Regulation of wages paid to employees by contractors awarded government building contracts. Hearings ... 71st Congress, 3rd session on H.R. 16619, a bill relating to the rate of wages for laborers and mechanics employed on public buildings of the United States and the District of Columbia by contractors and subcontractors, and for other purposes, January 31, 1931.

Mode of access: Internet.

Can governments use their construction contracts to improve training outcomes?

This paper explores the likely efficacy of government agencies using their contracting relationships with private firms to affect training outcomes in the construction industry. Specifically, it reports on the results of a study of two training policies of theWestern Australian government. Empirical data is drawn from the government’s Tender Registration System between 1997 and 2006. The main finding of the quantitative analysis is that in the absence of strong industry commitment to policy objectives, the contracting approach is likely to result in high levels of avoidance activity and generate very few benefits. The results of a qualitative investigation also support these findings.

New laws for off the plan contracts in Queensland

The Land Sales Act 1984 regulates “off the plan” sales in Queensland in conjunction with several provisions in the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997. Together the Acts regulate sales in both unit developments and housing estates. From 2010 to 2013 the Queensland Government undertook a comprehensive review of the Land Sales Act 1984 to identify opportunities to modernise and improve the legislation. Significant changes were recommended by the Review to align the Land Sales Act 1984 (LSA) with current surveying and conveyancing practice and to overcome a number of practical issues faced by developers under the current legislation. A significant outcome of the review is the removal of provisions related to off the plan community title sales from the LSA to the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (BCCMA) and the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (BUGTA). This article examines the Land Sales and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 due to commence in November 2014.

Government grants - an abrogation or management of risks?

New public management (NPFM), with its hands-on, private sector-style performance measurement, output control, parsimonious use of resources, disaggreation of public sector units and greater competition in the public sector, has significantly affected charitable and nonprofit organisations delivering community services (Hood, 1991; Dunleavy, 1994; George & Wilding, 2002). The literature indicates that nonprofit organisations under NPM believe they are doing more for less: while administration is increasing, core costs are not being met; their dependence on government funding comes at the expense of other funding strategies; and there are concerns about proportionality and power asymmetries in the relationship (Kerr & Savelsberg, 2001; Powell & Dalton, 2011; Smith, 2002, p. 175; Morris, 1999, 2000a). Government agencies are under increased pressure to do more with less, demonstrate value for money, measure social outcomes, not merely outputs and minimise political risk (Grant, 2008; McGreogor-Lowndes, 2008). Government-community service organisation relationships are often viewed as 'uneasy alliances' characterised by the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressurs of funding and security (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 308; McGregor-Lowndes, 2008, p. 45; Morris, 200a). Significant community services are now delivered to citizens through such relationships, often to the most disadvantaged in the community, and it is important for this to be achieved with equity, efficiently and effectively. On one level, the welfare state was seen as a 'risk management system' for the poor, with the state mitigating the risks of sickness, job loss and old age (Giddens, 1999) with the subsequent neoliberalist outlook shifting this risk back to households (Hacker, 2006). At the core of this risk shift are written contracts. Vincent-Jones (1999,2006) has mapped how NPM is characterised by the use of written contracts for all manner of relations; e.g., relgulation of dealings between government agencies, between individual citizens and the state, and the creation of quais-markets of service providers and infrastructure partners. We take this lens of contracts to examine where risk falls in relation to the outsourcing of community services. First we examine the concept of risk. We consider how risk might be managed and apportioned between governments and community serivce organisations (CSOs) in grant agreements, which are quasiy-market transactions at best. This is informed by insights from the law and economics literature. Then, standard grant agreements covering several years in two jurisdictions - Australia and the United Kingdom - are analysed, to establish the risk allocation between government and CSOs. This is placed in the context of the reform agenda in both jurisdictions. In Australia this context is th enonprofit reforms built around the creation of a national charities regulator, and red tape reduction. In the United Kingdom, the backdrop is the THird Way agenda with its compacts, succeed by Big Society in a climate of austerity. These 'case studies' inform a discussion about who is best placed to bear and manage the risks of community service provision on behalf of government. We conclude by identifying the lessons to be learned from our analysis and possible pathways for further scholarship.

BIM - Implications for government (Case Study No. 5 [2004-032-A + Case study no. 5])

BIM as a suite of technologies has been enabled by the significant improvements in IT infrastructure, the capabilities of computer hardware and software, the increasing adoption of BIM, and the development of Industry Foundation Classes (IFC) which facilitate the sharing of information between firms. The report highlights the advantages of BIM, particularly the increased utility and speed, better data quality and enhanced fault finding in all construction phases. Additionally BIM promotes enhanced collaborations and visualisation of data mainly in the design and construction phase. There are a number of barriers to the effective implementation of BIM. These include, somewhat paradoxically, a single detailed model (which precludes scenarios and development of detailed alternative designs); the need for three different interoperability standards for effective implementation; added work for the designer which needs to be recognised and remunerated; the size and complexity of BIM, which requires significant investment in human capital to enable the realisation of its full potential. There are also a number of challenges to implementing BIM. The report has identified these as a range of issues concerning: IP, liability, risks and contracts, and the authenticity of users. Additionally, implementing BIM requires investment in new technology, skills training and development of news ways of collaboration. Finally, there are likely to be Trade Practices concerns as requiring certain technology owned by relatively few firms may limit

