The natural resources deficit: the implications for German politics. OSW Commentary No. 46, 2011-02-08

Falling amounts of natural resources and the ‘peak oil’ question, i.e. the point in time when the maximum rate of extraction of easily-accessible oil reserves is reached, have been among the key issues in public debate in Germany on all levels: expert, business and – most crucially – the government level. The alarming assessments of German analysts anticipate a rapid shrinkage of oil reserves and a sharp rise in oil prices, which in the longer term will affect the economic and political systems of importer countries. Concerns about the consequences of the projected resource deficit, especially among representatives of German industry, are also fuelled by the stance of those countries which export raw materials. China, which meets 97% of global demand for minerals crucial for the production of new technologies, cut its exports by 40% in summer 2010 (compared to 2009), arguing that it had to protect its reserves from overexploitation. In 2009 the value of natural resources Germany imported reached €84 billion, of which €62 billion were spent on energy carriers, and €22 billion on metals. For Germany, the shrinkage of resources is a political problem of the utmost importance, since the country is poor in mineral resources and has to acquire petroleum and other necessary raw materials abroad1. In autumn 2010, the German minister of economy initiated the establishment of a Resources Agency designed to support companies in their search for natural resources, and the government prepared and adopted a national Raw Material Strategy. In the next decade the policy of the German government, including foreign policy, will be affected by the consequences of the decreasing availability of natural resources. It can be expected that the mission of the Bundeswehr will be redefined, and the importance of African states and current exporter countries such as Russia and China for German policies will increase. At the same time, Germany will seek to strengthen cooperation among importer countries, which should make pressure on resource-exporting states more effective. In this context, it can be expected that the efforts taken to develop an EU resource strategy or even a ‘comprehensive resource policy’ will be intensified; or at least, the EU’s energy policy will permanently include the issue of sourcing raw materials.

German macro: how it's different and why that matters. EPC Discussion Paper, May 2016

Do the macroeconomics of the German political establishment really differ from standard western macroeconomics? That question was the starting point for the seminar on ‘German macro: How it’s Different and Why that Matters’, which was held at Heriot-Watt University in December 2015, with financial support from the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) and the Money, Macro & Finance Research Group (MMF). This ebook, edited by George Bratsiotis and David Cobham, is the result of that exercise; six of the papers were presented at the seminar in earlier versions, and the editors sought some additional papers to complete the range of perspectives offered. The authors all sought out to discover whether or not there is something unique about German macroeconomics, and in what ways it differs from standard western macroeconomics; is it true that the former neglects demand management (although it may be quite interventionist in other ways), rejects debt relief and emphasises structural reform designed to improve competitiveness as the (only) key to economic growth? How much of whatever difference exists is due to a well worked out set of ideas in the form of Ordoliberalism? In what way does it relate to Germany’s own experiences in different periods? And how far is this the result of political preferences and how much do the idiosyncrasies of these German views matter, for the development of the Eurozone and indeed the health of the German economy?

The role of Central Europe in the German economy. The political consequences. OSW Report June 2016

Recent publications allow us to conclude that the economic relations between Germany and Central Europe have come to the ‘end of history’, and nothing new will happen. However, a deeper analysis of these relationships reveals interesting new trends. Since joining the European Union the states of Central Europe have not settled for maintaining the average level of economic development, but have continued to narrow the distance between them and Western Europe, something which the global financial crisis did not prevent. Their improved economic situation also affected their relations with Germany. The latest results from the Visegrád Group states show them to be Germany’s most important trading partner, and their balance of trade in goods is in a state of equilibrium, while many euro area countries have recorded high trade deficits with Germany. The aim of this report is to display the trends in trade and investment between Germany and Central Europe, based on the example of the Visegrád Group. The author will also attempt to answer the question of whether the advancing economic cooperation between Germany and the V4 countries will lead to the further modernisation of those countries’ economies, or whether it will run the risk of leaving them in the ‘middle income trap’.

German currency and finance.

Binder's title.

Our changing German problems.

Mode of access: Internet.

Immortality or annihilation? The question of a future state discussed and decided by the arguments of reason.

"A translation from the German of Part I of an anonymous work 'Elpizon' by Ch. Friedrich Sintenis." Halkett & Laing, 1928. v.3, p. 135.

German bank inquiry of 1908 : stenographic reports.

Rudolf Havenstein, chairman.

The lessons of German and French finance. A reply to the N.Y. Nation.

Mode of access: Internet.

