Las microfinanzas: el sistema financiero en Guatemala

Incluye Bibliografía

Balance de la privatización de la industria petrolera en Argentina y su impacto sobre las inversiones y la competencia en los mercados minoristas de combustibles

Incluye Bibliografía

Istmo Centroamericano: estadísticas del subsector eléctrico (datos actualizados a 2001)

Incluye Bibliografía

Regional Specialization in Communal Agriculture: The Shakers, 1850- 1880

When the Shakers established communal farms in the Ohio Valley, they encountered a new agricultural environment that was substantially different from the familiar soils, climates, and markets of New England and the Hudson Valley. The ways in which their response to these new conditions differed by region has not been well documented. We examine patterns of specialization among the Shakers using the manuscript schedules of the federal Agricultural Censuses from 1850 through 1880. For each Shaker unit, we also recorded a random sample of five farms in the same township (or all available farms if there were fewer than five). The sample of neighboring farms included 75 in 1850, 70 in the next two census years, and 66 in 1880. A Herfindahl-type index suggested that, although the level of specialization was less among the Shakers than their neighbors, trends in specialization by the Shakers and their neighbors were remarkably similar when considered by region. Both Eastern and Western Shakers were more heavily committed to dairy and produce than were their neighbors, while Western Shakers produced more grains than did Eastern Shakers, a pattern imitated in nearby family farms. Livestock and related production was far more important to the Eastern Shakers than to the Western Shakers, again similar to patterns in the census returns from other farms. We conclude that, despite the obvious scale and organizational differences, Shaker production decisions were based on the same comparative advantages that determined production decisions of family farms.

Riesgo sistémico, concentración y tamaño: Caso del sistema bancario colombiano

El presente documento tiene como propósito establecer en qué medida la concentración y el tamaño de la banca comercial puede afectar, si es que se da, la exposición de riesgo en el sistema bancario colombiano en el periodo de 1995 – 2014 -- Para tal fin, se siguió la metodología de Chumacero y Langon (2001) y Barro (2011), la cual realiza un modelo de serie de tiempo, tomando la razón entre cartera total y cartera vencida del total de los bancos, como variable proxy que mide el riesgo; así mismo, el indicador Herfindahl - Hirschman que determina el nivel de concentración, finalmente, con la razón entre activos de la banca como porcentaje del PIB -- El resultado obtenido describe que para el caso de la concentración, muestra un coeficiente menor a cero, que soportaría la idea de que la competencia se daría en riesgo ofertado en el mercado bancario colombiano; el tamaño por su parte, su coeficiente registra ser mayor que cero, soportando la existencia de bancos demasiado grandes para quebrar

Endogenous normative indices for the industry concentration

This paper presents new indices for measuring the industry concentration. The indices proposed (C n ) are of a normative type because they embody (endogenous) weights matching the market shares of the individual firms to their Marshallian welfare shares. These indices belong to an enlarged class of the Performance Gradient Indexes introduced by Dansby&Willig(I979). The definition of Cn for the consumers allows a new interpretation for the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (H), which can be viewed as a normative index according to particular values of the demand parameters. For homogeneous product industries, Cn equates H for every market distribution if (and only if) the market demand is linear. Whenever the inverse demand curve is convex (concave), H underestimates( overestimates) the industry concentration measured by the normative indexo For these industries, H overestimates (underestimates) the concentration changes caused by market transfers among small firms if the inverse demand curve is convex(concave) and underestimates( overestimates) it when such tranfers benefit a large firm, according to the convexity (or the concavity) of the demand curve. For heterogeneous product industries, an explicit normative index is obtained with a market demand derived from a quasi-linear utilility function. Under symmetric preferences among the goods, the index Cn is always greater than or equal the H-index. Under asymmetric assumptions, discrepancies between the firms' market distribution and the differentiationj substitution distributions among the goods, increase the concentration but make room for some horizontal mergers do reduce it. In particular, a mean preserving spread of the differentiation(substitution) increases(decreases) the concentration only if the smaller firms' goods become more(less) differentiated(substitute) w.r.t. the other goods. One important consequence of these results is that the consumers are benefitted when the smaller firms are producing weak substitute goods, and the larger firms produce strong substitute goods or face demand curves weakly sensitive to their own prices.

Hirschman meets Williamson: Relationship-specific investment and loyalty

In Albert Hirschman’s theory, loyalty plays a key role in the equilibrium between exit and voice. This article extends economic (rational choice) analysis to the emergence of loyalty, which Hirschman considers an exogenous factor. This is accomplished by linking Williamson’s theory of specific investment to Hirschman’s model. Three cases are distinguished: (1) loyalty is due to specific investment; (2) loyalty is due to (intermediate) factors influenced by specific investment; and, (3) loyalty is independent of specific investment. A simple model formalizes the first case. A paradoxical dynamic of loyalty is identified: a lower degree of specificity may lead to a weakening of loyalty in the short run but astrengthening of loyalty in the long run. An application to the process of European integration is sketched.