Financial crises and periods of industrial and commercial depression,

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Mortality and financial crises

Drawing on a dataset covering more than 100 countries from 1970 to 2007, we estimate the impact of different types of financial crises on male and female mortality. We find that only currency crises have a direct short-term impact on mortality rates. We stylize our reading of the key empirical evidence of this paper in the following way: of three distinct types of financial crises, it is currency crises that have a direct short-term impact on mortality rates, and this is particularly the case for males.

Modelling stock volatilities during financial crises:a time varying coefficient approach

We examine how the most prevalent stochastic properties of key financial time series have been affected during the recent financial crises. In particular we focus on changes associated with the remarkable economic events of the last two decades in the volatility dynamics, including the underlying volatility persistence and volatility spillover structure. Using daily data from several key stock market indices, the results of our bivariate GARCH models show the existence of time varying correlations as well as time varying shock and volatility spillovers between the returns of FTSE and DAX, and those of NIKKEI and Hang Seng, which became more prominent during the recent financial crisis. Our theoretical considerations on the time varying model which provides the platform upon which we integrate our multifaceted empirical approaches are also of independent interest. In particular, we provide the general solution for time varying asymmetric GARCH specifications, which is a long standing research topic. This enables us to characterize these models by deriving, first, their multistep ahead predictors, second, the first two time varying unconditional moments, and third, their covariance structure.

Szisztematikus optimizmus a válság idején = Overoptimism during the financial crises

Számos publikáció bizonyította, hogy az elemzők a tőzsdei vállalatokra készült egy részvényre jutó nyereség- (EPS-earnings per share) előrejelzéseikben szisztematikusabban kedvezőbb tervértéket adnak meg, mint a tényérték. A cikkben az EPS-előrejelzéseket vizsgálta meg a szerző a válság első másfél évében, melyek ezen időszakban is optimistának bizonyultak a vizsgált adatbázison. Az elmúlt húsz évben számos magyarázat látott napvilágot a pénzügyi előrejelzésekben tapasztalható „túltervezésre”. A viselkedéstani magyarázatok jelentős része az elemzők túlzott önbizalmát, jövőbe vetett túlzott optimizmusát jelölték meg okként. Jelen cikk – az empirikus kutatáson túl – nagy hangsúlyt fektet a két fogalom részletes bemutatására, mivel a válság éveit is optimista EPS-előrejelzések jellemezték. _____ There are numerous evidences from the 1980s that analysts give systematically more favorable forecasts for the earnings per share of listed companies than the fact, i.e. they are generally optimistic. In the current article the author investigated the EPS forecasting error in the first two and a half years of the crisis (2008-2010), which was also proved to be an era of the optimistic forecasting error. During the last 20 years reasons of so called “overplanning” have been explained in several ways. Many of these cognitive thinking patterns explanations relied on the phenomenon of overconfidence, and overoptimism without giving detailed description of these concepts. Beside the empirical part of the research current article puts more emphasis on the analysis of these theoretical concepts.

Essays on financial crises

This dissertation analyzes recent financial crises in developed and developing countries. The research emphasizes the effects of institutional factors on the international banking and currency crises and their output losses. ^ Chapter two examines the roles of regulation, supervision, and countries' institutional environment in determining the probability of banking crises for a panel of fifteen developed countries from 1975 to 1998. The results from a multivariate logit model indicated that countries with greater government involvement, less capital standard requirements, and lower lending limits on a single borrower are associated with a higher probability of banking crises. ^ Chapter three studies whether output loss in banking crisis differs in market-based or bank-based financial systems. Using existing banking crisis data for sixty-nine countries during 1970–1999, we investigate whether the underlying financial system affects the output loss. The results show that output losses are more serious in market-based economies than those in bank-based economies. Longer crisis duration tends to increase the output losses in banking crises. Finally, countries with deposit insurance and strict law enforcement have less output losses. ^ Chapter four uses macroeconomic and institutional measures to explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and the decline in stock prices for emerging countries affected by the Mexican currency crisis of 1994–95. The results show that countries with more government budget deficits, and worse reserve adequacies tend to experience large exchange rate depreciation. The institutional measures do not explain much the extent of both the exchange rate depreciation and the decline in stock prices. ^

How to manage macroeconomic policies to foster growth and employment and prevent financial and external crises

My presentation focuses on the implementation of a macroeconomic policy regime which, I believe, is capable of simultaneously attaining several targets, including the promotion of growth and employment and the prevention of external and financial crises.

