An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

Análise de desempenho de redes p2p com protocolo push/pull para distribuição de vídeo na presença de nós não-cooperativos.

O uso de Internet para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo tem se mostrado uma tendência atual e traz consigo grandes desafios. O alicerce sobre qual a Internet está fundamentada, comutação por pacotes e arquitetura cliente-servidor, não proporciona as melhores condições para este tipo de serviço. A arquitetura P2P (peer-to-peer) vem sendo considerada como infraestrutura para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo na Internet. A idéia básica da distribuição de vídeo com o suporte de P2P é a de que os vários nós integrantes da rede sobreposta distribuem e encaminham pedaços de vídeo de forma cooperativa, dividindo as tarefas, e colocando à disposição da rede seus recursos locais. Dentro deste contexto, é importante investigar o que ocorre com a qualidade do serviço de distribuição de vídeo quando a infraestrutura provida pelas redes P2P é contaminada por nós que não estejam dispostos a cooperar, já que a base desta arquitetura é a cooperação. Neste trabalho, inicialmente é feito um estudo para verificar o quanto a presença de nós não-cooperativos pode afetar a qualidade da aplicação de distribuição de fluxo de vídeo em uma rede P2P. Com base nos resultados obtidos, é proposto um mecanismo de incentivo à cooperação para que seja garantida uma boa qualidade de vídeo aos nós cooperativos e alguma punição aos nós não-cooperativos. Os testes e avaliações foram realizados utilizando-se o simulador PeerSim.

Addressing the cognitive and social influence inhibitors during the ideation stages of technology roadmapping workshops

Technology roadmapping workshops are essentially a social mechanism for exploring, creating, shaping and implementing ideas. The front-end of a roadmapping session is based on brainstorming in order to tap into the group's diverse knowledge. The aim of this idea stimulation activity is to capture and share as many perspectives as possible across the full scope of the area of interest. The premise to such group brainstorming is that the sharing and exchange of ideas leads to cognitive stimulation resulting in a greater overall group idea generation performance in terms of the number, variety and originality of ideas. However, it must be recognized that the ideation stage in a roadmapping workshop is a complex psychosocial phenomenon with underlying cognitive and social processes. Thus, there are downsides to group interactions and these must be addressed in order to fully benefit from the power of a roadmapping workshop. This paper will highlight and discuss the key cognitive and social inhibitors involved. These include: production blocking, evaluation apprehension, free riding/social loafing, low norm setting/matching. Facilitation actions and process adjustments to counter such negative factors will be identified so as to provide a psychosocial basis for improving the running of roadmapping workshops. © 2009 PICMET.

"Call for prices": Strategic implications of raising consumers' costs

Many consumer durable retailers often do not advertise their prices and instead ask consumers to call them for prices. It is easy to see that this practice increases the consumers' cost of learning the prices of products they are considering, yet firms commonly use such practices. Not advertising prices may reduce the firm's advertising costs, but the strategic effects of doing so are not clear. Our objective is to examine the strategic effects of this practice. In particular, how does making price discovery more difficult for consumers affect competing retailers' price, service decisions, and profits? We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells its product through a high-service retailer and a low-service retailer. Consumers can purchase the retail service at the high-end retailer and purchase the product at the competing low-end retailer. Therefore, the high-end retailer faces a free-riding problem. A retailer first chooses its optimal service levels. Then, it chooses its optimal price levels. Finally, a retailer decides whether to advertise its prices. The model results in four structures: (1) both retailers advertise prices, (2) only the low-service retailer advertises price, (3) only the high-service retailer advertises price, and (4) neither retailer advertises price. We find that when a retailer does not advertise its price and makes price discovery more difficult for consumers, the competition between the retailers is less intense. However, the retailer is forced to charge a lower price. In addition, if the competing retailer does advertise its prices, then the competing retailer enjoys higher profit margins. We identify conditions under which each of the above four structures is an equilibrium and show that a low-service retailer not advertising its price is a more likely outcome than a high-service retailer doing so. We then solve the manufacturer's problem and find that there are several instances when a retailer's advertising decisions are different from what the manufacturer would want. We describe the nature of this channel coordination problem and identify some solutions. © 2010 INFORMS.