The organisation of innovation: collaboration, cooperation and multifunctional groups in UK and German manufacturing

Marked differences exist between the institutional and social context for innovation in the UK and Germany. The question addressed here is how these different contexts affect the objectives and organisation of innovation in UK and German manufacturing. In particular, the paper examines the extent to which UK and German plants engage in inter-plant collaboration and cooperation and multifunctional working as part of their innovative activity, and explores the reasons for differences in these patterns of involvement. The investigation is based on a large-scale, comparative survey of manufacturing plants in the two countries. In Germany, institutional and social norms are found to encourage collaborative inter-plant innovation, but aspects of the German skills training and industrial relations systems make the adoption of more flexible internal systems more difficult. In the UK, by contrast, the more adversarial nature of inter-firm relations makes it more difficult to establish external collaborations based on mutual trust, but less restrictive labour market structures make it easier for UK plants to adopt multifunctional working. This is linked to differences in attitudes to the property rights and transaction cost problems inherent in innovation.

Solidarity and power in German : language as political action : a contribution to the socio-cultural history of the German language

Germany's latest attempt at unification raises again the question of German nationhood and nationality. The present study examines the links between the development of the German language and the political history of Germany, principally in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By examining the role of language in the establishment and exercise of political power and in the creation of national and group solidarity in Germany, the study both provides insights into the nature of language as political action and contributes to the socio-cultural history of the German language. The language-theoretical hypothesis on which the study is based sees language as a central factor in political action, and opposes the notion that language is a reflection of underlying political 'realities' which exist independently of language. Language is viewed as language-in-text which performs identifiable functions. Following Leech, five functions are distinguished, two of which (the regulative and the phatic) are regarded as central to political processes. The phatic function is tested against the role of the German language as a creator and symbol of national identity, with particular attention being paid to concepts of the 'purity' of the language. The regulative function (under which a persuasive function is also subsumed) is illustrated using the examples of German fascist discourse and selected cases from German history post-1945. In addition, the interactions are examined between language change and socio-economic change by postulating that language change is both a condition and consequence of socio-economic change, in that socio-economic change both requires and conditions changes in the communicative environment. Finally, three politocolinguistic case studies from the eight and ninth decades of the twentieth century are introduced in order to demonstrate specific ways in which language has been deployed in an attempt to create political realities, thus verifying the initial hypothesis of the centrality of language to the political process.

German-Irish corporate relationships:the cultural dimension

The thesis raises the question of whether or not in an age of internationalisation and globalisation, the cultural differences which exist between Germany and Ireland are still relevant to German-Irish corporate relationships or have internationally accepted best practices removed culture from the equation? The first three chapters establish the theoretical framework of the thesis by outlining the broadly culturalist/institutionalist approach, based on the work of Hofstede and Maurice et al, to be pursued, profiling the business cultures of both countries by analysing the components of their respective national institutional frameworks, and the examining existing approaches to the study of mother company-foreign subsidiary relationships. Chapters four to seven constitute the empirical section of the thesis. Using the interviews carried out with two sample groups (Sample Group A: 15 German mother companies and 14 of their Irish operations and Sample Group B: 7 Irish mother companies and 9 of their German operations), the mother companies in both groups are examined to see whether or not they demonstrate characteristics which are in keeping with their national business cultures. Their foreign operations are then analysed as is the mother company-foreign subsidiary relationship to determine whether or not any mother company influences are visible. The general approaches adopted by the two groups of mother companies to their foreign operations are compared and contrasted. Finally, differences in national attitudes and values are identified and their impact assessed. The analysis reveals that despite existing pressures towards convergence, the cultural differences between both countries are still relevant to the relationship particularly at the level of attitudes and values and although similarities in the mother company approaches to their subsidiaries are present, national specificities may nevertheless be detected.

Jiddisch - niederdeutsche Sprachbeziehungen in Ostfriesland:Low German language relations in East Frisia

Recently discovered sources indicate that the Jewish population of East Frisia in Northwest Germany used a variety based on Western Yiddish as an in-group vernacular well into the 20th century. The East Frisian Jewish variety shows contact-induced traces of Low German, mainly in the lexicon but also in a number of morphological structures. This study does not only analyzes the influence of Low German on the East Frisian Jewish variety but also asks the question, whether three hundred years of language contact have led to traces of the Jewish variety in east Frisian Low German.

Governance in foreign policy-making in Germany and Poland and Polish-German relations:the role of non-state actors

This thesis examines the influence of non-state actors on Polish-German relations by considering foreign policy-making towards Poland in Germany and vice versa. The approach chosen for this thesis is interdisciplinary and takes into consideration literature from domestic politics (Area Studies), Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations (IR). The thesis argues that IR, by purely looking into the quality of inter-state relations, too often treats these relations as a result of policies emanating from the relevant governments, without considering the policies’ background. Therefore, the thesis argues that it is necessary to engage with the domestic factors which might explain where foreign policies come from. It points out that non-state actors influence governments’ choices by supplying resources, and by cooperating or competing with the government on an issue at stake. In order to determine the degree of influence that non-state actors can have on foreign policymaking two variables are examined: the institutionalisation of the state relations in question; and the domestic structures of the relevant states. Specifically, the thesis examines the institutionalisation of Polish-German relations, and examines Germany’s and Poland’s domestic structures and their effect on the two states’ foreign policy-making in general. Thereafter, the thesis uses case studies in order to unravel the influence of non-state actors on specific foreign policies. Three case studies are examined in detail: (i) Poland’s EU accession negotiations with regard to the free movement of capital chapter of the acquis communautaire; (ii) Germany’s EU 2004 Eastern Enlargement negotiations with regard to the free movement of workers chapter of the acquis communautaire; and (iii) Germany’s decision to establsh a permanent exhibition in Berlin that will depict the expulsions of millions of Germans from the East following WWII.

