A comparison of one- and two-compartment neighbourhoods in heuristic search with spatial forest management goals

Abstract

Small-scale non-industrial private forest ownership in the United States : rationale and implications for forest management

Abstract

Climate Change and the Cost of Carbon Sequestration: The Case of Forest Management

The Kyoto protocol allows Annex I countries to deduct carbon sequestered by land use, land-use change and forestry from their national carbon emissions. Thornley and Cannell (2000) demonstrated that the objectives of maximizing timber and carbon sequestration are not complementary. Based on this finding, this paper determines the optimal selective management regime taking into account the underlying biophysical and economic processes. The results show that the net benefits of carbon storage only compensate the decrease in net benefits of timber production once the carbon price has exceeded a certain threshold value. The sequestration costs are significantly lower than previous estimates

Transaction costs of farmers’ participation in forest management: Policy implications of payments for environmental services schemes in Vietnam

Recent research on payments for environmental services (PES) has observed that high transaction costs (TCs) are incurred through the implementation of PES schemes and farmer participation. TCs incurred by households are considered to be an obstacle to the participation in and efficiency of PES policies. This study aims to understand transactions related to previous forest plantation programmes and to estimate the actual TCs incurred by farmers who participated in these programmes in a mountainous area of northwestern Vietnam. In addition, this study examines determinants of households’ TCs to test the hypothesis of whether the amount of TCs varies according to household characteristics. Results show that average TCs are not likely to be a constraint for participation since they are about 200,000 VND (USD 10) per household per contract, which is equivalent to one person’s average earnings for about two days of labour. However, TCs amount to more than one-third of the programmes’ benefits, which is relatively high compared to PES programmes in developed countries. This implies that rather than aiming to reduce TCs, an appropriate agenda for policy improvement is to balance the level of TCs with PES programme benefits to enhance the overall attractiveness of afforestation programmes for smallholder farmers. Regression analysis reveals that education, gender and perception towards PES programmes have significant effects on the magnitude of TCs. The analyses also points out the importance of local conditions on the level of TCs, with some unexpected results.

Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania

Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection.

The implications of improved communications for participatory forest management in Tanzania

Following the 1998 National Forest Policy and Forest Act of 2002, participatory forest management (PFM) is being introduced in Tanzania. PFM has two key objectives: to reduce forest degradation thereby increasing ecosystem services, and to improve the livelihoods of local villagers. A unique data set collected in 2006 suggests that significant challenges remain with respect to communicating the new forest policies if the objectives of PFM are to be achieved. First, villagers as a group are much less well informed than other stakeholders, and their knowledge is often inaccurate. Second, women are less likely than men to have heard of the changes. Third, how PFM will contribute to poverty reduction (a key objective of PFM) is not always clear. Fourth, environmental degradation may not be reduced as much as anticipated – without alternatives sources, villagers often continue to cut trees for charcoal and firewood in the protected forests. Finally, several mismatches in perceptions are identified that could lead to difficulties in implementing PFM.

Implementing REDD through community-based forest management: lessons from Tanzania

REDD (reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation) aims to slow carbon releases caused by forest disturbance by making payments conditional on forest quality over time. Like earlier policies to slow deforestation, REDD must change the behaviour of forest degrading actors. Broadly, it can be implemented with payments to forest users in exchange for improved forest management, thus creating incentives; through payments for enforcement, thus creating disincentives; or through addressing external drivers such as urban charcoal demand. In Tanzania, community-based forest management (CBFM), a form of participatory forest management, was chosen by the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group, a local NGO, as a model for implementing REDD pilot programmes. Payments are made to villages that have the rights to forest carbon. In exchange, the villages must demonstrably reduce deforestation at the village level. In this paper, using this pilot programme as a case study, combined with a review of the literature, we provide insights for REDD implementation in sub-Saharan Africa. We pay particular attention to leakage, monitoring and enforcement. We suggest that implementing REDD through CBFM-type structures can create appropriate incentives and behaviour change when the recipients of the REDD funds are also the key drivers of forest change. When external forces drive forest change, however, REDD through CBFM-type structures becomes an enforcement programme with local communities rather than government agencies being responsible for the enforcement. That structure imposes costs on local communities, whose local authority limits the ability to address leakage outside the particular REDD village.

Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: an example from Tanzania

In low-income countries, both nearby local villagers, “insiders”, and non-locals, “outsiders”, extract products from protected forests even though their actions are illegal. Forest managers typically combine enforcement and livelihood projects offered to nearby communities to reduce this illegal activity, but with limited budgets cannot deter all extraction. We develop a game theoretic model of a forest manager's decision interacting with the extraction decisions of insiders and outsiders. Our analysis suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may reduce total forest degradation by legalizing “insider” extraction in return for local villagers' involvement in enforcement activities against outsiders.