Resolving questions about bias in real and hypothetical referenda

Despite 10 years of research on behavior in hypothetical referenda, conflict remains in the literature on whether or not the mechanism generates biased responses compared to real referenda, and the nature and source of any such bias. Almost all previous inquiry in respect of this issue has concentrated on bias at the aggregate level. This paper reports a series of three experiments which focuses on bias at the individual level and how this can translate to bias at the aggregate level. The authors argue that only an individual approach to hypothetical bias is consistent with the concept of incentive compatibility. The results of these experiments reflect these previous conflicting findings but go on to show that individual hypothetical bias is a robust result driven by the differing influence of pure self-interest and other-regarding preferences in real and hypothetical situations, rather than by a single behavioral theory such as free riding. In a hypothetical situation these preferences cause yea-saying and non-demand revealing voting. This suggests that investigation of individual respondents in other hypothetical one-shot binary choices may also provide us with insights into aggregate behavior in these situations.

Analyse en identification partielle de la décision d'émigrer des étudiants africains

La migration internationale d’étudiants est un investissement couteux pour les familles dans beaucoup de pays en voie de développement. Cependant, cet investissement est susceptible de générer des bénéfices financiers et sociaux relativement importants aux investisseurs, tout autant que des externalités pour d’autres membres de la famille. Cette thèse s’intéresse à deux aspects importants de la migration des étudiants internationaux : (i) Qui part? Quels sont les déterminants de la probabilité de migration? (ii) Qui paie? Comment la famille s’organise-t-elle pour couvrir les frais de la migration? (iii) Qui y gagne? Ce flux migratoire est-il au bénéfice du pays d’origine? Entreprendre une telle étude met le chercheur en face de défis importants, notamment, l’absence de données complètes et fiables; la dispersion géographique des étudiants migrants en étant la cause première. La première contribution importante de ce travail est le développement d’une méthode de sondage en « boule de neige » pour des populations difficiles à atteindre, ainsi que d’estimateurs corrigeant les possibles biais de sélection. A partir de cette méthodologie, j’ai collecté des données incluant simultanément des étudiants migrants et non-migrants du Cameroun en utilisant une plateforme internet. Un second défi relativement bien documenté est la présence d’endogénéité du choix d’éducation. Nous tirons avantage des récents développements théoriques dans le traitement des problèmes d’identification dans les modèles de choix discrets pour résoudre cette difficulté, tout en conservant la simplicité des hypothèses nécessaires. Ce travail constitue l’une des premières applications de cette méthodologie à des questions de développement. Le premier chapitre de la thèse étudie la décision prise par la famille d’investir dans la migration étudiante. Il propose un modèle structurel empirique de choix discret qui reflète à la fois le rendement brut de la migration et la contrainte budgétaire liée au problème de choix des agents. Nos résultats démontrent que le choix du niveau final d’éducation, les résultats académiques et l’aide de la famille sont des déterminants importants de la probabilité d’émigrer, au contraire du genre qui ne semble pas affecter très significativement la décision familiale. Le second chapitre s’efforce de comprendre comment les agents décident de leur participation à la décision de migration et comment la famille partage les profits et décourage le phénomène de « passagers clandestins ». D’autres résultats dans la littérature sur l’identification partielle nous permettent de considérer des comportements stratégiques au sein de l’unité familiale. Les premières estimations suggèrent que le modèle « unitaire », où un agent représentatif maximise l’utilité familiale ne convient qu’aux familles composées des parents et de l’enfant. Les aidants extérieurs subissent un cout strictement positif pour leur participation, ce qui décourage leur implication. Les obligations familiales et sociales semblent expliquer les cas de participation d’un aidant, mieux qu’un possible altruisme de ces derniers. Finalement, le troisième chapitre présente le cadre théorique plus général dans lequel s’imbriquent les modèles développés dans les précédents chapitres. Les méthodes d’identification et d’inférence présentées sont spécialisées aux jeux finis avec information complète. Avec mes co-auteurs, nous proposons notamment une procédure combinatoire pour une implémentation efficace du bootstrap aux fins d’inférences dans les modèles cités ci-dessus. Nous en faisons une application sur les déterminants du choix familial de soins à long terme pour des parents âgés.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

Should kids pay their own way?

Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised such that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this paper, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).