Modelling Interbank Relations during the International Financial Crisis

This paper examines the effects of the current financial crisis on the correlations of four international banking stocks. We find that in the beginning of the crisis banks generally show a transition to a higher correlation followed by a dramatic decline towards the end of 2008. These findings are consistent with both traditional contagion theory and the more recent network theory of contagion. JEL classifications: C51; G15 Keywords: Financial Crises; Contagion; Interbank Markets.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Systemic crises and growth

In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have on average grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where weak institutions lead to severe financial constraints and low growth. Financial liberalization policies that facilitaterisk-taking increase leverage and investment. This leads to higher growth, but also toa greater incidence of crises. Conditions are established under which the costs of crises are outweighed by the benefits of higher growth.

Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents,dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show thatgross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. Whenforeigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flowsare also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners invest more domestically and domesticagents invest more abroad. During crises, total gross flows collapse and there is a retrenchmentin both inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents. These patterns hold for differenttypes of capital flows and crises. This evidence sheds light on the sources of fluctuations drivingcapital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent withcrises affecting domestic and foreign agents asymmetrically, as would be the case under thepresence of sovereign risk or asymmetric information.

Sovereigns and banks in the euro area : a tale of two crises

This study attempts to identify and trace inter-linkages between sovereign and banking risk in the euro area. To this end, we use an indicator of banking risk in each country based on the Contingent Claim Analysis literature, and 10-year government yield spreads over Germany as a measure of sovereign risk. We apply a dynamic approach to testing for Granger causality between the two measures of risk in 10 euro area countries, allowing us to check for contagion in the form of a significant and abrupt increase in short-run causal linkages. The empirical results indicate that episodes of contagion vary considerably in both directions over time and within the different EMU countries. Significantly, we find that causal linkages tend to strengthen particularly at the time of major financial crises. The empirical evidence suggests the presence of contagion, mainly from banks to sovereigns.

Animal Spirits in Financial Markets: Agent-Based Model

In this work an agent based model (ABM) was proposed using the main idea from the Jabłonska-Capasso-Morale (JCM) model and maximized greediness concept. Using a multi-agents simulator, the power of the ABM was assessed by using the historical prices of silver metal dating from the 01.03.2000 to 01.03.2013. The model results, analysed in two different situations, with and without maximized greediness, have proven that the ABM is capable of explaining the silver price dynamics even in utmost events. The ABM without maximal greediness explained the prices with more irrationalities whereas the ABM with maximal greediness tracked the price movements with more rational decisions. In the comparison test, the model without maximal greediness stood as the best to capture the silver market dynamics. Therefore, the proposed ABM confirms the suggested reasons for financial crises or markets failure. It reveals that an economic or financial collapse may be stimulated by irrational and rational decisions, yet irrationalities may dominate the market.

Crises financeiras e modelos de contágio

O objetivo desta pesquisa é discutir os chamados modelos de “contágio mimético” como uma explicação das crises financeiras e mostrar que tais situações não nascem necessariamente de comportamentos irracionais dos agentes econômicos.

Crises financeira nos anos 1990 e poupança externa

Ao contrário do que afirma a análise econômica convencional, a causa das crises financeiras dos anos 1990 no México, Ásia, Brasil e Argentina não foi principalmente fiscal, mas sim a decisão dos governos de crescerem com poupança externa, isto é, com déficits em conta corrente. Essas foram crises de balanço de pagamento geradas pela sobreapreciação da moeda local e pelo alto nível de dívida externa e/ou rápido crescimento de déficit de conta corrente. Assim, repentinamente os credores externos se convenceram de que o país não enfrenta apenas um problema de liquidez, mas de solvência, e para de rolar a dívida. Um teste econométrico demonstra essas afirmações