On compliance of business processes with business contracts

This paper addresses the problem of ensuring compliance of business processes, implemented within and across organisational boundaries, with the constraints stated in related business contracts. In order to deal with the complexity of this problem we propose two solutions that allow for a systematic and increasingly automated support for addressing two specific compliance issues. One solution provides a set of guidelines for progressively transforming contract conditions into business processes that are consistent with contract conditions thus avoiding violation of the rules in contract. Another solution compares rules in business contracts and rules in business processes to check for possible inconsistencies. Both approaches rely on a computer interpretable representation of contract conditions that embodies contract semantics. This semantics is described in terms of a logic based formalism allowing for the description of obligations, prohibitions, permissions and violations conditions in contracts. This semantics was based on an analysis of typical building blocks of many commercial, financial and government contracts. The study proved that our contract formalism provides a good foundation for describing key types of conditions in contracts, and has also given several insights into valuable transformation techniques and formalisms needed to establish better alignment between these two, traditionally separate areas of research and endeavour. The study also revealed a number of new areas of research, some of which we intend to address in near future.

Auction of financial transmission rights in electricity market environment

An auction model is used to increase the individual profits for market players with products they do not use. A Financial Transmission Rights Auction has the goal of trade transmission rights between Bidders and helps them raise their own profits. The ISO plays a major rule on keep the system in technical limits without interfere on the auctions offers. In some auction models the ISO decide want bids are implemented on the network, always with the objective maximize the individual profits for all bidders in the auction. This paper proposes a methodology for a Financial Transmission Rights Auction and an informatics application. The application receives offers from the purchase and sale side and considers bilateral contracts as Base Case. This goal is maximize the individual profits within the system in their technical limits. The paper includes a case study for the 30 bus IEEE test case.

The role of implicit contracts: Building public works in the 1840s in Portugal

Business History, Vol 50 No 2, p147-162

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard in financial intermediation. We use the database we have built containing the contracts signed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD between 1991 and 2003. Our framework is a standard setting of repeated moral hazard. After having controlled for the adverse selection component, we are able to prove that client reputation is the discrimination device according to which the bank fixes the amount of credit for the established clients. Our results unambiguously isolate the effect of memory in the bank's lending decisions.

Choice of Contracts in the British National Health Service: An Empirical Study

Following major reforms of the British National Health Service (NHS) in 1990, the roles of purchasing and providing health services were separated, with the relationship between purchasers and providers governed by contracts. Using a mixed multinomial logit analysis, we show how this policy shift led to a selection of contracts that is consistent with the predictions of a simple model, based on contract theory, in which the characteristics of the health services being purchased and of the contracting parties influence the choice of contract form. The paper thus provides evidence in support of the practical relevance of theory in understanding health care market reform.

Transmission of macro-liquidity shocks to liquidity-sorted stock portfolios’ returns: The role of the financial crisis

This study examines the impact of macro-liquidity shocks on the returns of UK stock portfolios sorted on the basis of a series of micro-liquidity measures. The macro-liquidity shocks are extracted on the meeting days of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee relative to market expectations embedded in futures contracts on the 3-month LIBOR during the period June 1999- December 2009. We report definitive evidence that these shocks are transmitted to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, with most liquid stocks playing a very active role. Our results emphatically document that the shocks-returns relationship has reversed its sign during the recent financial crisis; the standard inverse relationship between interest rate surprises and portfolios’ returns before the crisis has turned into positive during the crisis. This finding confirms the inability of interest rate cuts to boost returns in the shortrun during the crisis, because these were perceived by market participants as a signal of a deteriorating economic outlook.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory as a screening device in repeated contracts with asymmetric information in financial intermediation. We use an original dataset from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We propose a simple empirical method to capture the role of memory using the client's reputation. Our results unambiguously isolate the dominant effect of memory on the bank's lending decisions over market factors in the case of established clients.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Identification and Management of Operational Risks in IT Organization of Financial Service Provider

Työn tavoitteena on tunnistaa toiminnallisia riskitekijöitä rahoituspalveluita tarjoavan yrityksen IT-organisaatiossa sekä löytää arkipäiväisiä keinoja hallita näitä riskejä. Työssä riskejä on myös tarkasteltu mahdollisen ulkoistuksen yhteydessä. Fuusiot ovat yleisiä rahoitusalan yrityksissä. Yhteenliittymien tuloksena yritysten IT-arkkitehtuuri voi olla monimutkainen ja kulttuurierot yrityksessä suuria. Synergia- ja mittakaavaetuja saadakseen yritys keskittää toimintojaan ja IT-ratkaisujaan. Riskien tunnistaminen on riskienhallintaprosessin tärkein vaihe. Tässä tutkimuksessa riskit ja riskitekijät tunnistettiin itsearvioinnin avulla kysymyssarjoja hyväksikäyttäen. Monet riskitekijät liittyivät sisäisen valvonnan ja seurannan puutteisiin. Myöhemmin näille riskeille pohdittiin työryhmässä käytännönläheisiä hallintakeinoja. Yritys voi siirtää tai jakaa IT -riskejä ulkoistamalla. Ulkoistaminen voi kuitenkin tuoda mukaan myös uusia riskitekijöitä. Ennen ulkoistamispäätöstä yrityksen sisäisten prosessien ja organisaation on oltava järjestyksessä, jotta sopimuksen kannattavuutta voidaan verrata luotettavasti saman palvelun tuottamiseen sisäisesti.

Quantil Hedging for telegraph markets and its applications to a pricing of equity-linked life insurance contracts

En este documento está desarrollado un modelo de mercado financiero basado en movimientos aleatorios con tiempo continuo, con velocidades constantes alternantes y saltos cuando hay cambios en la velocidad. Si los saltos en la dirección tienen correspondencia con la dirección de la velocidad del comportamiento aleatorio subyacente, con respecto a la tasa de interés, el modelo no presenta arbitraje y es completo. Se construye en detalle las estrategias replicables para opciones, y se obtiene una presentación cerrada para el precio de las opciones. Las estrategias de cubrimiento quantile para opciones son construidas. Esta metodología es aplicada al control de riesgo y fijación de precios de instrumentos de seguros.

Financial protection in the UK building industry: bonds, retentions and guarantees

Financial Protection in the UK Building Industry provides comprehensive treatment of a complex aspect of construction management which is increasingly important in modern construction contracts. The term 'Financial Protection' refers to refers to the various mechanisms by which funds are made available to ensure the due performance of a partys contractual obligations. This book is based on material written for a research project funded by the Reading Construction Forum. Financial Protection in the UK Building Industry looks at the legal and economic background to the problem of providing financial protection to clients to guard against poor performance and or the insolvency of contractors, consultants and sub-contractors. The inclusion of practical guidance notes and summaries makes this a valuable guide for the construction professional as well as for the researcher. * provides in-depth analysis of financial protection measures * explores the ways in which financial protection can increase efficiency in the industry * financial protection in construction is beset with problems - this book points toward practical solutions

Better cross hedges with composite hedging? Hedging equity portfolios using financial and commodity futures

Unless a direct hedge is available, cross hedging must be used. In such circumstances portfolio theory implies that a composite hedge (the use of two or more hedging instruments to hedge a single spot position) will be beneficial. The study and use of composite hedging has been neglected; possibly because it requires the estimation of two or more hedge ratios. This paper demonstrates a statistically significant increase in out-of-sample effectiveness from the composite hedging of the Amex Oil Index using S&P500 and New York Mercantile Exchange crude oil futures. This conclusion is robust to the technique used to estimate the hedge ratios, and to allowance for transactions costs, dividends and the maturity of the futures contracts.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.