Obfuscation and Strict Online Anonymity

I consider the case for genuinely anonymous web searching. Big data seems to have it in for privacy. The story is well known, particularly since the dawn of the web. Vastly more personal information, monumental and quotidian, is gathered than in the pre-digital days. Once gathered it can be aggregated and analyzed to produce rich portraits, which in turn permit unnerving prediction of our future behavior. The new information can then be shared widely, limiting prospects and threatening autonomy. How should we respond? Following Nissenbaum (2011) and Brunton and Nissenbaum (2011 and 2013), I will argue that the proposed solutions—consent, anonymity as conventionally practiced, corporate best practices, and law—fail to protect us against routine surveillance of our online behavior. Brunton and Nissenbaum rightly maintain that, given the power imbalance between data holders and data subjects, obfuscation of one’s online activities is justified. Obfuscation works by generating “misleading, false, or ambiguous data with the intention of confusing an adversary or simply adding to the time or cost of separating good data from bad,” thus decreasing the value of the data collected (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011). The phenomenon is as old as the hills. Natural selection evidently blundered upon the tactic long ago. Take a savory butterfly whose markings mimic those of a toxic cousin. From the point of view of a would-be predator the data conveyed by the pattern is ambiguous. Is the bug lunch or potential last meal? In the light of the steep costs of a mistake, the savvy predator goes hungry. Online obfuscation works similarly, attempting for instance to disguise the surfer’s identity (Tor) or the nature of her queries (Howe and Nissenbaum 2009). Yet online obfuscation comes with significant social costs. First, it implies free riding. If I’ve installed an effective obfuscating program, I’m enjoying the benefits of an apparently free internet without paying the costs of surveillance, which are shifted entirely onto non-obfuscators. Second, it permits sketchy actors, from child pornographers to fraudsters, to operate with near impunity. Third, online merchants could plausibly claim that, when we shop online, surveillance is the price we pay for convenience. If we don’t like it, we should take our business to the local brick-and-mortar and pay with cash. Brunton and Nissenbaum have not fully addressed the last two costs. Nevertheless, I think the strict defender of online anonymity can meet these objections. Regarding the third, the future doesn’t bode well for offline shopping. Consider music and books. Intrepid shoppers can still find most of what they want in a book or record store. Soon, though, this will probably not be the case. And then there are those who, for perfectly good reasons, are sensitive about doing some of their shopping in person, perhaps because of their weight or sexual tastes. I argue that consumers should not have to pay the price of surveillance every time they want to buy that catchy new hit, that New York Times bestseller, or a sex toy.

Basic Needs, Property Rights and Degradation Of Commons

A major problem in many developing countries is the degradation of commons. This degradation has occurred on account of the lack of fulfilment of the basic needs of the poor, free riding and ill–defined property rights. As these goods are essential for the survival of these people, they have to access these items from commons. This results in regular raids to common land for resources and also to private houses (for example, in New Delhi) which are not guarded for water. A variant of the agricultural household model is used to analyse the above problem. Several propositions are established and it is demonstrated that degradation can occur at both a low and high price of basic needs. This result has important policy implications as it demonstrates that land or common degradation cannot be solved by just using the price system. Properly defined property rights and provision of basic goods in kind may resolve the problem of degradation of commons.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Spatial spillovers and political coordination in public health provision

We estimate the impact of the main unconditional federal grant (Fundo de Participaçãodos Municípios - FPM) to Brazilian municipalities as well as its spillover from the neighboring cities on local health outcomes. We consider data from 2002 to 2007 (Brollo et al, 2013) and explore the FPM distribution rule according to population brackets to apply a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) using cities near the thresholds. In elasticity terms, we nd a reduction on infant mortality rate (-0.18) and on morbidity rate (- 0.41), except in the largest cities of our sample. We also nd an increase on the access to the main program of visiting the vulnerable families, the Family Health Program (Programa Sa ude da Família - PSF). The e ects are stronger for the smallest cities of our sample and we nd increase: (i) On the percentage of residents enrolled in the program (0.36), (ii) On the per capita number of PSF visits (1.59), and (iii) On the per capita number of PSF visits with a doctor (1.8) and nurse (2). After we control for the FPM spillover using neighboring cities near diferent thresholds, our results show that the reduction in morbidity and mortality is largely due to the spillover e ect, but there are negative spillover on preventive actions, as PSF doctors visits and vaccination. Finally, the negative spillover e ect on health resources may be due free riding or political coordination problems, as in the case of the number of hospital beds, but also due to to competition for health professionals, as in the case of number of doctors (-0.35 and -0.87, respectively), specially general practitioners and surgeons (-1.84 and -2.45).

Does group size matter? Cheating and cooperation in Brazilian school children

Cooperation between individuals is an important requisite for the maintenance of social relationships. The purpose of this study was to investigate cooperation in children in the school environment, where individuals could cooperate or not with their classmates in a public goods game. We investigated which of the following variables influenced cooperation in children: sex, group size, and information on the number of sessions. Group size was the only factor to significantly affect cooperation, with small-group children cooperating significantly more than those in large groups. Both sex and information had no effect on cooperation. We suggest that these results reflect the fact that, in small groups, individuals were more efficient in controlling and retaliating theirs peers than in large groups. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.