisis acerca de la constitución de una nueva identidad política en Venezuela a partir del discurso del presidente Hugo Chávez y con posterioridad al golpe de Estado de 2002. Para ello, se emplean los supuestos teóricos de Ernesto Laclau y Chantal Mouffe y la deconstrucción de las categorías discursivas del presidente venezolano, así como “la respuesta” popular en relación a la representación política en “doble vía”. Por medio de un estudio histórico sobre la conformación de Venezuela como un Estado democrático-liberal, es posible aprehender sobre su consenso (Pacto de Punto Fijo) y la manera en la que un discurso antagónico se erige como hegemónico y así, se establece una identidad política alternativa: “El pueblo bolivariano”. Se trata de un análisis cualitativo sobre la constitución de identidades políticas y la relación entre las mismas, se aleja completamente de una evaluación sobre los logros y/o fracasos del proceso político venezolano.

The United States Congress and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez

The Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991 marks the end of the Cold War and the elimination of the United States' main rival for global political-economic leadership. For decades U.S. foreign policymakers had formulated policies aimed at containing the spread of Soviet communism and Moscow's interventionist policies in the Americas. They now assumed that Latin American leftist revolutionary upheavals could also be committed to history. This study explores how Congress takes an active role in U.S. foreign policymaking when dealing with revolutionary changes in Latin America. This study finds that despite Chavez's vitriolic statements and U.S. economic vulnerability due to its dependence on foreign oil sources, Congress today sees Chavez as a nuisance and not a threat to U.S. vital interests. Devoid of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American patron intent on challenging the United States for regional leadership, Chavez is seen by Congress largely as a threat to the stability of Venezuela's institutions and political-economic stability. Today both the U.S. executive and the legislative branches largely see Bolivarianism a distraction and not an existential threat. The research is based on an examination of Bolivarian Venezuela compared to revolutionary upheaval and governance in Nicaragua over the course of the twentieth century. This project is largely descriptive, qualitative in approach, but quantitative data are used when appropriate. To analyze both the U.S. executive and legislative branches' reaction to revolutionary change, Cole Blasier's theoretical propositions as developed in the Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910- 1985 are utilized. The present study highlights the fact that Blasier's propositions remain a relevant means for analyzing U.S. foreign policymaking.