Government entity contribution to an effective partnership privatisation

The partnership form of privatisation is increasingly being used, in particular to carry out complex and evolving bundles of services. These have not previously been privatised because of incomplete contracts and contract management difficulties. Improved performance of the government entity as contract administrator and member of the partnership is crucial to modern service delivery expectations yet the privatisation literature has focused on other aspects of partnerships leaving the understanding of factors impacting the effectiveness of the government entity underdeveloped. This paper proposes the development of knowledge as to the range of factors which impact the effectiveness of the government entity. There is limited data available as to the operation of trust in the partnership relationship, and as to the capability of a range of privatisation forms to achieve stewardship of infrastructure. This research will utilise the findings from that research to build a tentative framework which will be utilised in staged research interrogating first the privatization literature and then the literature of other disciplines and sectors. The combined data will be analysed to provide government and practitioners such as government entity CEO’s with a complete listing of the operation of the factors which impact the effectiveness of the government entity in contributing to improved service delivery.

Accountability and Value for Money in Private Finance Initiative Contracts

Within the context of New Public Management (NPM), successive UK governments have claimed that PFI projects provide more accountability, and arguably, more value for money (VFM) than conventional procurement for the public (HM Treasury 1995, 2000, 2003a and 2003b). However, recent empirical research in the UK on PFI has indicated its potential limitations for accountability and VFM (Broadbent, Gill and Laughlin, 2004; Edwards, Shaoul, Stafford and Arblaster, 2004; Shaoul, 2005; and Ismail and Pendlebury, 2006) albeit these are based on either published accounts or a limited number of key stakeholders. This paper attempts to partially redress this gap in the literature by presenting an interesting case of the impact of PFI on accountability and VFM in Northern Ireland's education sector. The findings of this research, based on forty two interviews with a wide range of key stakeholders, suggest that stakeholders have different and often conflicting expectations and the actual PFI accountability and VFM benefits are much more obfuscated than those claimed in Government publications.

The Diffusion of Risks in Public Private Partnership Contracts

Purpose The UK government argues that the benefits of public private partnership (PPP) in delivering public infrastructure stem from: transferring risks to the private sector within a structure in which financiers put their own capital at risk; and, the performance based payment mechanism, reinforced by the due diligence requirements imposed by the lenders financing the projects (HM Treasury, 2010). Prior studies of risk in PPPs have investigated ‘what’ risks are allocated and to ‘whom’, that is to the public or the private sector. The purpose of this study is to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ PPP risks are diffused by their financiers. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on the financial structure of PPPs and on their financiers. Empirical evidence comes from interviews conducted with equity and debt financiers. Findings The findings show that the financial structure of the deals generates risk aversion in both debt and equity financiers and that the need to attract affordable finance leads to risk diffusion through a network of companies using various means that include contractual mitigation through insurance, performance support guarantees, interest rate swaps and inflation hedges. Because of the complexity this process generates, both procurers and suppliers need expensive expert advice. The risk aversion and diffusion and the consequent need for advice add cost to the projects impacting on the government’s economic argument for risk transfer. Limitations and implications The empirical work covers the private finance initiative (PFI) type of PPP arrangements and therefore the risk diffusion mechanisms may not be generalisable to other forms of PPP, especially those that do not involve the use of high leverage or private finance. Moreover, the scope of this research is limited to exploring the diffusion of risk in the private sector. Further research is needed on how risk is diffused in other settings and on the value for money implication of risk diffusion in PPP contracts. Originality/value The expectation inherent in PPP is that the private sector will better manage those risks allocated to it and because private capital is at risk, financiers will perform due diligence with the ultimate outcome that only viable projects will proceed. This paper presents empirical evidence that raises questions about these expectations. Key words: public private partnership, risk management, diffusion, private finance initiative, financiers

'It Is Not as Easy as ABC': Examining Practitioners' Views on Using Behavioural Contracts to Encourage Young People to Accept Responsibility for their Anti-Social Behaviour

This article examines the use of acceptable behavioural contracts as a tool for engendering the voluntary acceptance of responsibility in children and young people perceived to be engaging in anti-social behaviour and low-level criminality. Based on the results of a qualitative empirical analysis with local government and social housing anti-social behaviour teams, the article explores the attitudes of practitioners to the use of this unregulated but commonly utilised intervention. Practitioners' views are contrasted with the ideals of voluntary responsibilisation upon which the contracts are supposedly based. It is argued that there is a spectrum of differing approaches among practitioners, with some using the contracts more to encourage the voluntary acceptance of responsibility, whilst others use them more coercively to hold individuals responsible for their behaviour. The implications of these differing approaches are examined.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

Optimal safety incentives in road concession contracts

Changes in the roles of the government and the private sector in the provision of public services along with budget constraints are resulting in an increasing use of the concession approach for financing and managing roads. In the last few years, many of these contracts set up incentives linked to bonuses to encourage the concessionaire to render a better service to the users. Road safety is one the aspects on the basis of which concessionaires can be rewarded according to their performance. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether road safety incentives are being defined in the right way nowadays in different European countries and also identify what incentives would need to be implemented to achieve a socially optimal road safety level. To that end, we develop a specific incentive for road concession contracts that encourages companies to achieve the optimal level. We apply this methodology to three case studies of concessions recently awarded in order to determine to what extend the incentives they set up are closer or farther to the optimum.

Minorities and women as government contractors : a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

Cover title.

International science & technology : emerging trends in government policies and expenditures.

Shipping list no.: 96-0268-P.

Bibliography on government procurement and contractual procedure and related material /

Mode of access: Internet.