A social role for churches and cultural demarcation:how German MEPs represent religion in the European Parliament

This study deals with the question of how German members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent the German model of religion–state relations at the European level. Based on a survey and interviews with German MEPs as well as a content-analysis of German MEPs’ speeches, motions and parliamentary questions during the seventh term of the European Parliament (EP), our study demonstrates that this model is represented in three dimensions. First, German MEPs reflect the close cooperation between the churches and the state in Germany, primarily on social issues, through largely church- and religion-friendly attitudes and relatively frequent contacts with religious interest-groups. Second, by referring to religious freedoms and minorities primarily outside the EU and by placing Islam in considerably more critical contexts than Christianity, German MEPs create a cultural demarcation line between Islam and Christianity through their parliamentary activities, which is similar to, though less politicised than, cultural boundaries often produced in public debates in Germany. Third, our study illustrates similar patterns of religious affiliation and subjective religiosity among German parliamentarians in both the EP and the national Parliament, which to some degree also reflect societal trends in Germany. Yet our data also suggest that European political elites are more religious than the average German population. If the presence of religion in terms of religious interest-groups and arguments is included, the EP appears to be more secularist than the German Parliament.

Kameralizmus, történelmi iskola, osztrák gazdaságtan. Három vázlat a német és osztrák közgazdasági diskurzus történetéből (Cameralism, the historical school and Austrian economics. Three outlines from the history of German and Austrian economic debate)

A kameralizmus a 16-18. századi német gyakorlati államtudomány és egyetemi tantárgy volt, amely összefoglalta a hivatalnokok képzéséhez szükséges elméleti és gyakorlati gazdasági ismereteket. Felfogása szerint az alattvalók jóléte és boldogsága feltétele az uralkodó gazdagságának, de az alattvalók önmaguktól nem képesek utat találni ehhez a boldogsághoz, szükség van az állandó külső irányításra. Igazgatásközpontúsága és egyetemi intézményesülése miatt nem tekinthető a merkantilizmus helyi változatának. Az 1840 és 1945 közötti német történeti iskola hagyományos ábrázolása több mint egy évszázadon át a német és a neoklasszikus tradíció szembenállását hangsúlyozta, kiemelve az organicizmus, a fejlődésgondolat és az egyediség jelentőségét, a szociális kérdés fontosságát, illetve a deduktív módszer és a gazdaság változatlan törvényeinek tagadását. A modern rekonstrukciók a történeti iskolát a posztklasszikus válságra adott egyik európai válaszként fogják fel, amely a történelemből levont, empirikusan megalapozott induktív alternatívát kínált. Az 1871-től kialakult osztrák iskola a neoklasszikus paradigmának egyszerre volt alkotórésze és versenytársa. A módszertani individualizmus, a szubjektivizmus, az idő fontossága, a tudás szerepe, az alternatív költségek elmélete stb. ugyan beépültek a mainstream közgazdaságtanba, de hangsúlyos kiemelésük lehetővé tette, hogy a társadalomelméleti magyarázat igényét őrző osztrák iskola megtartson valamit önálló beszédmódjából. / === / Cameralism was a practical political science and university subject in 16th–18th century Germany, summarizing the theoretical and practical economic knowledge required in the training of officials. The assumption was that the prosperity of the ruler depended on the welfare and happiness of the subjects, but the subjects themselves were not capable of achieving this happiness without permanent directions from above. Cameralism’s emphasis on administration and university institutionalization means that this approach cannot be seen as a local variant of mercantilism. The traditional account of the German historical school from 1840 to 1945 emphasized for over a century the contrast between the German and the Neoclassical traditions. It underlined the significance of the organic approach, the concept of development and individuality, the importance of the social question, and the denial of the deductive method and unalterable laws of the economy. Modern reconstructions see the historical school as one European response to the post-Classical crisis, offering an inductive alternative grounded empirically on history. The Austrian school formed in 1871 was at once a constituent of the Neoclassical paradigm and a rival to it. Methodological individualism, subjectivism, the importance of time, the role of knowledge, the theory of alternative costs etc. were absorbed into mainstream economics, but the focusing on these issues allowed the Austrian school, in keeping alive its demand for a social-theoretical explanation, to preserve something of an alternative discourse.