HAMAS: ¿entre la táctica terrorista y la vía política?

El artículo muestra las disyuntivas en materia de política interna palestina a las que, con frecuencia, los líderes del HAMAS se enfrentan al momento de tomar una decisión con respecto a su relación con Israel en el contexto de la ocupación. Por un lado, el caso examina el papel de las influencias externas en el proceso de paz palestino-israelí y, por el otro, las presiones internas tanto de la población palestina como del gobierno de Israel, con respecto a las decisiones que debe tomar HAMAS ahora que ha dejado de ser oposición y se ha convertido en gobierno.-----This article shows the frequent dilemmas that the HAMAS leaders have to face in respect of the Palestinian internal policy at the time of making decisions regarding their relationship with Israel within the context of the occupation. This case examines on the one hand, the role of external influences in the Palestine-Israel peace process and, on the other hand, the internal pressures from both the Palestinian population and the Israeli government in regard of the decisions HAMAS has to make now that it has ceased to be in the opposition and has become the government.

The Long Game: Hamas, The IRA, and the Politics of Radicalization in Palestine and Northern Ireland

The value of a comparative study of the two conflicts stems from a remarkable similarity in the structural organization of political violence by its most influential practitioners: the IRA and Hamas. At the core, I have merely tried my best to approach a beguiling question in a fresh, dynamic way. The stultifying discourse of conflict that serves as lingua franca for the Israeli‐Palestinian issue has largely reduced strategic debate to how best the conflict can be managed – not ended. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s focus on “economic peace” and unwillingness to commit to a two‐state solution – the consensus that has governed peacemaking for decades – belies such thinking. The Clinton Administration’s cadre of Mideast negotiators operated amidst the most rapid institutionalization of Palestinian democracy in history ‐ yet remained obsessed with Israeli‐Arab “confidence‐building” measures, doing little to legitimize the gains of Oslo. So long as Palestinians continue to view the creation of Israel as “al‐Nakba” – the catastrophe – whilst successive Israeli governments refuse to grant their aspirations any legitimacy, there can be no progress. Peace requires empathy, a substantial compromise in the context of internecine conflict. The “long war” both conflicts have become mandates an equally expansive, broad‐based and labor‐intensive approach – a demanding process that can only be called The Long Game.