Reforming the procurement of construction and financing of Australian infrastructure : advancing capacity, competition and investment

Funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage grant over four years (2009–13), the Major Infrastructure Procurement project sought to find more effective and efficient ways of procuring and delivering the nation’s social and economic infrastructure by investigating constraints relating to construction capacity, competition, and finance in new public sector major infrastructure.1 The research team comprised researchers in construction economics and finance from Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Griffith University (GU), The University of Hong Kong (UHK), and The University of Newcastle (UoN). Project partners included state government departments and agencies responsible for infrastructure procurement and delivery from all Australian mainland states, and private sector companies and peak bodies in the infrastructure sector (see “Introduction” for complete list). There are a number of major outcomes from this research project. The first of these is a scientifically developed decisionmaking model for procurement of infrastructure that deploys a novel and state-of-the-art integration of dominant microeconomic theory (including theories developed by two Nobel Prize winners). The model has been established through empirical testing and substantial experiential evidence as a valid and reliable guide to configuring procurement of new major and mega infrastructure projects in pursuance of superior Valuefor- Money (VfM). The model specifically addresses issues of project size, bundling of contracts, and exchange relationships. In so doing, the model determines the suitability of adopting a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) mode.

Government grants - an abrogation or management of risks?

New public management (NPFM), with its hands-on, private sector-style performance measurement, output control, parsimonious use of resources, disaggreation of public sector units and greater competition in the public sector, has significantly affected charitable and nonprofit organisations delivering community services (Hood, 1991; Dunleavy, 1994; George & Wilding, 2002). The literature indicates that nonprofit organisations under NPM believe they are doing more for less: while administration is increasing, core costs are not being met; their dependence on government funding comes at the expense of other funding strategies; and there are concerns about proportionality and power asymmetries in the relationship (Kerr & Savelsberg, 2001; Powell & Dalton, 2011; Smith, 2002, p. 175; Morris, 1999, 2000a). Government agencies are under increased pressure to do more with less, demonstrate value for money, measure social outcomes, not merely outputs and minimise political risk (Grant, 2008; McGreogor-Lowndes, 2008). Government-community service organisation relationships are often viewed as 'uneasy alliances' characterised by the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressurs of funding and security (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 308; McGregor-Lowndes, 2008, p. 45; Morris, 200a). Significant community services are now delivered to citizens through such relationships, often to the most disadvantaged in the community, and it is important for this to be achieved with equity, efficiently and effectively. On one level, the welfare state was seen as a 'risk management system' for the poor, with the state mitigating the risks of sickness, job loss and old age (Giddens, 1999) with the subsequent neoliberalist outlook shifting this risk back to households (Hacker, 2006). At the core of this risk shift are written contracts. Vincent-Jones (1999,2006) has mapped how NPM is characterised by the use of written contracts for all manner of relations; e.g., relgulation of dealings between government agencies, between individual citizens and the state, and the creation of quais-markets of service providers and infrastructure partners. We take this lens of contracts to examine where risk falls in relation to the outsourcing of community services. First we examine the concept of risk. We consider how risk might be managed and apportioned between governments and community serivce organisations (CSOs) in grant agreements, which are quasiy-market transactions at best. This is informed by insights from the law and economics literature. Then, standard grant agreements covering several years in two jurisdictions - Australia and the United Kingdom - are analysed, to establish the risk allocation between government and CSOs. This is placed in the context of the reform agenda in both jurisdictions. In Australia this context is th enonprofit reforms built around the creation of a national charities regulator, and red tape reduction. In the United Kingdom, the backdrop is the THird Way agenda with its compacts, succeed by Big Society in a climate of austerity. These 'case studies' inform a discussion about who is best placed to bear and manage the risks of community service provision on behalf of government. We conclude by identifying the lessons to be learned from our analysis and possible pathways for further scholarship.

The dilemma of international capital tax competition in the presence of public capital and endogenous growth

Using an OLG-model with endogenous growth and public capital we show, that an international capital tax competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates, and as a consequence to lower welfare levels and growth rates. Each national government has an incentive to reduce the capital income tax rates in its effort to ensure that this policy measure increases the domestic private capital stock, domestic income and domestic economic growth. This effort is justified as long as only one country applies this policy. However, if all countries follow this path then all of them will be made worse off in the long run.

Entry and competition in generic biologics

Patents for several blockbuster biological products are expected to expire soon. The Food and Drug Administration is examining whether biologies can and should be treated like pharmaceuticals with regard to generics. In contrast with pharmaceuticals, which are manufactured through chemical synthesis, biologies are manufactured through fermentation, a process that is more variable and costly. Regulators might require extensive clinical testing of generic biologies to demonstrate equivalence to the branded product. The focus of the debate on generic biologies has been on legal and health concerns, but there are important economic implications. We combine a theoretical model of generic biologies with regression estimates from generic pharmaceuticals to estimate market entry and prices in the generic biologic market. We find that generic biologies will have high fixed costs from clinical testing and from manufacturing, so there will be less entry than would be expected for generic pharmaceuticals. With fewer generic competitors, generic biologies will be relatively close in price to branded biologies. Policy makers should be prudent in estimating financial benefits of generic biologies for consumers and payers. We also examine possible government strategies to promote generic competition. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Government intervention in a dynamic economy

From the late 1970s onwards, the view that government intervention could provide a means of overcoming market failure in advanced was increasingly questioned. For some, intervention was to be discouraged because it interfered with individual liberty. For others, what was problematic was the welfare economist's assumption of an autonomous state acting in the public interest. Finally, there was the issue of the state's ability to achieve what it set out to do. Government failure it was argued was just as pervasive as market failure and no antidote to it. This paper critically evaluates such arguments in relation to competition, industrial change, innovation, and competitive advantage in production.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Benefits of Implementing Lean Practices and the Impact of the Lean Aerospace Initiative in the Defense Aerospace Industry and Government Agencies

