Money trust investigation. : Investigation of financial and monetary conditions in the United States under House resolutions nos. 429 and 504, before a subcommittee of the Committee on banking and currency. (In three volumes).

Arsene P. Pujo, chairman.

Money trust investigation. Investigation of financial and monetary conditions in the United States under House resolutions nos. 429 and 504, before a subcommittee of the Committee on banking and currency. (In four volumes) ....

The hearings, paged continuously, as in this issue, were published also in current numbers. The "Report of the committee appointed pursuant to House resolutions 429 and 504 to investigate the concentration of control of money and credit", together with "Views of the minority" by Everis A. Hayes, Frank E. Guernsey and William H. Heald, and "Views of Mr. McMorran", was published as House rept. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d sess. The "Report" without minority views, and the "Minority report of Henry McMorran" were also published separately without document series notes.

Improving retail banking staff incentive systems

This Work Project seeks to analyze the viability, utility and best way of implementing mechanisms of double accounting and of insertion of low (or null) sales objectives in an incentives program. The main findings are that both processes are possible and to a certain extent advisable, although in very specific ways and with some limitations. Double accounting processes are especially effective between different segments and networks and should have a greater impact in the first evaluation periods of each case and the null objectives, albeit usable, are recommended to be always substituted by positive objectives, even if quite small. Moreover, it is concluded that the formal structure of the incentives program influences significantly these concepts, namely concerning the duration of the evaluation periods and the interaction of the objectives of different entities for both the vertical (hierarchic) and horizontal (individual and collective) levels.

Monetary policy and banking supervision: coordination instead of separation. CEPS Policy Brief No. 286, 12 December 2012

Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.

Essays on monetary and banking theory

Esta tese de Doutorado é dedicada ao estudo de instabilidade financeira e dinâmica em Teoria Monet ária. E demonstrado que corridas banc árias são eliminadas sem custos no modelo padrão de teoria banc ária quando a popula ção não é pequena. É proposta uma extensão em que incerteza agregada é mais severa e o custo da estabilidade financeira é relevante. Finalmente, estabelece-se otimalidade de transições na distribui ção de moeda em economias em que oportunidades de trocas são escassas e heterogêneas. Em particular, otimalidade da inflação depende dos incentivos dinâmicos proporcionados por tais transi ções. O capí tulo 1 estabelece o resultado de estabilidade sem custos para economias grandes ao estudar os efeitos do tamanho populacional na an álise de corridas banc árias de Peck & Shell. No capí tulo 2, otimalidade de dinâmica é estudada no modelo de monet ário de Kiyotaki & Wright quando a sociedade é capaz de implementar uma polí tica inflacion ária. Apesar de adotar a abordagem de desenho de mecanismos, este capí tulo faz um paralelo com a an álise de Sargent & Wallace (1981) ao destacar efeitos de incentivos dinâmicos sobre a interação entre as polí ticas monet ária e fiscal. O cap ítulo 3 retoma o tema de estabilidade fi nanceira ao quanti car os custos envolvidos no desenho ótimo de um setor bancário à prova de corridas e ao propor uma estrutura informacional alternativa que possibilita bancos insolventes. A primeira an álise mostra que o esquema de estabilidade ótima exibe altas taxas de juros de longo prazo e a segunda que monitoramento imperfeito pode levar a corridas bancárias com insolvência.

Nazi war finance and banking

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