In the 1980’s, many United States industrial organizations started developing new production processes to improve quality, reduce cost, and better respond to customer needs and the pressures of global competition. This new paradigm was coined Lean Production (or simply “Lean”) in the book The Machine That Changed The World published in 1990 by researchers from MIT’s International Motor Vehicle Program. In 1993, a consortium of US defense aerospace firms and the USAF Aeronautical Systems Center, together with the AFRL Materials and Manufacturing Directorate, started the Lean Aircraft Initiative (LAI) at MIT. With expansion in 1998 to include government space products, the program was renamed the Lean Aerospace Initiative. LAI’s vision is to “Significantly reduce the cost and cycle time for military aerospace products throughout the entire value chain while continuing to improve product performance.” By late 1998, 23 industry and 13 government organizations with paying memberships, along with MIT and the UAW were participating in the LAI.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.

Government intervention or entrepreneurial profit? Explaining innovation in the Korean online gaming industry

The paper examines how and why the Korean online gaming industry gained dominance in the global market despite US and Japanese competition in related gaming sectors.

High prices for generics in Australia : more competition might help

It is commonly believed that dispensed prices of medicines in Australia are substantially lower than those in other developed countries, particularly the US. This article reports the results of an analysis comparing dispensed prices for the most commonly prescribed and the highest cost items in Australia with dispensed prices in the US. Although a large majority of items are less expensive in Australia than in the US, Australian prices are higher for a substantial number of products, particularly generic drugs. This article examines various policies affecting the pricing of generics in Australia. It is postulated that the main cause for higher prices for a substantial number of generic products is the lack of price competition. This results from government policy which ensures that a price reduction by one company is communicated immediately to all competitors in that market along with an invitation to match the reduced price. The dominant strategy for all suppliers is to only reduce their price in response to a reduction in price by a competitor. The result is a lack of differentiation in pricing across brands of a medicine on the Schedule of Pharmaceutical Benefits. The government could improve the structure of the generics market and encourage greater competition by ceasing to disclose competitor firms’ offers to other competitors. The government could conduct pricing reviews of each generic product relatively infrequently (eg, only once annually or every 18 months). At the time of the pricing review, the government would request confidential offers on price for a generic from all players in the market. Brands should then all be listed under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) at the offered price. Prices offered by the individual supplier would apply until the next pricing review. The PBS would continue to subsidise up to the price of the lowest priced brand, with brand premiums applying to all brands priced higher than the benchmark price. Such an approach would provide opportunity for players in the market to capture market share by being thelowest priced brand.

Competition and television news in India : a content analysis

In India, not unlike some other developing countries, ruling parties have used public service broadcasters to propagate their virtues, adversely affecting the broadcasters' image as a credible news media. The Indian public service broadcaster. Doordarshan,
which has been besieged by increased competition and government-imposed demandfor selfsufficiency in recent years, continues to struggle to shed its image as a government mouthpiece despite being run by an independent corporation. This article
presents a content analysis of news programs broadcast by Doordarshan and a foreign television network. Star News. The study examines the differences and similarities between Doordarshan and Star TV's prime time news programs broadcast at the turn ofthe century, almost a decade after the advent ofcommercial television in India broke the public service broadcaster's monopoly in the country.

Political competition and environmental reporting: evidence from New Zealand local governments

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between "political competition" and "environmental reporting" by New Zealand local governments. Design/methodology/approach - The research method includes a longitudinal analysis of environmental reporting by New Zealand local governments in their annual reports for the financial years 2005-2006 to 2009-2010. "Content analysis" was used to attach scores to the extent of environmental reporting. The "number of candidates divided by the number of available positions at the previous election" was used as the proxy for "political competition". Findings - The study reports a positive relationship between "political competition" and "environmental reporting" in 2007-2008. The number of local governments reporting voluntary environmental information increased in 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 compared to 2005-2006, followed by a reduction in such numbers following the 2007-2008 financial year. This trend in disclosure can be attributed to the local government elections in October 2007. This finding is consistent with the expectation of "agency theory" and provides insight into the pattern of perceived agency costs. The study also finds a dearth in reporting "monetary" and "bad" news. Originality/value - The study contributes towards the previous literature on environmental reporting by concentrating on the public sector and New Zealand, together with investigating the relationship of such reporting with "political competition" through a longitudinal analysis. The theoretical contribution of this study is the adoption of "agency theory" in the context of public sector voluntary reporting and investigating the significance attached by agents to environmental reporting to minimise agency cost. The practical contribution of the study is in the area of future development of reporting standards in regards to environmental reporting.

Low expectations, low demand : when should the government intervene?

Este trabalho estuda o impacto de diferentes políticas que procuram mitigar falhas de coordenação em um ambiente macroeconômico. Abordamos questões relativas ao timing dos estímulos econômicos. Quando o governo deveria começar a incentivar a economia? Deveria gastar mais para prevenir crises ou para tirar a economia da recessão quando os fundamentos estão melhorando? Como o estímulo deve alterar a complementaridade estratégica? Para responder a estas perguntas, construímos um modelo macroeconômico dinâmico com concorrência monopolística e decisões de investimento sequenciais. Aplicando resultados da literatura teórica de jogos dinâmicos com fricções, selecionamos um único equilíbrio neste modelo, nos dando um instrumental tratável para a análise de políticas. Nossos resultados sugerem que o governo não deveria viesar incentivos nem para a prevenção de crises nem para resgatar a economia quando esta já está em crise.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.